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PREFACE

In this work,

I

am concerned primarily with what we might
meta-

phorically speak of as the temporal shape of
persons.
topic of the thesis is personal

Although the

identity , there is no attempt here to

define "identity," or to analyze the associated
concept.

claim that personal

identity is

a

There is no

special type of identity.

Rather, my

concern is to give conditions under which persons existing
at different
times are identical.

Of course, any philosopher can generate dozens of

principles providing necessary and sufficient conditions for identity
between persons in

matter of moments.

a

I

am not interested, then,

merely in producing some, any , principle which provides such conditions.

I

am concerned, rather, with principles indicating--again,

speak metaphorically

— the

I

temporal shape entities must have if they

are, properly, to be considered persons.

Thus, this thesis is an

examination, not of the concept of identity, but rather of the concept
of a person.

I

nowhere fully analyze that concept, however; at most

I

offer some clarification of it.
My project, more specifically,

criterion of personal

is that of examining the memory

identity proposed by John Locke in his Essay Con -

cerning Human Understanding .

This principle, or more generally psycho-

logical continuity principles, seems to hold the most promise for

v

satisfying

a

variety of diverse intuitions concerning
conditions under

which persons who look nothing alike,
who perhaps do not even think in
the same way, are to be pronounced
the same .

I

examine the traditional

charges of circularity brought against
Locke's approach, as well as
Reid

brave soldier" objection.

s

This work is done in Chapter II.

Countless other objections, with the following exception,
are left
untouched.

The exception involves the "brain-splitting" case intro-

duced by David Wiggins (1967).

In what follows,

misleadingly to this case as the "fission" case.
V

refer somewhat

I

Chapters III, IV, and

are devoted to a discussion of this case as counterexample
to Lockean

criteria as well as to
world

a

certain more general difficulty, the "three-

puzzle introduced in Chapter III.

based on

a

The three-world puzzle is

case sketched by Derek Parfit (1971).

I

eventually conclude

in favor of Lockean criteria.

am very grateful to Fred Feldman for his extensive criticisms

I

of earlier drafts of this work and for his many positive suggestions as

well.

I

am also indebted to Michael Jubien, Gareth Matthews, and Alan

McMichael for their helpful comments.
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Directed by:

Professor Fred Feldman

Two closely related issues are addressed in this
thesis.

The

first of these issues is whether Lockean criteria
can withstand criti-

cisms based on cases such as Wiggins' brain bisection
case.
lem here is that the memory relation, or in
general

psychological continuity, seems to be
suitable as

a

a

The prob-

any relation of

many-one relation and hence not

criterion of identity for persons.

The second issue

involves the question of what we ought to say about such cases.

The

problem here is that, intuitively, psychological continuity seems to be
a

very good criterion of personal

logically continuous with

a

identity.

When one person is psycho-

future person, we want to say that the one

person has survived--as that future person.
Several

these issues.

contemporary philosophers have addressed themselves to
In

Chapter

I

of the thesis,

identity suggested by Baruch Brody.

I

consider the theory of

He rejects Lockean criteria, and

instead uses his own perfectly
general theory as
ty.

I

a

criterion of identi-

argue that the theory he suggests is
of limited value, and that

the arguments he provides against
Lockean criteria are question-begging.
In

I

Chapter II,

I

develop

a

specific Lockean criterion; in Chapter
III,

consider and finally reject particular
arguments against this criter-

ion which are based on the brain
bisection cases.

consider work by
In

Chapter IV,

I

In this chapter,

I

David Wiggins, Bernard Williams, and Roland
Puccetti
turn to the defense of Lockean criteria
suggested by

John Perry and David Lewis.

Finally, in Chapter V,

I

develop my own

views on the brain bisection case, and concluding
that Lockean criteria
of a certain sort remain defensible.

vi
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CHAPTER

I

PERSONAL SURVIVAL, IDENTITY, AND LEIBNIZ'S
LAW
My primary aim in this Chapter
is to determine the limitations of

Leibniz

s

Law as

a

principle, or criterion, of identity for
persons.

I

conclude that, given that one's goal is to
settle issues of personal
survival by settling issues of personal

identity, it is entirely un-

clear whether Leibniz's Law will be of any help
whatsoever.

This fact

motivates the investigation, initiated in Chapter II, of other
means of
settling issues of personal

identity.

The Problem

I

noted earlier that any number of principles providing necessary

and sufficient conditions for identity between persons are available.

Some of these principles will be adequate for one purpose, some for

another.

For this reason, my first task will be to indicate for what

purpose we seek

a

principle of identity here.

As already noted, a principle of identity which will count as ade-

quate for our purposes will be one which helps to indicate the "temporal

shape" persons have.

will be helpful.

I

should explain this metaphor.

An example

Smith, let us suppose, is very ill but nonetheless

very much alive at time tl.

At time t2, what is apparently Smith is

1

unconscious.

At time t3, the individual
physicians and nurses and

family members call

"Smith" is

a

"Smith" is in an irreversible
coma.

ventilated corpse.

At t4, their

At t5, "Smith" is declared dead and

his bod£ is wheeled out of the
emergency room.

To indicate the tempo-

shape of Smith is. in part, to
point out the precise time at which

ral

the person Smith ceased to exist.
Was it when he slipped into

a

Was it when he became unconscious?

coma?

These are difficult questions.

The issues raised here are, clearly,
those of personal survival

.

Other examples of questions involving
personal survival are the follow
ing.

If something is a person, does

Puberty?

Turning thirty?

it

survive the loss of

A "body transplant"?

a

hand?

Complete and irrevoca

ble loss of all memories?

Concern with issues of personal survival may be motivated
by
number of diverse interests.
hypothetical

situation.

Smith requires

a

Consider, for instance, the following

Smith's surgeon decides that the unconscious

certain purportedly life-saving operation.

surgeon performs the surgery, and within
him

a

Let us assume that

a

The

few hours the fellow— call

Smith*— whom the surgeon regards himself

conscious.

a

as having saved becomes

correct account of personal survival

yields that in fact Smith did not survive surgery; Smith* is, thus,
new person.
Smith*.

a

The surgeon has not saved Smith, but has rather produced

It seems to me that in this hypothetical

surgeon was not obligated to operate:

situation Smith's

while physicians are perhaps

prima facie obligated to save lives, they are not obligated to create
them.

Indeed, it may plausibly be argued that, given certain natural

exceptions, they are obligated to refrain from creating new lives.^

3

Concern with issues of personal
terest in certain practical

issues.

survival
It

stems not just from in-

is not unreasonable to think

that the issue of what persons essentially
are may be approached by ex-

amining conditions under which persons
survived

learning that puberty, or
stroy

a

Specifically, in

brain transplant, alters but does not de-

person, one learns something about what persons
are.

a

For these reasons, then, as well

survival arise.

as others,

issues of personal

A principle of identity which will

be considered

ade-

quate for our purposes will be one which enables us to
answer such

questions of personal survival.
sonal

survival

person

x

and personal

It

is evident that the notions of per-

identity are closely linked.

and event e, x survives e if and only if there is

such that y exists just after e occurs and

x

is identical

For any
a

person y

to y.

Thus,

we may say that a principle of identity between persons which shall

count as adequate for our purposes will be one which generates answers
to questions of identity in those situations or contexts in which

questions of survival arise.

Reconsider the case of Smith and Smith*.

We wonder whether Smith survives surgery.

Smith*.

Thus, we ask whether Smith=

An adequate principle of identity yields that Smith is

identical neither to Smith* nor to anyone else existing just after the

time of surgery.

We then appeal to the fundamental and evidently true

principle, introduced above, which links the notion of survival and
identity.

We infer, finally, that Smith does not survive surgery.

Of course, there are contexts and there are contexts; and no

principle of identity can be expected to generate results
text in which questions of survival arise.

in

every con-

In the following discus-

4

sion,

put practical

I

thetical

limitations aside.

Thus, for instance, the hypo-

subjects raising questions about survival and
identity in what

follows are assumed to have powers of
observation and concentration
limited in no particular way.
in mind,

in

In

general, it will

what follows, the issues of survival we seek
to settle by,

first, settling issues of identity.

person, does it survive the loss of
A 'body transplant"?

These include:
a

hand?

if,

something is

a

Turning thirty?

Complete and irrevocable loss of all memories?
x

for any time t and property F, x has

if y has F at t.

If

Puberty?

Leibniz's Law is the principle that persons
if and only

be important to keep

It may seem that Leibniz's Law,

and y are identical
F

at t if and only

together with the

straightforward principle linking survival and identity introduced
above, may enable us to answer perplexing questions of personal

survival.

At the very least, the proposal

Ultimately, it will be rejected.
I

will

is worth considering.

The difficulty with Leibniz's Law, as

argue in the following sections, is that it is not clear that,

in any of the contexts of interest here, one can come to any sort of

rational conclusion to the effect that objects have all their proper-

ties in common
not share
in a

— or

— unless

even that there is

a

single property that they do

one al ready has managed to settle, or one is

position to settle, those very identities

exceptions to this generalization.

in

question.

al

ready

There are

But the clearer exceptions involve

contexts which are not of interest here.

The exceptions thus do not

refute the principal thesis of this chapter, which is just that if our
goal

is to settle issues of personal

survival, then we shall need

criteria of identity beyond Leibniz's Law.

5

Exceptions arise, for instance,

in

cases in which the objects

being compared are of different
sorts or kinds.

Thus, Leibniz's Law

may enable one to infer that the
pen with which Ronald Regan
signs his
name, for instance, is not
identical with Ronald Reagan.

interesting questions of identity
arise, however,

in

those cases in

which the objects under inspection
are of the same kind.

concerned only with cases of this
sort here.
any case in which the subject is
told by
a

The more

I

will be

Other exceptions arise

in

reliable source that objects

a

and b share all their properties;
the subject, then, may infer by

appeal to Leibniz's Law that a=b.
will

This exception, and others as well,

be examined in subsequent sections
of this chapter.

Limitations of Leibniz's Law

David Wiggins writes, In Sameness and Substance

,

that

... it is impossible even i n theory to conceive of a way
independent of the prior discovery that a=b by which to
establish that, for all 0, no matter what
0 property 0 is,

0a

0b.

Wiggins in this passage refers to
(LL).

In particular,

a

certain limitation of Leibniz's Law

he is interested in

a

principle entailed by

(LL), the Principle of the Identity of Indi scerni bles (Id).

the principle that x=y, if for any property

F

This is

and time t, x has

F

if and only if y has F at t.

Wiggins elucidates his objection to (Id) as follows.
.
.
.
suppose one should leave the identity [between a and b]
open and renounce all elucidations of identity other than
a and b's complete community of properties.
How would one
then think about the temporary properties enjoyed by an individual a identified with respect to the past and the temporary
properties [that is, properties a thing may have for a while

at t

6

and then lose] enjoyed by individual b identified
with respect
to the present?
His objection has nothing to do with the difficulty
of ascertaining,
for instance, that b possesses each of the
infinite number of properties possesseo

—

is

a

b.

Nor dn^s he, presupposing that being identical to

a

property, argue that (Id) is circular.

subtle than either of these.

His objection is more

Consider an example.

Suppose that at tl

there is before someone Jones an apple; later, at t2, it is also
the
case that there is before Jones an apple.

Jones calls the apple he

first observes "a" and the apple he later observes "b".
one may imagine, first,

then, "The apple

I

"The apple

am pointing to now is a," and

I

point to now is b.")

the ability to recognize apples.

(He utters,

Jones is thus presumed to have

Suppose as well that Jones has extra-

ordinary powers of observation and, furthermore, that he inspects the
situation continuously from tl to t2.
that

a

Will

(Id)

same?

is green at tl,

Among other things, he notices

and that b is red at t2.

Unknown to Jones, a=b.

help him to answer the question of whether

a

and b are the

Before (Id) is of any use to him, clearly he will need to know

that the antecedent of the appropriately instantiated (Id) is satisfied
by a and b;

properties.

he will

need to know, that is, that a and b share all their

Jones, then, will need to know that

at tl and red at t2.

open

.

.

and b are both green

But being green and being red are what Wiggins

calls temporary properties.
about a's color at t2.

a

That

a

is green at tl tells Jones nothing

Thus, if Jones

.," then he will

".

.

.

should leave the identity

not know whether to say that

a

is green at

tl, and b is not, or to say that a and b are both green for

a

time, and

7

then both red.

In the absence of information as to the
identity of a

and b, on Wiggins'

view, Jones would have no means of determining
which

of these two inconsistent ascriptions of
properties is correct.

This is Wiggins'
a

forceful

one.

against it.
It

argument; and it is an interesting one as well as

But here again certain objections which can be raised

Let us consider these objections now.

is given

that Jones knows (Id).

Suppose as well that Jones

knows, from some^(x,y), the following principle (PI):
PI-

—

(x)(y)(x and y are apples
(<£(x,y)
(F)(t)(x has F at

—

t

y has

at t)))

F

Jones can ascertain, suppose finally, that $(a/x,b/y) without first
having to know that a=b.
infer that

a

and

b

In this situation, Jones may use

(PI) to

have all their properties in common; he may then use

(Id) to infer that a=b.

Thus, it would seem that it is not the case

after all that Jones needs information as to the identity of
in order to

a

and ab

justify one way to ascribing properties over others.

Two replies to this particular objection are available to Wiggins.
First, given (PI), it seems that all need for (Id) has been obviated.
For (PI) together with the plausible assumption that each thing
the property of being identical to itself entails (PI
PI'.

has

)

(x)(y)(x and y are apples

U(x,y)«_*
Thus, Jones, given
In

'

x

x=y )

)

(PI), has no reason to appeal to (Id) whatsoever.

attempting to supplement (Id) with (PI), one in fact succeeds

supplanting (Id) by (PI).

in

To counter this objection, one would have to

argue that there is no such property as being identical to a.
A second reply, as well,

is available to Wiggins.

(PI) was intro-

8

duced as

a

way of supplementing (Id).

Given just (Id) and the facts of

the case, Jones was not able to justify one ascription
of properties to
a

and b over others.

among ascriptions.
(PI)

form will

s

(PI) was introduced,
It

in

then, to help Jones choose

is, however, doubtful

that any principle having

fact help Jones to make this choice.

Suppose, for

instance, that, where "t" varies over times and "1" over spatial

locations, $(x,y)

=

(3t)(3i)(x and y occupy^ at t).

sition, is (PI) then useful to Jones?

Under thi

s

suppo-

It is, only if Jones can

determine, in the absence of any information as to the identity between
a

and b, that (Ht) (3/) (a and

b

occupy^ at t).

this determination, if indeed he
.

.," is very mysterious.

.

where

a

spatial

a.)

that

a

.

.

leaves the identity open

Consider, for instance, tl.

However, he could not know that

b

Jones knows

occupies just that

location at tl unless he has additional information concerning

(The most obviously useful

b.

i

is at tl.

".

But how he may make

information would be, of course, that

b

Thus, whereas (PI) was introduced to enable Jones to determine
and b share all their properties, some further principle, it

appears, will have to be introduced to enable Jones to make any use of
(PI);

specifically, the principle would need to enable Jones to

determine that

a

and b overlap fully at some point.

There is, clearly,

no guarantee that this further principle will not itself have to

supplemented as well.
The deficiencies of principles such as (PI) and (P1‘) are

elaborated on in more detail in Chapter II.

For the present, it

suffices to say that the problem with such principles seems to involve
the fact that Jones, unsure about the identity at issue, is unsure of

9

the precise references of the names "a"
and "b."

Jones does not know

how far a and b extend, so to speak; he does
not know at what temporal

point a "leaves off" and b "begins."

properties they have.

He thus cannot be clear on what

And this is knowledge he must have, if he
is to

be able to determine whether the antecedent
of the relevant properly

instantiated principle holds.
We may summarize, then.

Even where the subject is assumed to have

the ability to recognize instances of the kind in
question, and assumed
to have powers of observation and concentration limited
in no particu-

lar way,

(Id)

is not useful

indirectly of survival.

impracticable.

It

is not

in

settling issues of identity, or

The problem with (Id) is not merely that it is

merely practically impossible for Jones to

determine, for the infinite number of properties
those very properties, and vice versa .

a

has, that b has

For Jones cannot even

determine, for the one property of being green at tl, that
property.

b

has that

No matter how closely he scrutinizes b at t2, he will not be

able to ascertain that b is green at tl.

observation alone

— no

Information gained through

matter how close and careful that observation

coupled with (Id) will not suffice; more theory is needed; and once
this further theory is introduced, dictating, as it would, that

a

and b

share all their properties, need for (Id) evaporates.

Two points are appropriate here.

First, it may be supposed that

Jones, having great powers of observation, correctly notices that there
are no spatiotemporal
he observes at t2.

again

— determined

gaps separating what he observes at tl and what

It may even be

supposed that Jones has--correctly

that the matter constituting what he observes at tl

10

is the

same

as— or approximately

what he observes at t2.
only

the same

as— the matter

(There is, from tl and t2, at the very most

slight shift in constituent stuff.)

a

decide whether a=b?

constituting

Do these data help Jones to

Not unless he has at hand certain further prin-

ciples as

well— such

between

and b guarantees complete community of properties, or the

a

as the principle that spati otemporal

principle that continuity of stuff between
community of properties.
appeal

a

continuity

and b guarantees complete

But such principles, as does (PI), make

to (Id) unnecessary.

The second point is a caveat of sorts.

Wiggins,

I

think success-

fully, points out a certain difficulty in appealing to (Id) to settle
issues of identity.

But it is certainly consistent with what

said in my elaboration of Wiggins'
on some occasions

above.

Consider

apple b at t2.

,

a

have

point that Leibniz's Law is useful

even if it is not useful on that occasion described

different case.

In fact,

informs Jones that

I

a

Jones observes apple

unknown to Jones, a=b.

and b share all

at tl and

Someone, Smith,

their properties.

appeals to (Id) and deduces that a=b.

a

Jones, then,

One might here wonder, however,

how Smith came to learn that a and b have all their properties in common.

He did not, as we have already seen, gain this information simply

through whatever powers of observation he may be assumed to have.

There are other situations in which (Id) appears, at least, to

These are cases in which the subject

help settle issues of identity.
is

assumed, not only to know enough to recognize apples, but also to

have at hand a definition of ".

discussed in Section 3 below.

.

.

is an apple."

These cases are

11

Wiggins might also have argued,

think, that (LL) is as

I

ineffective in settling questions of diversity among objects as it is
in

settling questions of identity.

The relevant entailment of (LL)

would be, of course, the Principle of the Indi scerni

bi

1

ity of Identi-

cals (In), that is, the principle that, if x=y, then for any time t and

property F, x has

F

at t if and only if y has F at t.

That this

charge can be supported may seem doubtful; after all, given (In), to
infer diversity between, say, distinct objects

and b, one need only

a

spot a single property object a has and b lacks.

Surely one such

property can be discovered.

however, that the

It will

be recalled,

problem with (Id) cited above was independent of the issue of whether,
in

principle at least, one could compare

infinite number of properties.

a

and b with respect to an

The problem involved, rather, the

ascription of one mundane property— the property of being green at tl.
Suppose, as before, that Jones observes
sees that

a

a

at tl and b at t2.

at tl is green and that b at t2 is red.

marvelous powers of perception, etc.

He retains his

Unknown to Jones, a^b.

infer, given (In) and the facts of the case, that a^b?
as noted before, and being red are temporary properties.

being green at tl does not indicate that
red, at t2.
is red,

a

is green,

He

Can he

Being green,
Thus, a's

and hence not

Analogously, b's being red at t2 does not indicate that

and hence not green, at tl.

Other temporary properties are no

more helpful to Jones than are color properties.
facts that (1)

a

at tl

at the South Pole and

b

Indeed, were the

is green, rough in texture, small, and located
(2)

b at t2

has none of these properties, the

facts would not together dictate that

a

has even one property b lacks.
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Temporary properties are, of course, not the only
sorts of properties things have.
ties as well

Since

They also have essential

or necessary , proper-

,

as properties which are neither essential
a

nor temporary.

and b are both apples, they have in common what may be

considered their essential properties.
and both are self-identical.

Both are apples, for instance,

Thus, Jones will not find any essential

feature which one of the objects of his examination has and the other
lacks.
It

might be objected that there exist essential properties which

belong to some, but not to all, apples.

property

F

Jones recognizes such

then Jones knows that at each moment

in a at tl,

and in any possible world a exists,

further, that b lacks

If

F

a

possesses

F

if possessed is

essential, then he knows as well that at no moment at which
does b possess F.

(Otherwise, it would possess

F

clude easily, then, by appeal to (In), that a^b.
he would consider.

at t2.)

b

exists

He may con-

There are two cases

If a fails to exist at t2, then clearly a^b.

if a does exist at t2,

at t2.

exists,

If he discerns,

F.

at t2, and recognizes that

a

then

Thus, by (In), a^b.

a

has F at t2.

Since either

b,
a

a

as noted before,

And

lacks

F

does, or a does not, exist

at t2, a^b.

Perfectly analogous reasoning leads to the conclusion that the pen
with which Ronald Reagan signs his name, for instance, is not identical
to Ronald Reagan.

Such results, however, under reasonable assumptions, are of limited value.

Let us make the assumption that the essential properties

possessed by some but not all apples are not unique to those apples
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which possess them.

On this assumption,

from the fact that

a

has the

essential property F, it cannot be concluded
that anything which has
is a.

F,

thus, is not unique to a.

Thus, let us consider

a

case involving only apples which are F's.

Suppose that Jones examines apple
F.

F

Jones examines apple

b'

at tl

a

at tl

and finds it to have property

and finds it to have

F

as well.

In

this case, Jones cannot appeal to (In) in an attempt to
distinguish be-

tween

and b'.

a

Thus, even under the assumption that there are essen-

tial

properties common to some but not all apples, difficulties with

(In)

remain.

persist

We still must set out the conditions under which F-apples

— conditions,

that is, under which an F-apple, existing at some

time tl, and an F-apple, existing at

a

later time t2, are identical.

We have considered, up until this point, three classes of properties:

temporary properties, essential properties common to all apples,

and essential

properties common to some but not all apples.

fourth class of properties which should be examined here.

There is
It

a

might be

thought that each individual apple (or, more generally, each physical
object) has at least one essential property which no distinct apple can

possess.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that such essential pro-

perties exist.

Under this assumption, for every pair of distinct ap-

ples, there will be some such essential property one has which the

other lacks.

a

and b' were

and b'

are in fact

Reconsider, then, the case sketched above,

said to share certain essential properties.

Since

a

distinct, there will be at least one essential property— say ,
to a.

b',

since in fact it is not a, must lack property G.

G— unique
Hence,

under the assumption that essential properties of this special sort
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actually exist, (In), it seems, will enable
Jones to discover, in principle, for an^ pair of distinct apples,
that they are distinct.

There are two fundamental problems with
this proposal.
posal

The pro-

clearly rests on the assumption that such
essential properties

actually exist.

But this assumption is highly dubitable.

It

is cer-

tainly difficult to imagine what such properties
would be like.
viously, the property of being identical to

a

will

(Ob-

not do for our pur-

poses.)
The proposal, furthermore, rests on the assumption that the
subject
is able,

such

a

in

principle, to detect that

property.

Why is this?

a

particular apple has, or lacks,

Reconsider the example of

a

and b'.

These are in fact distinct apples; presumably, between the time
ceases to exist and

b'

begins to exist there is

No matter how brief the gap,
it is there.

a

a

and

b'

is

a

differ-

Jones is able to perceive this difference,

as well, no matter how subtle it may be.

given these circumstances

spatiotemporal gap.

let us suppose, Jones is able to see that

We may suppose further that between

ence in constituent stuff.

a

a

has persi sted

Jones wants to know whether

— whether

,

that is, a=b'.

Under the current proposal, he will not be able, even in principle, to
answer this question unless he can somehow discern the property G which
a

has essentially and b*

Someone might posit that the property

lacks.

G is just the property of being composed of such-and-such constituent

stuff.

If this were the case,

detected it.

then of course Jones would have

ready

However, it is evident that this property is not one

plausibly said to be essential to
There is

al

a

final

a

given object.

class of properties which should be examined in
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this discussion.

essential.

existence

These are properties which are neither temporal
nor

Consider, for instance, the property of having come
into
at.

tjme

and spatial

perty must have it; and if

ways has this property.

a

location

JL\

.

Nothing having this pro-

thing ever has this property, then it al-

Presumably, since

and b (or b') are distinct

a

apples, they will not have come into existence at precisely the
same

time in precisely the same location.
at tl
All

inil,

Thus, if, say,

a

begins to exist

it is not the case that b begins to exist at tl in Jtl.

Jones must do is recognize this fact; he then can appeal to (In) to

determine that a^b.

Difficulties arise.

Let us suppose that in fact b comes into

existence in X\ (taking a's place) at t2.
Jones observes that

Jones to know that

a

Let suppose, as well, that

comes into existence in

b has

JL\

at tl.

not yet come into existence?

Then, how is
(In), of course,

does not provide this information; and it is not information Jones can
glean through observation.

Consider an attempt to supplement (In)— to introduce, that is,
some principle which will help Jones to determine how properties are to
be ascribed

(thus, to determine that, while a has the property in ques-

tion, b does not).

Once he knows which of the two competing ascrip-

tions is correct, he can then appeal to (In), inferring finally that
a^b.

Here is one principle which may seem to be potentially useful.
P2.

(i)(t)(x)(y)(x and y are apples
((x comes into existence at t in/&
y comes into existence ini &
x and y are not spatiotemporally continuous)
y does not come into existence at t))

Since Jones may be presumed to have noted

a

temporal gap between

a

and
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b,

he can use

lacks.

(P2) to infer that there is some property
a has which

But it seems that, while indeed (P2) does
helpfully supplement

(In), one must ask what justifies (P2).
is

b

true?

It

is to appeal

How does Jones know that (P2)

seems to me that the only plausible way of justifying
(P2)
to the

fact

that distinct apples do not come into exist-

ence at just the same time and in just the same place, and
apples which
are not spatiotemporally continuous are distinct.

But if this is

right, then while in this case the supplement (P2) does not itself sup-

plant (In), one must accept

a

certain principle (the "fact" above)

which does supplant (In) before one can be justified in using (P2).
But, then, appeal to (In)

There is

a

(indeed, appeal to (P2)) is unnecessary.

further difficulty here as well.

Jones must know that

a

In

order to use (P2),

and b are not spatiotemporally continuous.

was supposed above that Jones in fact had this information.

position is itself problematic, however.

Jones already knows at what point
point b begins.

a

It

This sup-

It seems to suggest that

ends, so to speak, and at what

But it is unclear whether Jones can have this infor-

mation, if he has indeed left the question of identity open.
I

have tried to suggest, concerning several different classes of

properties, the difficulties involved in justifying one ascription of

properties over others.

Of course, if the issue of identity is

settled, these problems disappear.

al

ready

Observations, together with the

facts of identity, favor one ascription over others.

For instance, if

Jones knows that apple a=apple b, then he will not be so puzzled over

whether
at t2).

a

is red at t2

(assuming, of course, that no other apple exists

17

want to introduce one last example to help
motivate the claim

I

that it is not as easy as it would perhaps
seem to be to spot even one

feature which
he calls

has and b lacks.

a

Suppose Jones observes that the apple

"a" exists in Room 1, and the apple he
calls "b" exists at the

same jMme in another room. Room 2.
ing that be i
ng

j_n_

Room

In

fact a^b.

Will Jones, recogniz-

and being in Room 2 are distinct properties,
_

_1

be able to justify an ascription of
properties which, together with

(In), will

note that

enable him to infer that a^b?
a

is in Room 1,

and b is not.

All Jones would need to do is

(In) then yields that a/b.

But in fact things are not quite so simple.
the claim that

a

is

be that a is in Room

fact).

in Room
1

1

For what justifies

and b is not for Jones?

It cannot merely

and b is Room 2 (although Jones is aware of this

For it is consistent with the claim that

a

is in Room 2 that a is in Room and b is in Room 1.

is

in Room

1

and b

It is consistent

with what Jones is assumed to know that a single apple, co-designated
by "a" and "b," is scattered through space.

Jones, as before, thus has

no means of justifying one ascription of properties
1

and b is not) over the other (that

a

(that

a

is in Room

and b are both in Room 1).

does not know that it is not the case that

a

He

and b have all their pro-

perties in common.
I

conclude that, given the limitations on (LL), there is no evi-

dence that (LL) will, indirectly, enable one to answer questions such
as:

Can

a

person survive the loss of his hand?

and perhaps character?
is false,

I

His body?

His memory

do not, of course, mean to suggest that (LL)

or even that as a criterion of identity it is circular.

Wiggins' own conclusion concerning (Id) is

a

bit more radical than
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mine.

On his view,

.

.

relations of agreement in every property of

relation must flow from identity itself."
that a=b will

If, but only if, Jones knows

he be able to choose among property

ascriptions— that

will Jones be able to choose that ascription which
dictates

have all their properties in common.

against Wiggins'

a

is,

and b

In the next section, the evidence

stronger claim is considered.

When Leibniz's Law is Useful

There is, it seems to me,
will

be useful

ever useful

in

in

a

single class of cases in which (LL)

settling the relevant issues of identity, if (LL)

settling such issues.

is

Because of this class of cases,

I

am hesitant to accept the extreme view that no ascription of properties
can be justified until

the question of identity is settled.

(LL) is limited in its usefulness,
it is

argued in Section 2, because

I

typically difficult to justify one ascription of properties over

others if the question of identity is itself not settled.

Of course,

one must choose among ascriptions before one can appeal to (LL).
In this section,

I

want to describe

a

case in which it at least

seems that one can choose among ascriptions prior to having settled the

question of identity.

Consider the following situation.

Suppose that Jones fixes the

references of the names "a" and "b" as follows.

He lets "a" name that

thing which exists just during tl and just in Room

1.

He lets "b"

name that thing which exists just during t2 and just in Room 2.
is no

claim here to the effect that

a

and b are apples.

There

In this situ-

ation, Jones should have no trouble deciding on an ascription of pro-
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perties.

He notes, we may suppose, that

Room 1; b is not.
if

is

a

green; b is not.

Appealing to (In), then, he infers that a^b.

is

a

in

Thus,

Jones is allowed to "draw- for himself the
spatial and temporal

boundaries of

a

are), he will

be in a position to determine a's and b's
properties.

and

b

He, then, can appeal

(in

to

general, if he knows what these boundaries

(In).

It may be, as well, that in analogous

circumstances involving identical objects, the ascription
according to
which the objects in question have all their properties
be justified.

suggests,

bowl

common can

such circumstances, contrary to what Wiggins

In

(Id) will

be useful.

One might defend Wiggins here by

arguing that two objects can share, in
spatial

in

and temporal

boundaries.

a

(A bowl

world, precisely the same
and the clay of which the

is made may be imagined to begin to exist and to cease to exist at

precisely the same moments.)
of the extreme view on

(In)

Let us see whether there is any defense

— the

view, that is, that one can not

discover even one difference between objects until the question of
identity is settled.

Reconsider the case at hand.

Jones has learned that a^b.

still, it seems, does not know very much.

recognizes what he observes in Room

observes in Room

2

1

at t2 as an apple.

He

Let us suppose that he

at tl as an apple and what he

(He thus, Quine might say, is

assumed to have the ability to "herald" apples.)

whether the apple he observes at tl in Room

1

He is interested in

persists; that is,

whether that apple is identical to the apple he observes at t2 in Room
2.

He knows that a is not b; but it is consistent with everything that

has been said so far that he does not know that a and b are apples.
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Suppose, that,

in

fact,

a

and b are apples, distinct apples,
and that

Jones falsely believes that

a

and b are not apples

distinct temporal parts of the same apple.

but are rather

,

He then will

wrongly think that the apple he observed at
tl in Room

of course

does indeed

1

persi st.
It

seems that the further bit of information Jones
needs, if he is

to correct his beliefs,

is an

adequate definition of

".

.

.

is an

apple," or at least enough information about apples
to determine that
and b are apples.

He will

a

then recognize that the apple he first

observes does not persist— does not, at least, persist as the apple
he

observes next.
not help him

(A

definition of

".

.

.

is apple*'— if such

whit, however; for the aggregate of

a

a

and

exists-will

b— that

object

scattered through space as, say, my pen is on occasion scattered— would

presumably count as apple .
b

What he needs is some indication that

a

and

each count as one apple.)

Suppose, then, that he has this further information.
used (LL), many steps back?

Need he have

He can appeal to the definition of

"

.

.

.

is an apple" to learn that the aggregate of a and b is not an apple,

that is, that it is not one apple.

Furthermore, he can appeal to the

definition of

"...

is an apple.

At this point, he surely knows enough, even without (LL),

is an apple" to learn that each of

a

and b alone

to say that the apple he first observes is not identical to the apple
he next observes and, hence, that the apple observed at tl does not

persist as the apple observed at t2.
follows:

He could reason, by reductio

,

suppose the apple observed at tl is identical to the apple

observed at t2.

Then, the aggregate consisting of both what is

as
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observed just at tl

— a-- and

"...

satisfy the definition of
one apple.

what is observed just at t2--b--would
is an apple"; that entity would be

This contradicts the earlier claim (already
known to Jones)

that the aggregate in question does not count
as an apple.
A brief summary might be helpful
be useful

ficial

If the subject has

ences of "a" and "b"

— if

a

clear idea of the precise refer-

he knows where object a "leaves off" and

begins"--then he is an

b

Leibniz's Law may

for settling questions of diversity for certain
rather arti-

cases.

object

at this point.

a

position to justify one ascription

of properties to a and b over others.

He may, then, appeal

to (LL).

However, he may still be unable to settle the principal issue; he may,
that is, not know whether the apple he first observes persists.

knows that

a

(He

does not persist; but he does not know, ipso facto , that

the apple does not persist.)

A definition would enable him to settle

the issue of the apple's persistence; but with the definition in hand,
he will

not need to appeal

to Leibniz's Law.

What can be concluded?

In

those cases in which Leibniz's Law

seems to enable the subject to settle issues of identity, the subject

remains unable to answer questions concerning the persistence, or survival, of kinds of things, whether apples or persons.
the preceding section has been borne out:

that (LL) is ever useful

in

The thesis of

it remains quite unclear

settling issues of identity in those

important and interesting contexts in which we are striving to settle
issues of persistence and survival.

One further point must be made here.

This point concerns the

claim that (LL) is at least useful in settling issues of identity

in
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the narrow class of cases described above.
for himself the spatial

and temporal

boundaries of

the boundaries of a, for instance, in such

him that a exists in just Room

Jones, it was said, "draws"

a

and just tl.

1

to exist in just Room 2 at just t2.

a

and b.

He

"draws"

way that it is obvious to
b, then,

he stipulates

But could Jones actually define

a

and b as he does without a deep awareness at the time
of definition of
the diversity between

a

and b?

tion here; indeed,

I

way or the other.

In any case,

I

will

not attempt to settle this ques-

am not sure how the question could be settled, one
the arguments above are independent of

this question.

Improper Uses of Leibniz's Law

Some philosophers have seemed to suggest, contrary to what

I

have

argued above, that Leibniz's Law can be used in perfectly ordinary contexts to settle questions of identity.
his book Identity and Essence

,

Baruch Brody, for instance, in

seems to suggest in several passages

that Leibniz's Law is useful in deciding certain interesting questions
of identity.^

Having established, by appeal to (LL),

a

given identity

(or diversity), Brody then rejects whatever criteria of identity

produce results conflicting with his own.

I

argue that, in many

instances, at least, Brody succeeds only in misusing (LL).

Consider

a

specific example.

someone, Roger, pulls the trigger of

stranger.

Brody imagines a case in which
a

gun, and in doing so, kills a

Brody continues:

is easy to show why, on our theory, Roger's pulling the
trigger is not identical with his killing the stranger. A
number of familiar arguments show that these two events do
It
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Thus, Brody concludes, the event of
pulling the trigger and the event
of killing the stranger are
distinct.

Furthermore, any criterion of

event-identity which directs otherwise is
false.
I

do not question Brody's conclusion
here, only his argument.

Brody tells his reader that one event
lasts
and that another event endures for

a

a

certain period of time,

longer period of time.

The diffi-

culty is that Brody does not justify his
claim that this particular

ascription of properties is correct.

Without such justification he has

begged the question against the claim (however
improbable it may be)

that pulling the trigger and killing the stranger
are the same event.
Given the ascription he indicates, it follows necessarily
that the

events are distinct.

Indeed, that they are distinct, given this

ascription, is hardly worth saying.

What needs arguing is the accuracy

of the ascription he provides.

Perhaps Brody conceives his approach

a

bit differently.

He may,

for instance, intend to suggest the following line of reasoning.

stipulate that "a," say, names
second, while "b" names

a

a

process which lasts precisely one

process which lasts precisely two seconds.

(In this case, we have ourselves

in question;

We

"drawn" the boundaries of the entities

we know precisely what the references of "a" and "b" are.)

Then, of course, we may infer by appeal to (LL) that a^b.

However, even on this unlikely reading of Brody, his argument

thoroughly inadequate.

is

For it does not follow, from the mere fact that

a^b, that the event of pulling the trigger and the event of killing the
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stranger are distinct.
that

a j[s

Additional premises are needed, to the effect

the event of pulling the trigger and

the event of

b

killing the stranger.

Consider another of Brody's arguments.
method, not his conclusion.)

(As before,

I

question his

Let "a" name the event of "the top's

7

spinning in place at tl."'
ing up at tl."

g

Where the spinning and the heating occur at the same

place and time,
a=b would be:
and time.

one is

a

Let "b" name the event of "the top's heat-

criterion of event-identity having the result that

a

e

is e'

if and only

Brody writes that

a

if e and e'

and b

spinning and the other is

a

to suggest the following argument.
is a heating then

.

a

.

cannot be identical, since

.

heating."^

He apparently intends

(LL) is true;

(1)

it is not a spinning;

heating; therefore (4)
a^b.

“

occur at the same place

(3)

a

is

a

(2)

if an event

spinning and

is a spinning and b is not;

therefore,

The claim that needs support is, obviously, (2).

is a

b

(5)

Without an

argument for this claim, Brody's argument is hardly more compelling
than the following:
is not round;

(3')

(1)

is true;

is red and b'

a'

not red; therefore (5

(LL)

'

a'?*b'.

is

(2‘)

(2')

if a thing is

round:

therefore,

is obviously false.

red then it
(4
'

(2)

b'

is

is not

obviously false; nonetheless, Brody cannot simply assert (2) without
begging the question against the so-called "rough-grained" criteria of

event-identity.
Brody's arguments against what may be called "specific" criterion
of identity for persons are also unsatisfactory.
.

the claim that bodily continuity

...

He writes that

"

.

.

is sufficient for the identity

of persons is, at least, a hypothesis whose justification is very
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unclear. "10

He continues:

.
.
.
consider the hypothetical case of a
person who wakes up
one morning to find himself in
a very different body far
removed from the one he previously
occupied.
This problem case,
often advanced by opponents of the
claim of bodily continuity
is an example of a case in which
there is a pi before the transformation and a p2 afterwards who are
identical just because
they have all of their properties
in common, but who do not
satisfy the condition of bodily continuity.
Similar examples
can be constructed to cast doubt
upon the claim that either
bodi ^continuity or memory
continuity is sufficient for iden-

l

1

uy

•

Brody supposes correct

a

particular way of ascribing properties; and

clearly, if he is right, pl=p2.
tion he affirms.

But he does not justify the ascrip-

He thus begs the question, this time against
the so-

called bodily continuity criterion of personal

identity.

One can imagine arguing analogously against the Principle
of

Extensional ity.

Let si be the set of all

noon, January

1900.

1,

Let s2 be the set of all

existing at noon, January 1, 1982.
and s2

persons actually existing at
persons actually

Then, "because" (as Brody says) si

"have all their properties in common," by

(LL)

sl=s2.

This

example, one might expect Brody to say, "casts doubt" on the Principle
of Extensional ity.

Brody seems to be aware that his pattern of argumentation is

problematic.

Thus, when he considers Extensional ity, he says that his

only critical

point about it is that it is inadequate as

of "identity" for sets.

a

definition

But when he considers various criteria of

individuation for events and persons, he is not nearly so cautious.
is, clearly, urging that the theories yield false results, not that

they are simply inadequate definitions of identity.

amples he presents in discussion of personal

He calls the ex-

identity "counter-exam-

He
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pies."

He calls one view of events "wrong" 14

"clearly not correct

;

another he says is

." 15

Brody seems to think that he can argue
against particular criteria
of identity by noting (a) that their
results conflict with (LL) and (b)

that

(LL)

is correct.

But in each case Brody assumes (a), thereby

begging the question against the principles he
seeks to undermine.

Cone! usions

In

many instances, the conclusions which can be drawn from the

preceding discussions are not,

I

think, very firm or fast.

What seems

clear is just that the situation in which Leibniz's Law will actually

enable one to decide between
tity are relatively rare.

a

claim of diversity and

claim of iden-

a

The difficulty, in each case, involves

justi fyi ng one ascription of properties to objects over others.

Until

one ascription is justified over others,

is,

(LL) cannot be used;

while neither circular nor false, simply ineffecti ve .

I

it

do not

conclude from this that it cannot happen that an ascription is justified before the identity at issue is settled.
(LL)

is always

ineffective.

I

do not conclude that

However, we have yet to produce clear

evidence for the claim that (LL) is effective in any of the contexts of
interest here.

Indeed, in the cases we have examined so far, by that

point at which the subject is prepared to justify one ascription of

properties over others, he typically has

al

ready settled, or has the

information he needs in order to settle, the issue of identity at hand.
At the very least, in such cases, it is not clear that he has not

already settled that issue.
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Perhaps the weakest link in the discussions
of this chapter is the

senes

of objections raised against the
proposal

that unique essential

properties are possessed by things such as
apples.
that no such properties exist.

I

am unable to show

However, the difficulty with showing

that such properties do exist argues in favor
of the claim that there
is no clear evidence in favor of the
view that,

in certain relevant

contexts, at least, (LL) is ineffective.

Persistence and Survival

Let us return to the original

apple case, in which

a

persists dur-

ing tl, at a given location, and b (ja) persists during
t2, at that

same location.

What actually happens is that

before b begins to exist; b replaces a.

a

ceases to exist just

So far, Jones has been unable

to ascertain the identity at issue.

Suppose, however, that Jones is given
apples based on spatiotemporal continuity.

a

criterion of identity for

Inspecting the situation

carefully, he notes that after he observes a, and before he observes b,
he finds nothing at all.

withers away, and b,
ly,

a

What actually happens is that

moment later, pops into existence.

there is no spatiotemporal continuity between

cludes, then, that

a

a

is not

a

and b.

simply

ConsequentJones con-

identical to b.

Jones may similarly infer, concerning the case in which

a

and b

exist at the same time but in two completely disjoint spatial

locations, that

a

is not b.

Thus, while (LL) will not be useful in answering the question of

whether the one apple is the other, it is not implausible to suppose
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that there are other principles
capable of doing this work.
A principle of spatiotemporal

continuity may be viewed as part of

the definition of an apple, or more
generally

thing which is
speak,

a

s eparated

its parts.

physical

a

physical object.

A

object, one might hold, cannot be, so to

from itself.

There are no spatiotemporal gaps between

If this view of identity criteria holds
in general, then my

project in the coming chapters is to say something
about what persons
are.
In

useful

in

general, criteria of identity for persons which may
actually be

helping us to settle issues of identity and survival
fall

into two distinct categories.

They are either based on spatiotempoeral

continuity or on psychological continuity.
I

In the following chapters,

am most interested in formulating an acceptable criterion based
in

the relation of psychological continuity.

Chapter II,

In

'herald") persons.

assume the ability of recogni ze (Quine might say

I

I

assume, that is, the ability to recognize the

presence of humanity.

definition of

"...

I

do not, for obvious reasons, assume at hand a

is a person."

I,

then, consider several criteria

of identity for persons of the form.

(x)(y)(x and y are persons
(x,y ) )
( x= y

^

—

As it happens, principles having this form are ultimately no more

helpful

in settling issues of identity than is Leibniz's Law.

Chapters III, IV, and V,
somewhat.

In these

I

find it necessary to complicate matters

chapters,

parts , or person stages

,

Thus, in

I

assume the existence of temporal person

and consider

a

variety of principles designed
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to provide conditions under which
temporal

single person.

parts are unified in

a

Such principles are, as it turns out,
more appropriate

for the task of settling questions of
personal

identity and survival.

CHAPTER

I

NOTES

In some cases, at least,
philosophers seem to Dut to pthiral
accounts of personal identity. Michael
B. Greene and Daniel
jjSrrfp
WildeF for instance, suggest that a
certain Lockean account of oersonal identity (that suggested by
John Perry) may be used to justify
euthanasia in a variety of contexts.
See their "Brain Death and Personal Identity,
Philosophy a nd Public Affairs 9. (Winter
1980), 105133.
Some patients' lack of psychological
continuity with earlier
persons, on the psychological continuity
account to which Greene and
lkler appeal, indicates that those
patients are not identical to any
earlier persons. Thus, euthanasia is morally
permissible, in such
situations.
Greene and Wikler's argument is not convincing.
The difficulty with it has nothing to do with whether
the particular account
of personal identity they appeal to is
correct. The problem rather involves their failure to exclude the possibility
that the patients in
question are, while perhaps not survi vors persons
nonetheless.
.
2

V. Quine suggests that one does not really
understand terms
rabbit," "apple," and, it would seem, "person," unless
one
understands what counts as, respectively, one rabbit, one
apple, and
one person.
Thus, in "Speaking of ObjectsTHn his Ontolo gical
Relati vity and Other Essays (New York:
Columbia University Press
1969), he writes:

such as

To learn "apple" it is not sufficient to learn how much of
what goes on counts as apple; we must learn how much counts
as an apple, and how much as another (p. 8).

"...

And, again, the term "rabbit" cannot, Quine says,
be mastered
without mastering . . . where one rabbit leaves off and another
begins.
See "Ontological Relativity," in his Ontological Relativity
and Other Essays , p. 31.
In general, one does not really understand a
particular term for F's (a given count noun) unless one understands
what counts as one F; and, of course, to determine whether the F's at
hand are one or two, one needs to be able to settle the question of
their i denti ties .
Conversely, presumably, when one gains the ability
to count, say, persons, one has gained some insight into what a person
is.

%)avid Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford:
well, 1980), p. 50.
4 Ibid

Basil

Black-

.

^Baruch Brody, in Identity and Essence (Princeton:
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Princeton
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1

1
in
r0p0SeS <LL) as a "9 eneral theory
2^Hp later
\ltVr’ modifies
He
this proposal, for he finds LL) "incomplete as a general theory." The
modification involves simply conjoining a certain further principle with
(LL) (p. 82).
This further
ln
6
0U
provide
additional
necessary
conditions for identity
-? .
?n
£m
?
1
will not here consider the modified version
ip. 83).
of the theory
of identity Brody favors; I should
just note the nowhere in his later
iscussions do I find any disavowal of the uses
he makes of (LL) in the
early chapters of his book.
It is these early chapters I will be
examining here.

P eS

of identUv
identity.

^?

“

'

6
bi

1

,

p

.

70

. ,

P

.

69.

.

7
1

bi

1

bi d

8

Ibid ., p. 69.
I
am simplifying Brody's argument here.
states his argument as follows.

He

Using Donald Davidson's example of the top which is both
spinning and rotating, we consider the following events:
E'l
E'2
E'3

E'4

the top's spinning in place at tl
the top's heating up at tl
the top's undergoing a rotation or heating at
(this is the event associated with, but maybe
identical with, E'l)
the top's undergoing a rotation or heating at
(this is the event associated with, but maybe
identical with, E'2)

tl
not
tl

not

E'3 and E'4 cannot be identical, since one is a spinning and
the other is a heating, and yet they both involve the same object
having the same property at the same time in the same place
(p. 69).
I
assume that he would hold
that E'3^E'4, that E'l^E'2.

1Q
11

Ibid.

1

3

14
15

p.

50.

. ,

p.

64.

Ibid.

18

1

,

bi

Ibid .

,

pp. 50-51.

Ibid.

,

p.

68.

Ibid.

,

p.

69

for precisely the same reasons he holds

CHAPTER

II

LOCKE'S MEMORY CRITERION
Consider the following version of
Leibniz's "King of China" example . 1

I

am told that tomorrow

astonished and delighted.
will

present self;

I

will

will

be crowned King of China.

am then told that prior to coronation

I

lose all my memories.

I

I

I

am

I

will, tomorrow, know nothing of my

not know, for instance, that

I

was at one time

astonished and delighted at the prospect of becoming
King of China.

My

spirits fall.

John Locke

s

account of personal identity suggests an explanation

for my sudden change in attitude.

On

Locke's view, when

my memory bank is to be erased prior to coronation,

that it is not

misled

— that

my body,

in

who will be crowned.

I

learn that

I

learn that

I

ipso facto learn

I

was initially

fact someone other than me , someone who nonetheless has

is to be made King.

At this point,

I

cease to look forward to

the coming day, for my glee depended upon my belief that

l_

was the one

who would be crowned King.

Locke's memory theory suggests one explanation for my shift in
attitude.

Of course, there are competing views.

If

was soon to undergo any dramatic and terrible change,

mayed.

were told that

I

I

would be dis-

Why not say that my shift in attitude is due, not to my dis-
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appointment in being denied the crown,
not even to my fear of imminent
death, but rather to the fact that

have come to anticipate some dra-

1

matic and terrible change in myself?

Leibniz's case can be further detailed.
coming King of China.
of China.

tomorrow

I

I

care about nothing except that

No prospect disturbe me, as long as

X

will

am obsessed with be-

be crowned King.

I

I

become King

remain confident that

Intuitively, it seems that my learn-

ing of impending memory loss would leave
me crestfallen.

theory helps to explain my new attitude.

Locke's

But the claim that

I

have

come to anticipate some dramatic and terrible change
in myself does
not.

lx hypothesi

,

such

a

prospect is undisturbing to me.

Locke's Theory of Personal

Identity

Locke expresses his memory theory in his Essay Concerning Human

Understanding .
•
.
since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it
.
is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and
thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things;
in this alone consists personal identity, i.e., the sameness

of a rational being:
and so far as this consciousness can be
extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far
reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now
it was then, and it is by the same self with this present one
that now reflects on it, that that action was done.
In this passage Locke

suggests that

a

later person is identical to an

earlier person if the later person has consciousness of doing or thinking something the earlier person in fact did or thought.

stance, if
ing, then

Thus, for in-

I

have consciousness of thinking about Appleton last even-

I,

Roberts, extend backwards in time at least to that point

at which Appleton was contemplated.
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Locke indicates that he holds the
converse of this principle as
well.

He writes, for instance, that:

being the same consciousness that makes
a
identity depends
L
on that only . .
.

.

.

it

man he himself to tjimself, personal

Furthermore
[that] with which the consciousness of this
present
thinking thing can join itself, makes the
same person,
and is one self with it, and with nothing
else . . .
In both of

well

these passages, Locke seems to be providing
necessary, as

as sufficient,

conditions for personal identity.

These passages together suggest what
Lockean intuition concerning personal
identical

if and only

I

take to be the basic

identity.

It

is that persons are

if one has consciousness of doing something the

other did.

Before this intuition can be evaluated, it needs to be more carefully formulated.

It will

be seen that producing

a

plausible, workable

formulation is no easy task.

Consider, for instance,
and "t" and "t"' over times.
LI.

x=y

Let "x" and "y" vary over persons,

(LI).

Then,

<-*

(3t)(3t')(x exists at t &
y exists at t' &
y has consciousness at t' of having done (doing)
something x did (does) at t)
We may provisionally say that, where y's consciousness at time t'

consciousness of an action occurring at time
t', then

t

and t is earlier than

"has consciousness of" just means remembers .

t'=t, "has consciousness of" just means is aware of.

having consciousness of performing

a

is

Furthermore, if
The notion of

specific action will be more care-
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fully scrutinized in a later section.

thoughts are actions.

We may assume further that

Thus, according to (LI), persons are
identical

just in case one at some time remembers
or is aware of having done some
one thing the other in fact did.

Consider

a

certain application of (LI).

know whether, say Jill

is

John.

Suppose that one wants to

If one knows that

(1)

holds

(3t) (3t‘ ) (John exists at t &
Jill exists at t'&
Jill at t' has consciousness of having done (doing)
something John did (does) at t),

1.

then one may infer, given

(LI), that John=Jill.

On the other hand, if

one knows that (2)
(3t) (3t ) (John exists at t &
Jill exists at t' &
Jill at t‘ has consciousness of having done (doing)
something John did (does) at t),

2.

'

then one may infer, given
(LI)

is,

(LI), that John^Ji

however, problematic.

1 1

In order to use

either know that (1) holds or know that (2) holds.

In

(LI), one must

certain rather

ordinary cases, cases in which any principle adequate for our purposes
can be expected to yield results, one will
(1) and

(2).

or (2) and not
It will

be unable to choose between

One will, that is, be unable to justify (1) and not (2),
(1), as the correct ascription of properties.

be helpful to have an example at hand.

exists at time tl, and Jill, at

a

later time t2.

Suppose that John

Suppose further that

for any time t at which they exist, John and Jill have consciousness at
t of

doing something he or she in fact does at t.

Suppose, finally,

that it is not the case that Jill at t2 has consciousness of doing any-

thing which John does at tl.

The case may be depicted as follows.
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where arrows represent the four-place
consciousness relation, xtyf
has consciousness at t'

of doing something x did at t).

1.

o

o

John

Jill

tl

t2

Problem Case for (LI)

As noted before, to make use of
(2)

Jill

over (1).

(LI), one must justify

(1)

over (2), or

But it is clear that, given the facts of the John-and-

case, neither (1) nor (2) can be justified over the
other.

One

must of course in the beginning "leave the identity open";
then, in
order to determine whether (1) holds or (2) holds, one must
first

settle on (3) and (4)r>
3.

John exists at t2 &
Jill exists at t2 &
Jill at t2 has consciousness of doing something
John does at t2

4.

John exists at tl &
Jill exists at tl &
Jill at tl has consciousness of doing something
John does at tl

Clearly,

(5)

(y

and (6) are both true, given the facts of the case.

5.

Jill exists at t2 &
Jill at t2 has consciousness of doing something
Jill does at t2

6.

John exists at tl &
John at tl has consciousness of doing something
John does at tl.

But, given just (5) and

(6), it would seem that one is unable to

justify any judgment about (3) and (4) if one truly "leaves the
identity open."

For, if John is Jill, then if (5), then (3) and if
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(6), then

Furthermore

(4).

if

case neither (3) nor (4) holds.

JohnWIll, then given the facts

of the

6

Thus, the difficulty with (LI) in the
above context is that the
subject, lacking information to the
effect that the appropriately in-

stantiated right-hand side of (LI) holds,
cannot apply (LI).

I

should

stress that the claim against (LI) here
is neither that it is false
nor that it is circular.

impracticable.

The claim against it is not even that it is

For convenience, let us say simply that it is
ineffec-

tive in this context.

Here is

a

second point.

Clearly, if the subject has

al

ready set-

tled the issue of identity, he can easily obtain the
information he
must have if he is to apply (LI).
that Jill

is

Indeed, if he thinks it possible

John, then he will, as well, think it possible that
(3)

and (4) both hold.

He can only justifiably deny (3) and (4), given (5)

and (6), if he has already precluded the possibility of identity be-

tween John and Jill.

If this argument is sound, then

(LI), in any con-

text absent of further supplementation, is ineffective.
But let us return to the former, weaker, objection.

ineffectivity of (LI) constitute

problem with (LI)?

a

Why does the

Why is it reason

enough to reject (LI)?
In

persons.

this chapter,

I

am presupposing the ability to “herald"

What is being sought here is

guish between those transformations

a

principle which will distin-

a

person who has already been “her-

alded" will survive and those "transformations" such a person will
to survive.

Thus, suppose that

a

thing

the property of personhood by someone

s

x

is

fail

recognized as exemplifying

at a time t.

x is named

"John"
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by

s

at t.

An adequate criterion of personal

to answer,

survival

s

for instance, the following questions
(given that John's

depends solely on his being identical with
some future

person):

Will John survive total

he survive dying his hair green?

his body?
s

identity should enable

and irrevocable loss of memory?
Will

Will

he survive the disintegration of

(LI), unless it is supplemented in some way,
does not enable

to answer these questions.

Even given the assumption that

s

has

stupendous powers of observation (that he knows what
actions the
persons he heralds perform, at the time and place of their
heralding;
what thoughts they are thinking; their shapes, colors and
sizes), (LI)
does not settle for

s

a

single question of identity or, consequently,

of survival.

Consider, then, (L2).
L2.

x=y

+-*

t

)((x exists at t &
y exists at t' &
t is earlier than or the same as t')—
y has consciousness at t' of having done (doing)
something x did (does) at t)
(

(L2)

t

) (

'

requires for identity that one person have awareness, at each time

he exists, of doing something the other in fact did at each time at

which the other exists.
thus,

(L2)

Note first that (L2) directs that John^J ill;

is not vulnerable to the specific objection which forced the

rejection of (LI).

(L2)

is nonetheless itself quite obviously false.

Ronald Reagan may not now remember doing anything anyone did on March
6,

1962, yet he nonetheless existed at that time.

Can such a case be used to show, further, that (L2) leads to con-

tradiction?

Similar examples have, of course, been used to show that
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certain memory criteria lead to contradiction.

The most famous of

these examples is Thomas Reid's "brave officer"
case.

Suppose

Reid writes:

brave officer to have been flogged when a
for robbing an orchard, to have taken
a standard from the enemy in his
first campaign, and
to have been made a general in advnced life;
suppose, also, which must be admitted to be possible,
that, when he took the standard, he was conscious*
of his having been flogged at school, and that, when
made a general, he was conscious of his taking the
standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness
of his flogging.
These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr.
Locke's doctrine, that he who was flogged at school
is the same person who took the standard, and that he
who took the standard is the same person who was made
a general.
Whence it follows, if there be any truth
in logic, that the general is the same person with him
who was flogged at school.
But the general's consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging; therefore, according to Mr. Locke's doctrine, he is not the
person who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and
at the same time is not, the same person with him who
was flogged at school/
a

boy at school

Does the "brave officer" case, together with (L2), lead to contradic-

tion?

Suppose that the young boy exists at tl, the brave officer, at

t2, and the old general,

times.

at t3, where tl, t2, and t3 are distinct

Then, since there is

at tl and a time,

a

time, tl, such that the young boy exists

t3, such that the old general exists at t3, and since

furthermore the old general at t3 fails to recall doing anything the
young boy did at tl,

(L2) directs that the old general^the young boy.

A contradiction can be derived if it can be inferred as well both that
the young boy is the brave officer and that the brave officer is the

old general;
it can be

from this information, given the transitivity of identity,

concluded that the young boy is the old general.

means by which

a

(No other

contradiction might be derived suggests itself.)
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However, (L2) together with the facts of the
case does not direct both
that the young boy is the brave officer
and that the brave officer is
the old general.

For consider:

if the brave officer

_i_s

the old

general, then by (L2) the brave officer is not
the young boy.
the brave officer is the old general, then
there is

a

For if

time t3 at which

the brave officer fails to recall doing anything
the young boy did at
tl.

By

(L2), then, the brave officer^the young boy.

similarly, that if the brave officer
the old general.

j_s

It can be argued,

the young boy, then he is not

Thus, the "brave officer" case cannot be used to

prove that (L2) leads to contradiction.
It

is worth noting that

(LI) as well

fails to yield

tion when applied to the "brave officer" case.

a

contradic-

(LI) directs that the

old general

is the brave officer and that the brave officer is the

young boy.

The "trouble" with (LI) is that it does not direct that the

old general/the young boy.
(L2)

— does

Thus, given the facts of the case, it

— like

not lead to contradiction.

While (L2) does not, when taken together with the standard examples, lead to contradiction, the principle is, as noted before, none-

theless problematic.

Reagan, it may be supposed, does not recall doing

anything anyone did at noon, March 6, 1962.

Yet in fact he is

identical to someone who existed on that day, since in fact he existed
then.

(Similarly, the old general existed fifty years earlier even

though he in later life does not recall his youthful escapades.)

A new

principle is needed.
It will

be convenient to allow "Rx,t,y,t"' to abbreviate "y has

consciousness at

t'

of having done (doing) something x did (does) at
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t.

n

R's logical

features are as follows.

at which x exists, Rx,t,x,t.
t

,

For any person

x

and time

t

But it may happen, for some x,
y, t, and

that Rx,t,y,t‘ but not Ry,t',x,t; and
it may happen, for some

further person

z

and time

Rx,t ,z,t".

Loosely, then,

symmetric.

"R*x,t,y ,t

,"
'

f,
R

that Rx,t,y,t\ Ry.t'z.t", but not
is

reflexive, but neither transitive nore

which expresses the ancestral of R, in

contrast, has the advantage of being "transitive."

It may be defined

recursively as follows. 8
Dl.

R*x,t,y,t'
(Rx,t,y,t‘

v

pz)(3t")(R*x g t,z,t"

&

R*z,t",y,t' ))"

R* is the relation which will be used here in formulating
the Lockean

thesis.

Consider, then (L3).

L3.

x=y
(3t)(3t‘ )R*x,t,y,t'

(L3) avoids the particular difficulty which plagued

(L2), since its

requirements for identity are not so stringent as (L2)'s.

On

(L3), x

may be identical to y, where y exists now and exists twenty years ago,

even though y does not now recall doing something
ago.

(L3)

x

did twenty years

requires for identity just that y's present be linked by

a

series of memories to some action x performed in the past.

Consider, for instance,
ficer" and the "Reagan" cases,

a

schematic version of the "brave ofc,

at t3,

remembers doing something

did at t2; and at t2, b remembers doing something

Rb,t2,c,t3 and Ra,tl,b,t2.

By

a

did at tl.

Thus,

(Dl), then, R*b,t2,c,t3 and R*a,tl,b,t2.

A second application of (Dl) yields that R*a,tl,c,t3.

yields are a=c.

b

Finally,

(L3)
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Given that

a

certain psychological continuity
holds between

Reagan of twenty years ago and
today's Reagan, and between the
young
boy and the old general, (L3)
yields the "right" results in these
two
cases:
i

that Reagan did live on March
6, 1962, and that the old general

the young boy.
(L3) must, however, be rejected on
other grounds.

is,

fact, defective in just the way

in

John-and-Ji

case.

1 1

Is John

(LI)

The principle

Consider again the

is.

identical to Jill?

To answer this

question by appeal to (L3), one must determine
first whether there are
times

t

and t'

such that R* relates John, t, Jill, and
t'.

in the context

in

such times exist.

As before,

question, one shall be unable to determine whether
(L3)

is, thus,

ineffective in this context.

Furthermore, it is unclear how one might obtain this
necessary information if one in fact "leaves the identity open."
(L4)

in

L4.

x=y

contrast yields that John and Jill are distinct.
*-*

)((x exists at t &
exists
at t' &
y
t is earlier than or the same as t')-»
R*x,t ,y,t )
(t) (t

'

1

R* does not hold among John, tl, Jill, and t2.

So by

(L4) JilljAJohn.

So far, so good.
An adequate principle must also direct that Reagan lived twenty

years ago, and that the old general is the brave officer.

Consider,

again, the schematic version of these cases, involving a, b, and c who

exist at tl, t2, and t3, respectively.

An adequate principle would

yield that a=c.
As before, Ra,tl,b,t2 and Rb,t2,c,t3.

Two applications of (Dl)
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yield that R*a,tl,b,t2, R*b,t2,c,t3,
and R*a,tl,c,t3.

Of course,

does not direct, given only the fact
that R*a,tl,c,t3, that a=c.

requires more:

it

requires for identity that for

such that a exists at t and c exists
at

t\

aJJ_

(L4)
(L4)

times t and t’

R* relates a, t, c, and

t\

Thus, before applying (L4), one must
establish that each of the

following pairs (among others) satisfies the
condition specified by
(L4):

<tl, t2>, <tl, tl>,
<t2, t3>, <t2, t2>,
<tl, t3>, <t3, t3>

The condition, specifically, is (A):
A.

(a exists at
R*a,t,c,t'

t

& c

It can now be seen that

exists at t

*

)

—

(L4), too, is ineffective.

For, as it

happens, whether certain pairs satisfy (a) cannot be determined in the

context described.

The easiest way to see that this is so is to

imagine that each member in the original cast has
am supposing here that

a

thing may be

situation is depicted below.

a

a

contemporary.

contemporary of itself.)

(I

The

Arrows, as before, indicate the R-rela-

tion.

o ^_

O

.O
“

d

e

O

O

a

b

c

tl

t2

t3

2.

f
.

O

Problem Case for (L4)

The R-relation is not exemplified except at these points.

(One may

look across the "matter of mind" to see how often R is exemplified.
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Suppose, e.g., that

a

at t intentionally sips a cup of coffee.

be known, without appeal

It can

to questions of identity between persons,
that

the thoughts associated with the action of
intentionally sipping coffee

occur just once.)

But it is absolutely crucial to note that from
the

fact that R is exemplified no more times than
indicated above, it does
not follow, for example, that it is not the case that
Rc,t3,f,t3.
if c=f,

then indeed Rc,t3,f,t3.

And diversity between

c

and

f

For

has not

yet been established.
Let us turn, then, to the issue at hand.
should, that a=c?
satisfy

(A)?

Consider, for example, the pair <t2,t2>.

If either a or c fails to exist at t2,

satisfies (A).
b,

But suppose that both

a

If each is

The result is the same, if

But now consider the case in which a=b and c=e.

before <t2,t2> satisfies (A).

Does it

then <t2,t2>

and c exist at t2.

then as before <t2,t2> satisfies (A).

each is e.

Does (L4) direct, as it

But suppose now that b^e.

case, it would be false that R*a,t2,c,t2.

In

If b=e,

as

this

(Recall that exemplifica-

tions of R, hence, of R*, are limited in accordance with the above

diagram.

The issue could be settled easily enough if the possibility that
c=e could be precluded.

<t2,t2> will

For, if c=e, then whether or not b=e,

satisfy (A).

Thus, is c=e?

There are alternative means of showing diversity

between c and e which should be considered.

If,

for example, it can

be shown that c^f, then it may be inferred that ~R*e,t2,c,t3 and,

hence, by

(L4) that c^e.

mining whether c=f.

(L4

) ,

however, provides no means of deter-

As pointed out before, it cannot simply be assumed
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that ~R*c,t3,f,t3.
and t3.

And, clearly, if c=f, then R* holds among
c, t3, f,

But, if c^f, then the relation does not hold.

Thus, it is

difficult to justify the claim that R* holds, and
so, difficult to use
(L4) to decide identity between c and f.
is

ineffective.

In this context, then,

And here, as before, it seems that one must

al

(L4)

ready

know whether c=b, before one can support the claim that
R* holds.
If

it can be shown that c^d,

sion that ~R*c,tl,e,t2
R

are limited).

to use

(L4

)

then one can reason to the conclu-

(given, again, the fact that exemplifications of

And, if

R*c,tl,e,t2 then by (L4), c^e.

But, again,

to determine diversity between c and d, one would first

have to determine diversity between c and f.

Problems with this task

have already been noted.

Determining diversity between

c

and e would do as well, for set-

tling the issue of identity between c and d; but this is the very question at hand.
It

should be noted that, while (L4) fails to direct that a=c, it

does not direct the clearly false a^c.

It simply yields no results.

Thus, (L4) is, we may say, ineffective in
contexts

— in

contexts in which

a

can be expected to yield results.

a

variety of ordinary

principle adequate for our purposes
Indeed, it cannot be used to answer

certain even extremely straightforward questions of identity.

The several

identity criteria considered in this chapter have

been found to be ineffective in contexts in which we expect adequate

principles to yield results.

Considerable observational data have been

assumed (such as the location and nature of thoughts and actions); yet
the Lockean principles so far considered have been no more helpful

in
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indicating how person-stuff is properly
divided into persons than
either the Principle of the Identity
of Indi scerni bles (Id) or the

Principle of the Indi scerni
Chapter

I,

bi

1

ity of Identicals

(In).

I

argued, in

that it is unclear whether these
principles can be used to

settle issues of identity between
persons in certai crucial contexts.
The argument is based on the fact
that it is unclear whether one as-

cription of properties can be justified over
others, in those contexts
of interest to us here.

Of course, unless one can justify

a

particular

ascription of properties over others, one cannot
use (Id) or (In) to

determine identity.

In this

chapter

principles are similarly defective.
whether the

R

I

have argued that the Lockean

The difficulty is in determining

relation, or the R* relation, holds.

And, of course,

without this information, the corresponding principles are
of no use
whatsoever.
Indeed (LI) through (L4) appear to be, if anything, more proble-

matic than (LL) is.

In the case of

(LL), the possibility that, in the

contexts of interest here, the principle shall be of use remains open.
(There may be, for instance, unique essential properties.)

But for

each of (LI) through (L4), there appear to be certain crucial contexts
in

which the principle is without

tell

a

doubt ineffective.

For we cannot

just who has consciousness of whose activities, until issues of

personal

identity are settled.

of identity,

Thus, if we even admit the possibility

or diversity, between objects, we become very unclear on

whether or not the R, or R*, relation in fact holds.
One might object that some further principle could be introduced,

which would provide conditions under which R* holds by appealing to our
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abundance of observational data.

However, it is unclear that there

any true principle which both links
observational

U

data and the R, or

R*, relation _and is itself effective.
In

any case, the hope behind each
Lockean principle introduced so

far has been that that principle
would enable the subject, who has the

ability to "herald** persons and who has
at hand unlimited observational
data, to answer questions of identity.

The subject wonders, we may

suppose, whether the person before him on Saturday
and the person

before him on Sunday are the same .
the situation at hand.

A principle adequate for our purposes would

enable him to answer this question.
effect

a

full

He observes carefully and closely

definition of

"...

Certainly,

a

principle which is in

is a person" would do the trick;

but, since we have got no such principle we must ask
whether there is

anything less than that which would yield the desired information.
is not clear that

(LI) through

(LL) will

(L4) will

serve this purpose; and it is clear that

not.

A1

It would be

It

ternati ves

premature to dismiss Locke's account of personal

identity at this point.

Other, more promising alternative formulations

of his position remain to be considered.

One alternative involves con-

joining certain principles considered above; the other involves an
appeal

to the notion of a temporal

person part

,

or a person-stage .

(L3) was rejected because it was shown to be ineffective in

certain contexts, not because it was shown to be false.

jected for the same reason.

(L4) was

Thus, there is no reason to think, at

re-
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this point, that the conjunction of
(L3) and (L4) is false.

Further-

more, conveniently enough, where one
principle does not provide answers
to the questions of identity so far
raised, the other principle does.

Thus, the conjunction of (L3) and (L4)
may succeed as

a

criterion even

though each principle alone fails.

Reconsider the “brave officer" case.
that the old general

is the

young boy.

(L3), but not

(L4), directs

Reconsider as well the case of

Jill, who at t2 fails to remember doing anything John
did at tl.

directs, in contrast to (L3), that Jill
the conjunctive principle
L5.

is

distinct from John.

(L4)

Thus,

(L5)

(L3) & (L4)

has a certain advantage over each of (L3) and (L4) alone.

The second formulation involves quantification over person -

stages rather than persons.
"s',

"

Two definitions will be helpful.

and "s“" vary just over person-stages.

Let "s,"

Then,

Ms,s'~

D2.

has consciousness of having done
in fact did (does)

s'

(doing) something

M is reflexive but neither symmetric or transitive.

s

One might object

that persons, not stages, are the sorts of things that have consciousness or perform actions.

person at
him at

t

—

If a

time t lifts that bale, surely the stage that belongs to

a

i

But this objection is not compelling.

f

there is such

if one wishes,

a

thi ng

—

1 i

fts that bale as well.

one may substitute for the literal

of doing something

s

in fact did"

"s'

has consciousness

Grice's metaphorical

memory of an action actually contained

in

However,

"s'

contains

s."^

A criterion appealing to the M-relation rather than to the an-

a
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cestral of this relation will

be problematic.

Such

a

criterion, like

(L2), is vulnerable to the "brave officer"
objection. 11

Thus,

second

a

definition is required.
D3.

M*s

,s

'

—

(Ms, s'

M* holds between
or

and

s

s'

v

s

,s

1

)

and s' just in case either M holds between

are linked by

related by M.

a

s

and

s'

series of person-stages, pairs of which are

Finally, the criterion may be stated.

(7x)(s is

S.

(3s")(M*s,s" & M*s"

stage of x) =
is a stage of x)<->.
) (
(M*s,s‘ v M*s ,s)
a

s

(7 x

'

'

Thus,

and s'

s

between

s

are stages of the same person just in case M* holds

and s'.

Consider, yet again, the schematic version of the "brave officer"
case.

Call

"s3.

Then, given the facts of the case, by (D2) Msl ,s2 and Ms2,s3;

"

a's tl stage,

thus by (D3) M*sl,s3.

(S)

"si"; b's t2 stage,

yields then that a=c.

infer that the young boy is the old general.

and-Ji

1
1

"

case.

"s2";

and c's t3 stage,

Similarly one could

Consider again the "John-

Call John's tl stage "s4" and Jill's t2 stage "s5."

M*

does not link s4 and s5; thus, by (S), the person to whom s4 belongs—

that is, John

— is

not identical

to the person to whom s5 belongs— that

is, Jill.

(L5) and

(S) thus

both yield results which are intuitively cor-

rect when applied to the cases that have already been introduced.
(S) may be thought to be flawed in a way

(S)

is simply vacuously true,

(L5)

is not.

For unless

it presupposes the existence of person-

stages, that is, temporal person parts.

If these entities exist, what
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are they?

Presumably, one is to come to an understanding
of the notion

of temporal
a

^

parts by analogy— by understanding first, the
notion of

P art

*

But just what the analogies are supposed to be
between

the two cases is unclear.
spatial

a

The disanalogies are what stand out.

The

parts are at least in principle separable from one
another.

Temporal parts are not.

An entity may exist at a given location when

only an arbitrary minute temporal part of it exists
there.

entity cannot exist at

a

But an

time if only one arbitrary minute spatial part

of it exists at that time.

Still, the supposition that person-stages,

which have some very brief duration and are individuated by appeal
to

a

principle of the "unity of consciousness," is not itself obviously incoherent.

In the

following chapters,

shall

I

in fact be making this

very supposition.

Fundamentally, the claim that person-stages exist will be no more
than

supposition.

a

Just now, however,

I

wish to point out

a

certain

advantage (S) has over (L5), and, thus, indirectly the practicality of
the supposition that there are person-stages.

Consider the following example,
a

reads

a

and b both exist at time tl.

book then, and is aware of doing so.

then, and is aware of doing so.

after tl.

a

fact a^b.

In

b sews on a button

No one exists before or

The case may be depicted as follows.

o
a

o
b

tl

3.

Problem Case for (L5)
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As before, R is exemplified only as
indicated; nonetheless, it cannot
be determined at this point that
~Ra,tl,b,tl.
(L5) yields concerning such a case.

On

Consider the results

(L3), a=b if and only if there

is some action one performs of which
the other has consciousness.

a-b, then there is such an action:
on the button,

since

b

does.

a

If

has consciousness of b's sewing

If a^b, then

(given the limited number of

exemplifications of R--just two, in this case) there is
no such action.
Thus,

(L3

)

cannot be used to determine whether a=b unless one
already

has at hand this very information.

Clearly (L4) is no more helpful.
identity between
Is

(S)

a

and b unless it is already known whether a=b.

similarly flawed?

To use

and b one must have already at hand

person-stages.
"s2."

As before, call

a

of himself reading.

(S) to infer diversity between a

means of differentiating between

a's tl-stage "si" and b's tl-stage

These two stages are distinct,

b sews on a

(L4) cannot be used to decide

a

reads at tl and is then aware

Such thoughts, but no others, are contained in si.

button at tl, and is at tl aware of himself sewing.

thoughts but these occur in s2.
in order to use

(S) then directs that a^b.

No

One thus,

(S) to decide identity between a and b, must have at

hand information concerning the identities of person-stages .

But one

need not have already at hand information concerning the identities of

persons .
(S)
it really?

seems, then, to have

a

certain advantage over (L5).

But does

It was assumed that a's tl-stage, si, and b's tl-stage, s2,

were distinct.

Gi ven

this assumption, it was easy to determine that M

failed to hold between these two stages.

Since there exist, ex hypoth-
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—

these tw0 stages, and since M fails
to hold between them,

*

clearly so does M*.
is,

Applying (S), one obtains finally that a^b
(that

that the person to whom

si

belongs is distinct from the person to

whom s2 belongs).
It was

was made.

Here

a

taken as fact that sl^s2 before any attempt
to apply

(s)

The ability to individuate among person-stages
was assumed.

question arises.

If one has the ability to distinguish between

distinct, simultaneous person-stages, does one
not also have the ability to judge, after having examined at

a

given time what are in fact

distinct persons, that they are in fact distinct?

If this question is

answered affirmatively then (S) after all has no advantage
over (L5);
if one
a

is

in

a

position to apply (S), one would then be, ipso facto

in

position to apply (L5).
In

fact, however, the answer to our question is "no."

have the ability to distinguish simultaneous person-stages

without having the ability to distinguish between
a

,

single time and are at that time examined.

a

One may
si

and s2

and b, who exist at

One may, for instance, be

ignorant as to whether a, like milk, can exist in entirely disjoint

locations at

a

given time.

A second question concerning the supposed advantage of (S) over
(L5) might be raised.

and that

a

It was assumed above that person-stages exist

means of individuating them was at hand.

An alternative

supposition would be that there are persons and that synchronic identity conditions for them are at hand.

We must, it seems, make one sup-

position or the other; does it really matter which of the two suppositions is adopted?

If not, then,

it does not matter whether

(S) or
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(L5) is ultimately adopted.

(L5).

If not,

(S)

would have no advantage over

However, despite the fact that the main
topic of this thesis

personal

survival

d iachronic

,

is

which might seem to involve only issues
of

identity, it is actually important that
one and not the

other supposition is made.

Indeed, mere suppositions concerning syn-

chronic identities of persons must be avoided
at this time.

For, as it

happens, how issues of person survival are settled
may decide how

certain issues of synchronic identity should be
settled.
The primary goal of this chapter is to state

a

plausible, work-

able Lockean criterion of identity for persons— a
basis on which de-

cisions concerning survival may be made.
to count as Lockean principles.
in which

Both (S) and (L5) would seem

But (L5) is effective only in contexts

issues of synchronic identity are already settled.

not so of (S).

This is

To use (S), one need only have settled issues of ident-

ity between person-stages.

Thus, in the following sections, it is (S)

rather than (L5) which is developed and scrutinized.

In particular,

(S) must be defended against two “charges of circularity," one rather

obscure and the other,

a

bit more well-known.

I

turn, now, to these

objections.

"

Charges of Circularity "

Both the M-relation and the R-relation were specified in terms of

the notion of one thing's having consciousness of having done something

another in fact did.

The elucidation of this notion is the primary

topic of this section.
In

particular, there are two difficulties which must be overcome.
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(1)

If

"something" in "y has consciousness of having
done something

x

did," is construed as equivalent to "some
action-type," then clearly one

person may have consciousness of performing actions
in fact performed
by others, such as bathing the dog or
reading

book.

a

thing" is interpreted in this way, principle (S)
will
false results.

Thus, if "some-

generate numerous

Suppose, then, that "something" is construed as meaning

^some action - token

.

(Examples of such entities would be Sam's bathing

the dog this morning and my reading

a

book yesterday).

Then, where

V"

varies over individual, irrepeatable action-tokens, "y has
consciousness of doing something x did" may be expanded as "(3<y)(x performed
y has consciousness of hi

having himself performed °c)."

construed in accordance with this expansion,

cularity" may be raised against it.
sciousness of
be identical

hi

having performed

a

If

(S)

is

certain "charge of cir-

For surely y cannot have con<*,

unless y also believes himself to

to the unique performer of

<*.

The difficulty is that the

criterion is beginning to look circular, for implicitly referred to in
the right-hand side of (S) is the concept of identity.

Perhaps it is

this objection Joseph Butler had in mind when he wrote:
one should really think it self-evident that
.
.
.
consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and
therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any
more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which is presupposes.^
(2)

Assume, as before, that "y has consciousness of having done

something x did" is to be expanded as "(3°<)(x performed
sciousness of his having himself performed

<*)."

ment that y's consciousness by accurate or true .
the door for counter-examples.

&

& y

has con-

There is no requireThis omission opens

Bernard Williams imagines the case of
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Charles, who lives during the twentieth
century and has the false
belief that he himself is the
seventeenth-century Guy Fawkes. 13
Charles' delusion is detailed and accurate;
he can even be imagined to
be clairvoyant with respect to Guy
Fawkes'

thoughts and actions.

Clearly, Guy Fawkes and Charles are distinct
persons; but (S) instructs
that they are the same. 14

This difficulty for (S) cannot be overcome by

requiring that y's consciousness be accurate or true.

For such

a

construal would make the account vulnerable to yet
another "charge of

circularity.

Clearly, the accuracy of y's consciousness cannot be

determined unless identity between

x and

y--the unique performer of

°c--

is already known.
In this

section

I

will

consider the question of whether either of

these two objections signifies irreparable flaws in the criteria stated
above.

I

will

conclude that neither clearly does.

The former "charge of circularity" will be discussed first.

locution "y has consciousness of doing something

x

in

The

fact did" can be

expanded in accordance with (El).
El.

(El)

y has consciousness at t‘ of having done
something x in fact did at t «-»
there is something x did at t, and
y has consciousness at t' of his having
himself done this thing x did.

is, of course, vague.

whether the something

x

The first issue which must be settled is

does is an action-token or an action-type.

(E2), or (E3), what is wanted for the purpose of stating

identity for persons?

a

Is

criterion of
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E2.

y has consciousness at t' of having done something
x in fact did at t
There is an individual, irrepeatable

action-token
performed by x at t, and
y has consciousness at t' of his having himself
performed this action-token.
E3.

y has consciousness at t' of having done something x in
fact did at t ->
There is a universal, repeatable action-type
performed by x at t, and
y has consciousness at t' of his having himself
performed this action-type

Examples of what

I

am calling "individual, irrepeatable action-tokens,"

are my working on my thesis now, your eating dinner
last evening, and

Nixon's resigning as President of the United States August
2, 1974.

Examples of what

writing

a

I

am calling "universal, repeatable action-types" are

thesis, eating dinner, and resigning as President of the

United States.

Thus, for instance (7), together with (E3) but not

(E2), entails that Bob has consciousness of doing something Sam did:
7.

Sam bathed Rover this morning, and Bob has
consciousness this evening of his having
himself bathed Rover.

In contrast,

(E2) as well

as

(E3) yields, with (8), that Bob has con-

sciousness of doing something Sam did.
8.

(S), given

Sam bathed Rover this morning, and Bob
has consciousness this evening of his
having himself performed the action of
Sam's bathing Rover this morning.
(E2) but not given

first "charge of circularity."

(E3), is apparently vulnerable to the
I

turn to this objection now.

ledged difficulty may be stated as follows.
Bob is identical to Sam.

The al-

Suppose one wonders whether

For Bob to have consciousness of his perform-

ing the irrepeatable action-token of Sam's bathing Rover is just for
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Bob both to have consciousness
that he is identical to Sam and
to have

consciousness of Sam's bathing Rover.

Thus, the concept of identity of

which (S) is alleged to provide an
account is implicitly appealed to
the right-hand side of that principle.
It

is

(S)

in

is, thus, circular. 15

perhaps obvious that this objection to
(S) fails.

(S)

has

not here been alleged to define
"identity" or to analyze the concept of

identity.

It

is, rather

,

intended to convey information concerning the

nature of persons, specifically, information
concerning changes which
person may undergo without ceasing to exist.

having to do with the nature of persons

nature of identity

,

,

a

is this information,

It

not information concerning the

which must not be presupposed.

Thus, one may in-

deed need to understand the concept of identity
to be able to determine

whether Bob has the appropriate "consciousness"; but one
need not already have any accurate opinion as to conditions under
which persons—
in

contrast to ships or piles of stones

— persist

through time.

Thus, given that the questionable locution is understood in ac-

cordance with (E2
ling.

)

this first "charge of circularity" is not compel-

There are, however, other problems with (E2).

lowing case, adopted from
is

a

Castaneda example.

Consider the fol-

Suppose that Quintus

attempting, on Monday, to find his way out of the Stanford library.

Suppose, too, that he is aware of what he is doing, but that he realizes neither that h£ is Quintus, nor that the day is Monday.

In this

case, it seems that Qunitus indeed has consciousness of performing one
of Quintus' Monday actions.

But, given, Quintus'

ignorance, it is not

the case that he has consciousness of himself performing the action of

Quintus's attempting to find his way out of the library on Monday.

58

(E3)

invulnerable to this particular objection.

is

Since Quintus

seeks to find his way out of the
library, and since quintus has con-

sciousness of himself seeking to find his
way out of the library, by
(E3) Quintus does indeed have
consciousness of doing something Quintus

did.

Should "has consciousness of" in (S), then,
be expanded in ac-

cordance with

(

E3

)

?

(S),

so interpreted,

is problematic.

Suppose that

Sam bathed Rover this morning, and that an
hour later Bob bathed Rover.

Suppose further that Bob has consciousness of his
bathing Rover.
nally, suppose that Bob^Sam.

doing something which Sam did.

Fi-

Then by (E3) Bob has consciousness of
It is easy to see that,

if

"has con-

sciousness of" in (S) is interpreted in accordance with
(E3), (S) will
generate false results.

Before resolving the issue of whether (E2), (E3) or neither is an
adequate expansion of "x has consciousness of having done something
y
in fact did,"

it will

be convenient to introduce the second "charge of

circularity."

The Second Charge

Whether (E2) or (E3) is finally adopted, the "Guy Fawkes" problem
arises.

Suppose that twentieth-century Charles believes falsely that

he plotted, as Guy Fawkes in fact did, against the British during the

seventeenth century.

Does this belief count as

a

case of Charles' hav-

ing consciousness of doing something Guy Fawkes in fact did?

said so far precludes that it does.
so interpreted,

(S) will

Nothing

But it "has consciousness of" is

generate obviously false results— for in-
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stance, that Guy Fawkes and Charles are
identical.
One might suggest that "has consciousness
of" is properly defined
in

such a way that, if the consciousness is
inaccurate or "false," then

it

is

lacking altogether.

take this proposal

The following modifications of (E2) and
(E3)

into account.

(For simplicity,

suppress reference

I

to times here.

E2'.

y has consciousness of doing something
x in fact did «-*•
1.
There is an individual, irrepeatable
action-token performed by x;
2.
y has consciousness of himself
performing that action-token; and,
3.
y in fact performed that action-token.

E3‘.

has consciousness of doing something
y in fact did
x

1.

2.
3.

It

is clear that

There is a universal, repeatable
action-type performed by x;
y has consciousness of himself
performing that action-type; and,
y in fact performed that action-type.

whether (E2‘) or (E3

against (S) may be raised.
On (E2

'

) ,

'

)

is adopted,

serious objections

Consider again the "Guy Fawkes" example.

Charles has the appropriate consciousness only if in fact he

performed the action of Fawkes' plotting against the British.

To

determine whether Charles performed this action-token, one would have
to know already whether Charles is Fawkes.

On

(E3‘), Charles has the

appropriate consciousness only if he performed the action of plotting
against the British.

To determine whether Charles performed this

action-type, one would have to discover first whether Charles is
identical to any of those persons

against the British.

— including

Guy Fawkes--who plotted

Thus, (S) read in accordance either with (E2

with (E3‘) appears to be circular.

'

)

or
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Perry's Defense

Some contemporary philosophers, bearing
in mind this second
16
"charge," have rejected Lockean criteria
altogether.

Others have

attempted to distinguish between genuine memory
and merely apparent
memory (such as Charles') without appeal to the
identity relation.
intuition is that, if the memory is genuine
part of

a

,

The

the original action forms

causal chain resulting in the subject's later
consciousness

of having performed that action.

On such

a

view, Charles' memory is

merely apparent, since it is not Fawkes' plotting that
causes Charles'
later delusion, but rather his reading about Fawkes together
with

a

certain mental instability.
Such

a

"causal" approach has a second advantage.

Recall that the

suggested expansions of "has consciousness of" (E2) and (E3) were problematic.

(E2) was subject to the "Quintus" objection, and (E3), taken

together with (S), simply produced the wrong results— yielding, for
example, that where Bob is not Sam, since Bob has consciousness of
bathing Rover and Sam in fact bathed Rover, Bob

defense of (E2) suggests itself.
way of defending

a

modified (E3).

j_s

Sam.

No effective

But the "causal" approach suggests

a

Since it was not Sam's bathing Rover

which ultimately resulted in Bob's consciousness that

jie

bathed Rover,

the hoped-for expansion of "has consciousness of" will not yield that
Bob has consciousness of doing something Sam in fact did.

The remain-

der of this section will be devoted to developing this "causal"

approach.
(E4) expresses the above informally-stated and, as it stands.
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ill-fated intuition.

"0" varies over
repeatable, universal

action-

types.
E4.

y has consciousness at t'
x in fact did at t
*—
1.

There is a 0 such that x performed
0 at t;

2.

y has consciousness at t'

3.

himself having performed 0;
x's performing 0 causes y to have
this consciousness.

(E4) is clearly inadequate.

Fawkes'

of doing something

of his having

For it is possible, even likely, that

actual plotting against the British is at least

tor leading to Charles'

later delusions.

a

causal fac-

What Fawkes did is partly why

he was written about in the history books Charles later read.

Rover" case can also be detailed in such
for (E4)

.

a

way that it is

a

The

problem

One can imagine that, while Sam and Bob separately bathe

Rover, it is Sam's bathing

Rover— not Bob's— which causes

Bob later to

have consciousness of himself bathing Rover.

Substituting for clause (3) the phrase "x's performing is the
sole cause of y's later consciousness" does not, for obvious reasons,

improve matters
this morning.

a

whit.

I

have consciousness of having eaten breakfast

But (E4) directs that in fact

I

lack such consciousness,

since my eating this morning is obviously not the sole cause of my

current remembrance.
John Perry develops the "causal" approach in

way.^

I

a

less objectionable

turn now to his theory.

According to Perry, three conditions must be met
someone to have

a

genuine memory of an earlier event,

individual, non-recurrent event-tokens.

in

order for

"E" varies over
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D4.

«E
There is a x such that x witnessed E;
y represents to himself the past occurrence of an event of E's type; and,
x's witnessing of E is C-related to
y's representation of the past occurrence of an event of E's type.

y remembers
!•

2.
3.

Some explanation of each of these three
clauses is in order.
The term "represent," according to Perry,

ways
type

".

.

.

covers the many

person can indicate the past occurrence of an event
of

a

.

.

."—by imagining the event,

or by painting

a

certain

a

by verbally describing the event,

picture of the event/ 0

Someone may wi tness an event by either perceiving it or by
inten-

tionally performing it, on Perry's view. 20
Perry specifies the C-relation by appeal to the notion of recol1

ecti on

.

D5.

("Recollection" is, for him,

a

technical term.)

y recollects E
1.

2.

3.

There is a x such that x witnessed E;
y represents to himself the past occurrence of an event of E's type; and,
y's stage at the time of the representing and x's stage at the time of
the witnessing are stages of the
same live human body/~

Linking the C-relation and recollection. Perry writes:
any ordinary human is drawn to the belief that
.
.
.
there is [a causal] explanation for the frequent occurrence of unaided cases of recollection, that there
is some process, material or immaterial, gross or
sublime, complex or simple, which frequently occurs
when a human being [or live human body] witnesses an
event and leads to that same human's later representation of it.
When the witnessing of an event leads
by this process to a later representation of it, t±e
witnessing and the representation are [C-related]/

Thus, on Perry's view, the C-relation can be specified as

.

.

relation that explains the great bulk of cases of recollection."

the
23
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Since live human bodies and persons
are different sorts of things,

according to Perry, the third condition
does not lead to circularity.
Perry
follows.
(0,

proposal can be adapted to views already
expressed as

s

It

is his notion of the C-relation which
is most helpful.

as before,

E5.

varies over repeatable, universal action-types.

y has consciousness of doing something
x did *—*
1.
There is some action 0 such that x
intentionally performs 0;
2.
y has consciousness of his having
himself performed 0; &
3.
x's performance is C-related to
y's consciousness.

Consider, then, the cases at hand— the "Guy Fawkes" case and
the
Rover" case.

Does Charles have consciousness, on (E5), of plotting

against the British, an action which Fawkes in fact performed?
Fawkes'
by

(D5

) ,

Charles'

performance is C-related to Charles' consciousness.
Charles' consciousness is £Ot

a

Only if

Clearly,

case or recollection, for

later stage and Fawkes' early stage are stages of distinct

human bodies.

But it does not follow from this fact that the C-rela-

tion does not hold between Fawkes' action and Charles' consciousness.
The C-relation may hold even when the correlated stages are not stages
of the same live human body.

Thus,

".

.

.

by distinguishing between

[the C-relation] and the relation of being or belonging to the same

human body, and by virtue of our lack of knowledge of the [C-relation],
it becomes possible to think of the two as separate.

and representings, to use Perry's language,

".

.

.

Witnessings

might be [C-relaOC

ted], though not experiences of the same human body
of, not just human bodies, but of

".

.

.

.

.

.

."

Events

ghosts or even gorse-bushes

64

..."

may be related by C. 26
Thus, the question of whether Charles'
consciousness and Fawkes'

action are related by C has yet to be answered.
that the causal

link between Fawkes' action and Charles'
consciousness

"...

is not that

But it is surely clear

process, material or immaterial, gross or sublime,

complex or simple, which frequently occurs when

a

[live human body]

witnesses an event and leads to that same human's later
representation
0-7

of it."

Similarly, it may be concluded that, although Sam's bathing

Rover is part of what caused Bob's later consciousness of
he himself
having bathed Rover, Sam's action and Bob's consciousness
are not C-re1

ated.
(E5) thus has advantages over (E4).

In

(E5) the causal

betwen actions and consciousness has been restricted in such

dubious cases of consciousness have been eliminted.

relation
a

way that

(S) does not

generate, if "has consciousness of" is read in accordance with (E5)
rather than (E4), obvious falsehoods such as Charles' being identical
to Fawkes or Bob's being identical to Sam.
(E5) needs defending on many fronts, however.

mention

a

few problems here.

(E5)

I

will just

is an account of how the phrase "y

has consciousness of doing something x in fact did" is to be expanded;
it is not a definition.

(E5) as such perhaps helps one to understand

the questionable locution; but it does not by itself suffice to convey
the concept.
In this respect

(E5).

(D4), suggested by Perry, may seem preferable to

For one difference between (D4) and (E5) is that "y has con-

sciousness

-

-

or "x remembers - -

is explained in terms of "y
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represents to himself
status of

senting

a

definition.

Primarily for this reason (D4) has the

Perry says

so mething to oneself

,

a

bit about the notion of repre -

but not enough to indemnify himself

against charges of vagueness on this
account.
A second difficulty is one which

theory.

Consider the following case.

(E5) inherits from Perry's

Dr. Smith wonders whether the

memory Jones seems to have just after having
his left cerebral hemisphere removed is an instance of memory as
specified by (D4).

Dr. Smith

understands thoroughly both the mechanism which
explains Jones' postoperative mental activities, and the manner in which the
human brain

ordinarily functions.

On Perry's view, Jones' memory is genuine only

if his postoperative and preoperative experiences
are C-related.

And

they are C-related just in case that relation which explains
the "great
bulk" of cases of recollection holds between them.

Does it?

provides no accurate way of determining whether or not

sentation belongs to the "great bulk."

a

Perry

case of repre-

And anyway the C-relation may

hold between a representing and some action even though that representings does not belong to the "great bulk."

Presumably Dr. Smith shall

have to ask himself whether Jones' recollection is sufficiently, or

relevantly, similar to more normal cases of recollection.
manners of vaguenesses emerge.

And here all

Each is inherited by (E5).

Despite its flaws. Perry's work nonetheless has value:
demonstrates that

a

it

non-circular memory criterion may well be within

the range of the feasible.

At the very least, he indicates what such

criterion might "look like," if it exists.
I

will

not attempt to detail Perry's theory further here, since

a
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it is not my primary aim to evaluate
the circularity charges.
I

should note that, looking ahead

a

However,

bit, one can find good reason to

believe that an acceptable account of memory
can be given which does
j]ot^

appeal

to a claim of identity between the relevant
persons.

I

will

conclude eventually that it may happen that in
certain so-called
fission

cases, two persons

— say,

b and

something one person— a— in fact did.

c— have

consciousness of doing

Thus, the claim that y has con-

sciousness of performing an action in fact performed by x
entails that
x=y

(as

it would

if identity between x and
y is appealed to in the

definition of "y has consciousness of doing something

x

did") leads to

contradiction, given that fission cases are at least possible.
an adequate elucidation of "has consciousness of" will

principle (S) circular.

Thus,

not render
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CHAPTER

III

FISSION PUZZLES

In

the preceding chapter, several
objections to Lockean criteria

of personal

identity were considered.

the face of these objections.

Criteria were reformulated in

Given this work, it seems reasonable
to

conclude that criteria which both
capture the Lockean spirit and are

nonetheless invulnerable to ineffecti

vi ty

charges, Reid's "brave

soldier" objection, and circularity
charges may well be available.

Other objections to the Lockean approach,
however, have not yet
been countered.
a

In

this chapter and the following two,

cluster of difficulties involving

the Lockean principle (S).

I

ple as the "fission case."

will

a

will

I

focus on

single apparent counterexample to

refer to this apparent counterexam-

Different versions of it have been

presented and discussed by several philosophers, including

B.

A. 0.

Williams, David Wiggins, Derek Parfit, John Perry, Roland
Puccetti

,

and

David Lewis.

The version

which,

argue, can only implausibly be held to be logically im-

I

will

I

introduce in Section

I

following is one

possible and is at the same time apparently effective against

a

wide

variety of Lockean criteria.

Williams finds in such "splitting" cases reason enough to reject
psychological continuity criteria in general

70

in favor of

(certain)

71

bodily continuity criteria.
will

Williams' conclusion does not follow,

I

point out, from his premises; and,
in any case, it seems that
any

otherwise satisfactory bodily criterion
can be counterexampled, together with psychological

continuity criteria, by the fission case.

This latter claim has
ported.

a

paradoxical air to it; but it can be sup

The claim is based on a certain
perfectly general problem—

problem designed to undermine bodily
continuity criteria as well as
psychological continuity cri teria— which
will be introduced towards
the end of this chapter.

consider and reject
this more general

a

In the final

section of this chapter,

I

single solution, proposed by Derek Parfit, to

problem.

The Fission Case

The following example seems to show that the memory
criterion (S)

developed in the preceding chapter leads to contradiction.
of person a is

(carefully) split into two equal parts.

housed in distinct, healthy, brainless human bodies.

creatures— b and
memories.

c— upon

1

The brain

The halves are

The resulting

awakening behave as though they have just a's

But b and c, after surgery, are each utterly unaware of what

the other is doing,

a,

b, and c are all

persons,

si

is a's stage

prior to surgery, s2, b's stage just after b awakens, and s3, c's stage
just after c awakens,

si occurs at tl,

and s2 and s3, at t2.

Thus, s2

and s3 at t2 have consciousness of doing something si does at tl, but

neither s2 nor s3 has consciousness at t2 of what the other is doing at
t2.

Thus, by

(D2), since b and c both have consciousness at t2 of

doing something

a

did at tl, Msl,s2 and Msl,s3.

By

(D3), both M*sl,s2
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and M*sl,s3.

(S)

yields, then, that a=b and that
a=c.

tity relation is both symmetric
and transitive, b=c.
is not the case that Ms2,s3.
s2 and s3,

Ms4,s5 and

.

.

and Msn,s3.

Furthermore, it

And, there is no series of stages
linking

i.e., there are no s4, s5,
.

Since the iden-

.

.

.

sn

such that Ms2,s4 and

Thus, it is not the case that M*s2,s3.

Similar reasoning yields that it is
not the case that M*s3,s2.

information together with (S) entails
that b^c.

with the facts of the fission case
yields

a

Thus,

This

together

(S)

contradiction.

The fission case may be diagrammed
as follows.

(Arrows represent

the M*-rel ati on.

4.

The Fission Case

There are two ways of avoiding this contradiction.

One may

either reject the example itself as impossible, or (S) as false.
the following sections,

I

In

consider both these alternatives.

The Possibility of Fission

If

persons logically cannot undergo fission, then of course any

objection to (S) or to any other criterion of personal identity based
on the fission case is insignificant.

Contemplation of any one of

a
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variety of alternative positions may
lead one to worry that the fission
case is impossible.

There are three such positions.
which is ordinarily thought to be
is

a

A.

person,

Necessarily, if something
a

single conscious being,

subjected to the "fission procedure" described
above, at most one

person is produced.

It is not the case that two or more
conscious

beings could be produced.

Suppose that something which is ordin-

B.

arily thought to be one person is "divided
into" two persons.

Under no

circumstances, then, would the resulting persons have
consciousness of
doing anything the original person in fact did.

C.

Suppose that brain

surgery of some exotic sort does produce two persons from
what is

thought to be just one, and that each of the resulting creatures
has

consciousness of doing something the original in fact did.

Then, under

no ci rcumstances would what appears to be one person in fact
be one

person.
than one.

What appears to be one would really be

a

conglomerate of more

(Each would fail to have consciousness of what the other is

doing; by (S), then, there would be two.)

Positions (A) and (C) both follow from the principle that
impossible to generate, from

a

single person, two persons.

consistent with the negation of this principle.

(B)

It concerns,

it is

is

rather,

the nature of the relationship between the resulting conscious beings

and the original.

I

will

discuss these three positions in this section

and the following, and conclude that the fission case is indeed

possible.

One might wonder why this discussion is necessary when all that
is needed to refute

(S)

is the logical

possibility of fission.

Con-
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trary, perhaps, to appearance,
the discussion is necessary.

For posi-

tions (A) through (C) involve claims
which would be expressed by

sentences of the form "Necessarily, anything
which is

such-and-such features."

Thus,

a

a

person has

philosopher who sincerely accepts any

one of (A) through (C) may sincerely
doubt whether an entity undergoing

the procedure described in Section

I

is a person

.

And indeed if any

one of (A) through (C), none of which
is entirely implausible, is true,
the fission case is impossible.

One method of undermining (A) through (C)
involves an examination
of

a ctual

creatures, entities such as you and me, which cannot
plaus-

ibly be denied that status of personhood 2
.

I

will

rely largely on this

method in the following sections.
Thus, consider (A).

"From the inside" it does seem that

a

single

conscious being cannot serve as material for the production of

a

plur-

ality of such beings, especially where there exists

a

continuity of

mental experience between the original being and each member of the

plurality.

But in fact there is evidence which suggests that people

may not really be what they seem, from an insider's point of view, to
be.
It will

be helpful to have at hand certain physiological

data.

Over seventy percent of the human brain is composed of the left and
right cerebral

hemispheres.

These two anatomically nearly symmetric

parts form the seat of the so-called higher mental functions, including
the ability to speak, reason, learn, calculate, recognize objects, as

well

as to see,

the world .

4

hear, feel, taste, smell, and finally to move about in
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The two cerebral
are functionally.

hemispheres are more alike anatomically
than they

They do different things.

right hemisphere damage may leave

a

For instance, severe

right-handed person linguistically,

but not physically, nearly unimpaired,
whereas severe left hemisphere

damage may leave someone apparently unable
to communicate by means of
spoken or written language.

a

interesting exception to this rule

(An

involves the important ability to understand
so-called "abstract"
language, such as metaphor.

Damage to the right hemisphere signifi-

cantly diminishes this ability. 5

)

Although the hemispheres become, so to speak, accustomed
to performing their own jobs, they seem to have similar capacities
.

Thus,

Stuart Diamond and J. Graham Beaumont write that each hemisphere
has a capacity, but

particular tasks . 5

.

.

.

".

one exceeds the other in proficiency" at

Many who write about the phenomenon of "later-

ality" find it convenient to speak of one hemisphere as being "dominant
for"

a

specific function.

What is ordinarily meant, when

a

given hemi-

sphere is said to be "dominant for" a particular function, is (loosely)
that that hemisphere is more "important" than the other for the com-

pletion of the task, and (more precisely) that that function is more
likely to be diminished or absent if the hemisphere in question is

severely damaged.

The left hemisphere of most right-handers would, for

instance, be said to be dominant for the majority of language-related

functions, including the abilities to speak, write, and understand both
oral

and written communications.

The right hemisphere is dominant for crucial functions as well.

Norman Geschwind writes that it

.

.

is dominant for certain spatial
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functions

for certain musical

.,

.

.

certain aspects of emotional

tasks, and

response ."

.

.

.

possibly for

7

it is thought further that

the right hemisphere is dominant
for calculating and creati ve-associa-

tive thinking.

8

Thus, the speech of those right-handers
who sustain

severe right hemisphere damage tends
to be "monotonous and flat"; and

right-hemisphere patients will perform less
well on
designed to measure spatial ability .

a

variety of tests

9

Right hemisphere damage results in the
subject's receiving lower
scores on the Block Design test (a test which
requires subjects to

arrange blocks in such

a

way that

a

given pattern is repeated); but

left hemisphere damage leads to lower vocabulary
scores.

The hemispheres are, then, functionally unlike;
however, as noted
before, each appears to have some capacity for the
labor that ulti-

mately is divided between them.
The cerebral

hemispheres are joined together by the cerebral

coirmissures, the largest of which is the corpus callosum.

Until

recent

years, the corpus callosum was thought to be without significant cognitive function.

At one point, the role of the corpus callosum was con-

sidered to be merely that of holding the hemispheres in place.

It

is

now known, however, that information is passed from one hemisphere to
the other via the corpus callosum.

What led researchers to this con-

clusion was the fact that bisection of these commissures (the procedure
is called a

"commissurotomy") seems to produce

centers of consciousness in

a

single body."

".

.

.

two separate

And it is this striking

phenomenon which is considered philosophically significant by some

philosophers.

^
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R.

W. Sperry described the
effects of commissurotomy on
non-human

animals as follows:
art * d ln the ear1
* 1950s » mostly on cats and
l
showed
consistently . . . that each hemisphere
:
; surgical separation
after
functions independently to a very
large. extent in most higher
activities, including perception
nin 9
and mem ° ry *
In ob J ective behavioral tests
involving9
!pnc
Adlscnm nat10n learning, each surgically
disconnected
h!m
h
)
S
PerC6iVe ’ lear "’ a " d
er
i ndependently
of°the ojher^’

or

matpf
tes *.*

“

-

Before the effects of the commissurotomy
were thoroughly understood,
the procedure was performed on several
patients suffering from severe

epilepsy.

Their epilepsy was greatly improved by
the surgery; subse-

quent testing then revealed the more dramatic
effects of cormiissurotomy, and the procedure was dropped.

These effects initially were not noticed.

For ordinarily the

conmi ssurotomy patient's left and right
hemispheres received the same

information.
a

(For instance, ordinarily when the left ear is
exposed to

given sound, the right ear is exposed to just the
same sound.)

But,

when testing is carefully restricted, the independence
of the two hemis-

pheres became evident.

Howard Gardner provides
R.

W. Sperry, j^t.

aj_.

In the

a

vivid description of results gleaned by

following passage, he is speaking of

right-handed conmi ssurotomy patient.
With his right hand, the patient could write appropriately,
and with his left hand, he could draw figures accurately.
However, he was unable to write with his left hand (because
the verbal information in the "linguistic" left hemisphere
was inaccessible), and incapable of drawing accurately with
his right hand (because the visual-spatial information in
the right hemisphere was disconnected from his right hand).
Required to copy a three-dimensional model of blocks, the
patient was unable to accomplish this with his right hand.
While the right hand was fitfully struggling to solve the

a
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problem

ne

the left hand, which evidently
understood the task

l,k e a Good Samaritan to rescue
its hapless

cSne

’

ue

It was, however, restrained by
the experimenter.
When words were flashed to the
patient's right visual field
he reported accurately what he had
seen.
When the same
materials were presented to his left
visual field, however
Ste ly reported he hdd seen nothing,
or just a flash
of light.
if
or
If,
however, instead of asking the agnosic
hemisphere what had been seen, the
experimenter instructed the
Se
eft hand t0 P ° 1nt t0 a matchin Picture
among
9
a^nllL^
nn
l!
ti
col ]® c 1 °
Patient could correctly designate the very
»
5
item that he claimed not to have seen.
When verbal information
was presented simultaneously to both
visual fields, the subiect
reported orally what he saw in his right
visual field, but
at
the same time, he was able to draw what
he saw in his left*
visual field.
His right hemisphere seemed unable to perceive
this inconsistency; the left hemi sphere—
which could talkappeared aware of the paradox but remained
impotent in the
face of it . 10

^ht

.

.

Although the left and the right hemispheres,
subsequent to commissurotomy, can no longer "communicate," they continue
to function. 14

Each

hemisphere behaves more or less normally, albeit independently
of the
other.

15

Recall

above.

the

division of labor" between the hemispheres described

As Gardner's discussion suggests, these remarks apply to the

split-brain patient as well as to the normal subject.

For instance,

the split-brain patient is able to describe verbally the information

presented just to his left hemisphere, which is dominant for certain

linguistic tasks; his right hemisphere, if placed in similar circumstances, remains "mute."
that the

talk."

15

"...

Thomas Nagel writes, somewhat misleadingly,

right hemisphere is not very intelligent and it cannot

Nonetheless, the right hemisphere as well as the left

is

capable of responding appropriately (by controlling the left and right
sides of the body, respectively) to instructions of varying levels of

complexity.

17
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A Cartesian might be inclined toward
the view that the right hem-

isphere, with its small quantity of linguistic
ability, is not conscious . 18

But it seems that in fact patients in which
the left hemis-

phere has been fully excised are only implausibly
excluded from the

category of conscious beings.

Oliver L. Zangwill writes, of such

a

patient, that he
•
•
though grossly handicapped in speech and motor
•
performance, was fully alert, in touch with his environment ji^d responsive to those around him.
He was found by
Smith
to be capable of a low-average performance on a
diagrammatic intelligence test.

Interestingly, left-hemisphere patients have been taught to communicate by means of

a

language-like apparatus . 21

Using paper cut-outs as

symbols for nouns, proper names, and verbs, patients expressed in

appropriate contexts simple propositions and behaved appropriately
when, in the same "language," propositions were expressed to them.

These observations make the claim that the right hemisphere (after

commissurotomy) lacks conscious awareness seem implausible.
The data introduced above do not, of course, prove in any sense
that commissurotomy produces a plurality of conscious beings.
it does seem that during certain

However,

periods the split-brain patient

is

most plausibly described as possessing distinct centers of consciousness.

This, in turn, suggests that it is at least possible that

something which would ordinarily be counted

a

single conscious being

can undergo a procedure which produces a plurality of conscious beings.

One now need blend together only
actual

fact.

a

bit of science fiction with

One need imagine only that, after the commissurotomy is

performed, the two hemispheres are removed from the original human
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body, transplanted into each of
two separate bodies, and reconnected
to

distinct middle and lower brains, thereby
producing distinct conscious
beings, each the proud possessor
of his own human body.

creatures surely must be counted persons
subjected to such

a

seems that it is.

procedure.
It

.

These distinct

Obviously, no one has been

But is it logically possible?

is hard to see why surgical

It

procedures delicate

enough to bring about the desired result
could not exist.

The dubious

aspect of the described procedure is that
which involves severing the
lines of communication" between the hemispheres
without destroying

consciousness altogether.

That this aspect is more than possible has

already been substantiated.
I

turn, then, to position (B).

Recall that stage si is

fission stage, and that s2 and s3 are post-fission stages.

a

pre-

Suppose

that it can happen that what is apparently just one person
splits into

two distinct persons.

Position (B) is that, under this assumption, if

cannot happen that the M-relation holds between si and s2 and between
si

and s3.

Against this position it should be noted that the right hemisphere of the conmi ssurotomy patient is capable of learning and, thus,

apparently of remembering.

(Zangwill writes, "The right hemisphere may

be mute but is certainly not amnesiac"^).

despite its minimal

Thus, the right hemisphere,

linguistic capability, apparently retains

in

its

memory certain bits of linguistic information acquired by the patient
prior to commissurotomy.

It seems, then, that there is a certain con-

tinuity of consciousness linking the precommissurotomy patient and the
right hemisphere.

03
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Of course the M*-rel ation

obscure to

and hence the M*-relation,
remains

,

considerable degree since it is
specified by appeal to the
still somewhat vague notion
of x's having consciousness
of doing somea

thing y did.

processes
c ould

But it is implausible to suppose
that whatever causal

gross or sublime" are involved in
generating the M-relation

not link si with s2 and si
with s3.

Furthermore, any specifica-

tion of the "consciousness of"
relation acceptable to the defender of
(S)

will yield together with (S) that
the left-hemisphere patient, for

instance, is identical to the person
who used to occupy his body.
this reason as well,

(B) must be rejected.

Puccetti

Puccetti adopts

For

a

1

s

Theory

view very like position (C).

commissurotomy does not actually produce two persons.
means of separating two intimately related persons.

According to him,
It is rather a

The problem of

deciding identities among a, b, and c, on Puccetti's
view,
.
.
could be overcome by supposing that each cerebral
.
hemisphere in the normal human brain constitutes the
basis for a unitary person, separation and successful
transplantation of each destroying only the original
compound of these two persons. ^

Thus, Puccetti avoids contradiction by maintaining that persons b and c

exist all along, at first within

pendently functioning bodies.

a

single body and later within inde-

The question of with whom the original

persona, a, is identical never arises, since there is no original
person.

Does this way of looking at things save

(

S

)

?

The answer to the

question depends on whether what was originally said to be one stage.
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Sl,

really two; and furthermore,
if two, on whether the
two are re
lated by M*.
Since Puccetti thinks that both
prior and subsequent to
fission there are just two
conscious beings, in fact the same
two
conscious beings, it seems that
he would reply affirmatively
to the
former question and negatively
to the latter.
This line would indeed
is

save (S) from contradiction.

The fission case, as Puccetti describes

it, can be diagrammed as
follows:

o

o

sl

s2

o
sl

o

1

s3

tl

5.

t2

Puccetti

'

s

Example

The basis for his claim that entities which
are normally thought
to be single persons are really conglomerates
of persons cannot, of

course, simply be that if it is correct, then
(S) is saved.

though (S) intuitively seems very plausible,

a

For, even

claim which is even more

intuitively plausible is the claim that under normal conditons what
is
thought to be just one person really is just one person.

This latter

claim is not, of course, something that one is wedded to as one is

wedded to the Law of the Excluded Middle.

Nonetheless,

a

considerable

amount of evidence is required before one is actually justified in re-

jecting it.

Puccetti offers what he considers sufficient evidence.

This evidence is presented in the form of arguments based on neuro-

physiological data and the Principle of the Indiscernibil ity of Iden-
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tical s.
I

Will

consider here only the two arguments
he introduces for his

view that the ordinary human body
is associated with two
conscious
beinas.

These arguments are both,

ment, which

1

think, flawed.

I

(A distinct argu-

will not consider here, is required
to show that each of

conscious beings is

a

person.)

Puccetti argues as follows.
[In] the normal, commissural
ly intact brain there is neurological
representation for the full subjective visual
field in each
cer ebral he misphere .
But in that case,TrT“.^7 wnlH^usness spans both hemispheres through the
commissural connections
between them, j ought to see not one but
two- full visual fields
“
w2th thej_r contents , side b^ side .
But I do not.
I
see only
one full subjective visual field.
But if that is correct, my conscious unity is not based in both cerebral
hemispheres but onlv
J

one.^

in

Thus, on Puccetti's view, in my visual
single, small, red

calls

a

rug.^

Neural

field now, for example, is

activity

— what

Puccetti prejudicially

neurological representation"--corresponding to what

to be found in each of my cerebral

hemispheres.

sentation in one of my cerebral hemispheres that
red rug.

I

see is

Suppose, as Puccetti

apparently does, that it is in virtue of there being

a

a

I

a

red-rug-repre-

see, or seem to see,

Suppose, then, for reductio , that associated with my brain

there is only one conscious being.

(That is, suppose that the

conscious being associated with my left hemisphere just is the one

associated with my right hemisphere.)
bral

hemispheres is

a

Then, since in each of my cere-

red-rug-representation,

see) two red rugs, side by side.

But

I

don't.

I

should see (seem to

Thus, Puccetti con-

cludes, it is not the case that I, the conscious being associated with
the left, verbal hemisphere, am identical to that associated with the
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right, non-verbal

hemisphere.

Thus, under one skull are two
distinct

conscious beings.
Puccetti appeals in this argument
to the principle that for each

distinct red-rug-representation
existing in the hemispheres, one at
least seems to see

a

distinct red rug.

Without this principle, the in-

ference from the fact that there
exist in my hemispheres distinct red-

rug-representations to the claim that
red rugs would be unlicensed.

support.
retinal

either

see, or seem to see, distinct

But this principle is dubious.

Clearly, associated with each of my retinas
is

red-rug-image.
I

I

a

It needs

distinct

But no one would suggest that, therefore,

seem to see two red rugs (which

I

don't) or "I" am really two.

Puccetti himself thinks that this first argument
is suggestive,
but not obviously sound.

^

Thus he offers

a

second argument.

The neurological data that form the basis for this
second

argument are the following.

(The subject, as before, is someone with

an intact corpus callosum.)

It was found that

... if the subject fixated on a point equi-distant between
two flashing lights the light flashing in the left visual
half-field of a right-hander had to precede by, say, 9.75
milliseconds the light flashing in the right visual halffield in order for the subject to report them verbally as
simultaneous.
[In contrast] the flashing lights were perceived in the mute hemisphere at twice the actual time
elapsed between them, that is as occurring 19.5 milliseconds apart . . , 2 °
Puccetti concludes as before that there are two distinct conscious

beings in one body.

One conscious being perceives the lights to flash

simultaneously, whereas the other perceives the lights to flash
fraction of

a

second apart.

a

By the Principle of the Indi scernibi

of Identicals, the conscious beings are thus diverse.

1 i

ty
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Here as before certain principles
Puccetti appeals to should be
examined.

One principle is that every perception
is such that some

conscious being has it.

Without this principle, Puccetti would not
be

able to conclude from the fact that

hemisphere that

a

a

perception occurs

conscious being has that perception.

in the

right

This principle

accords both with philosophical and with
everyday usage of the term

perception."
However,

I

will

a

second principle, if indeed the word "perception"
is

not question it here.

understood in this way, is less acceptable.

Puccetti assumes that the

electrochemical responses to the flashing lights which occur
in the
right

mute" hemisphere 19.5 milliseconds apart are perceptions.

(Recall

that the case is

a

"normal" one.

The subject's right, "mute"

hemisphere cannot be isolated and asked what it perceives.)
writes,

"...

Thus, he

the flashing lights were perceived in the mute hemis-

phere at twice the actual time

.

.

.

."

But Puccetti provides no justi-

fication for this claim.
Puccetti would perhaps argue as follows.

The responses of the

right hemisphere (what Puccetti says are "perceptions") are qualita-

tively similar to those of the left hemisphere.

Since the responses of

the left hemisphere are perceptions, so are those of the right hemis-

phere.

This reply is clearly inadequate.

Assuming that the responses

have exactly the same qualities (except, for instance, spatial

loca-

tion) would be to beg the question, since it would require the assump-

tion that the right hemisphere's responses are such that some conscious

being is aware of them.

However, unless Puccetti assumes that

al

1
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qualities which the two could share
they in fact do share, the
possibility remains open that one
difference between them is that one
is
perceived and the other is not.
Thus, Puccetti's arguments in favor
of his startling view con-

cerning the nature of the ordinary human
being are unconvincing.

Furthermore, Puccetti fails to account for
data which seem to support
the seemingly well-supported
commonsensical claim that within the

ordinary human skull there is

a

single conscious being (where

a

con-

scious being is something which thinks and
remembers, wills and wants.)
But these data need to be accounted for by
Puccetti, given that he

wants to hold that the thesis they support is false.

Thus, for in-

stance, he needs to explain why it is that only
after commissurotomy

patients begin occasionally to manifest behavior
indicative of two

conscious beings.

One commissurotomy patient attempted to strike his

wife with his left hand, which is controlled by the right
hemisphere.
At the same time, with his right hand, which is controlled by
the left

hemisphere, he strove to restrain his left hand.

Why are such cases so

unusual, if associated with the ordinary human being are two minds?

Thus, there seems at this point to be no adequate justification
for our third possibility,

(C).

I

conclude, then, that the fission

case is at least logically possible, if not phy si cal ly possible as

well.

To avoid contradiction, the Lockean principle (S) shall have to

be rejected.

What criterion of personal identity, if any, should be accepted
in

its place?

Appealing to an argument very much like that stated at

the beginning of this chapter against (S), Bernard Williams reasons
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that bodily continuity is at least

identity.
cal

He thus rejects

al_l_

a

necessary condition for personal

criteria according to which psychologi-

continuity between one person and another suffices
for personal

identity.

In the

following section, the line of reasoning he
suggests

against these “psychological

criteria" will be examined.

Williams' Argument

Williams' example of the twentieth-century Charles, who
imagines

himself to be the seventeenth-century Guy Fawkes and who
seems to
remember doing many of the things Fawkes in fact did, has
already been

mentioned (Chapter II, Section 3).

It was used as a

an early version of the memory criterion.

Williams further details the case.

counterexample to

In the following passage,

The similarity between the fission

case and the modified "Guy Fawkes" case is obvious.

[Both] Charles and his brother [are clairvoyant
with respect to Guy Fawkes.] What should we say in
this case? They cannot both be Guy Fawkes; if they
were, Guy Fawkes would be in two places at once,
which is absurd. Moreover, if they were both identified with Guy Fawkes, they would be identical
with each other, which is also absurd. Hence, we
could not say that they were both identical with
Guy Fawkes. 29
And any principle which does say that both Charles and Robert are

identical with Guy Fawkes is, in consequence, false.

Williams intro-

duces this example in order to argue for the claim that bodily continuity is a necessary condition of personal

ment

I

will
It

identity. ^0

It is this argu-

be concerned with in the present section.

is fair to point out

here that, given (E5), it is not the case

that either Charles or Robert can be said, strictly, to have conscious -
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ness of doing anything Guy
Fawkes in fact did.

Consciousness between
stages impiies that the
M‘-relation holds between these
stages.
But
Stages of Charles and Guy
Fawkes are not stages of the
same human body;
neither are stages of Robert
and Guy Fawkes. The stages
are not
causally linked in any way
similar to the way stages of the
same human
body are linked, when one
such stage recollects doing
something the
other did; and thus (E5) yields
that neither Charles nor Robert
has

consciousness of doing something
Fawkes did.

On (S), then, as it is

finally construed in Chapter
II, Charles and Robert are neither
one
Identical to Fawkes.

Thus, while the “Guy Fawkes" case may
perhaps be

used as a counterexample against
certain psychological criteria, it by
no means refutes every such
criterion.

The case, by itself, does not

compel one to accept Williams' claim
that bodily continuity is

a

necessary condition of personal identity.

Williams, however, has at hand
psychological criteria.

a

more general argument against

He writes:

•
•
•
identity is a one-one-relation, and ... no principle can be a criterion of identity for things
of type T if
it relies only on what is logically a
one-many or manymany relation between things of type T. 31

The point may be put as follows.
of logic

(

x,

"y

,

"

The following principle is

a

truth

"u," "v," and "w" vary over persons):

(R)((x)(y)(x=y
(u)(v) (w)

(

Rxy ) ->
(Ruv & Ruw)
v=w))

Thus, on Williams'

form (x)(y) (x=y
fy the

view, no criterion of identity for persons, of the

Rxy), will be true if the relation R does not satis-

following condition (Wl):
Wl.

(u)(v)(w)((Ruv

& Ruw)

—

>

v=w)
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Williams presumably thinks that no
"psychological" relation can satisfy
(Wl).

Thus, he concludes that bodily continuity
is

tion of personal

identity.

a

necessary condi-

However, as it happens, the relation

appealed to in (S)-ss' (M*s,s‘vM*s
,s)-can hold only between
1

person-stages and thus trivially satisfies
(Wl).

So even Williams'

more general argument fails against
(S).

Nonetheless, the more general argument can easily
be revised.

A

close relation of the logical truth formulated
above is the following.
Let

"

si," "s2," "s3,

"s4," and "s5" vary over person-stages.

(R)((sl)(s2)( (The x such that si is a stage of x)
(The x such that s2 is a stage of x) *->

Rsls2)~*
(s3)(s4)(s5)((rs3s4

&

Then,

=

Rs3s5)-^

Rs4s5)
Here, too, is an undeniable truth of logic.

tions are only suitable for use in

a

On this principle, rela-

criterion of personal identity if

they satisfy the following condition (W2):
W2.

(sl)(s2)(s3)((Rsls2 & Rsls3)

—

Rs2s3)

This second conditional is not, of course, equivalent to Williams' original; but it clearly

a

condition Williams would expect any adequate

criterion of identity to satisfy.
One may use (W2) to construct an argument against (S).

The

fission case reveals that the relation appealed to in (S) is m)t such
that it si bears it to s2 and to s3, for any si, s2, and s3, s2 bears
it to s3.

Therefore,

(S)

is unsatisfactory as a criterion of identity

for persons.

Williams does not explicity consider

a

"brain splitting" case.

But given the use he makes of the "Guy Fawkes" case, he could be expec-
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ted to accept the preceding
line of reasoning as an
argument against
(S).

There is nothing wrong with
this line of reasoning,

(s)

shall

have to be rejected.
A similar point has,

to Williams'

condition.

of course, already been
made without appeal

If one accepts both (S)
and the possibility of

fission, one becomes enmeshed in
contradiction.

That fission is at

least logically possible cannot
plausibly be denied.

Thus, (S) must be

rejected.

Williams

1

own conclusion is

a

bit more radical.

He apparently

thinks that some such line of
reasoning as that used above can be

adduced against any_ psychological
criterion of identity.
cludes that
personal

11

.

.

.

bodily identity is always

identity." 32

a

He thus con-

necessary condition of

However, whether this stronger conclusion
can be

justified is doubtful.

Among other things, one would first have
to

argue that no psychological criterion can
be formulated which satisfies
both (Wl) and (W2).

A view will

be considered psychological

Williams suggests.

be suggested in Chapter IV which must

but nonetheless meets the conditions

For the present, we will examine a certain assump-

tion Williams makes in his argument for his position
that bodily con-

tinuity is

a

necessary condition of personal identity we will then look

at a series of

questionable results to which this apparently unjusti-

fied position leads.

Gale's Objection;

A Reply

Williams argues that bodily identity
tion of personal

identity.

is always a

necessary condi-

He seems to think that this conclusion
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follows from, or at least
indicated by, consideration
of examples such
the "Guy Fawkes" case.
He, apparently, reasons
as follows.
,f bod .
1,y COntinuit* is admitted
as a necessary condition
of persona, identity, then Since not
both Robert and Charles
can be bodily continuous
with (have the same body
as) Fawkes, one will not
be led to the result
that both Robert and
Charles, clearly distinct
persons, are identical
to Fawkes.

Richard Gale notes that
this line of reasoning contains
a certain
questionable assumption.
The problem, as Gale sees
it, is that the

«

relation which Williams
implicitly suggests cannot be
such that Fawkes
bears it both to Charles and
to Robert does not in fact
have this very
feature.

That relation. Gale thinks,
is not one-one.

that is, satisfy the very
condition,
that any useful

relation must satisfy.

It does not,

(Wl), which Williams suggested

The case which leads Gale to

this conclusion is the following,
which not unexpectedly parallels the

fission case.

At t, person

A rises from his chair and
goes off in two different directions-t 0 h’s left and right. Let us
call the body
which goes off to the left B and
the one to the right C.
o say that A splits in two
at
t
may be misleading,
since it might be taken to mean that
the right and left
s^es of his body sever, each going its own merry
way.
But this is not what happens,
since-the bodies of B and
4
C are in all respects similar
to A.
B

and

C

are both bodily continuous with A.

distinct.

But

B

and C are themselves

Gale thus concludes that Williams’ reliance on bodily
con-

tinuity is misguided:

that relation is no more helpful, "logically,"

for stating a criterion of personal

chological continuity.

identity than is

a

relation of psy-
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williams states the claim
he wants to make in
different ways. As
already noted, he writes
that “bodily identity
is always a necessary
condition of personal identity."
He does not provide any
complete elucidation of the notion of
bodily identity, although
he does say that
he

upposes that

...

it

includes the notion of
spatiotemporal contin-

uity, however that notion
is to be explained ." 35

In a later paper pn

the same topic he says,
about the argument presented
in the earlier

paper that it was intended to
show that bodily continuity
is
condition of personal identity 36

a

necessary

.

Let us, then, just consider
the question of whether spatiotemporal continuity, that is,
bodily continuity, is one-one.

Williams would, of course, want
to maintain that the relation
is
one-one.
He considers, explicitly, the
case of an amoeba's splitting. 37
On his view,

neither of the amoebas produced

porally continuous with the original.

in

fission is spatiotem-

Presumably, Williams would say,

too, that neither is bodily continuous
with the original.
It seems,

then, that Williams would say about
Gale's case that

neither

B

nor C is spatiotemporal
ly continuous with A, thus, that

neither

B

nor C is bodily continuous with A.

The pertinent question is, however, on what
grounds might Williams make this claim.

He must explain wh^ it is that

not each spatiotemporal ly continuous with A.

B

and C are

As noted earlier, he does

not provide a complete elucidation of the notion of
spatiotemporal

continuity.

He does write that

"...

the normal application of the

concept of continuity is interfered with by the fact of fission

.

.

."

Williams does not, however, go on to say what it is about the "fact of
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fission" which "interferes"
with spatiotemporal
continuity.
two positions one might
take.

Here are

First, one might hold
that A and

B

are

not spatiotemporally
continuous because of the
presence of an offshoot
c.
Second, one might hold that
B is not spatiotemporally
continuous

with A because

B and A

do not share enough of the
same stuff.

That
they do not is indicated by
the presence of C, which
is an exact duplicate of B and is related to
A just as B is.

The first position is clearly
unacceptable.

want to say that the mere
presence of
rupts the spatiotemporal

parts.

continuity of

Williams would not

spati otemporal offshoot inter-

a

a

given aggregate of temporal

When an acorn falls from an oak
tree, spatiotemporal continuity

between the oak tree at the earlier
time and the oak tree at the later
time is not disrupted.

So the first position will

Thus, consider the second position.
lows:

x

if there

at t and y at t'
is

some stuff

composes x at
at t*

tion

is

I

s.

t

s

not do.

It can be formulated as fol-

are spatiotemporally continuous if
and only
such that more than half of the stuff
which

is s and more than half of the stuff
which composes y

(How such stuff is itself to be identified
is

leave aside here.)

"fifty percent plus" rule.

I

shall

a

deep ques

refer to this principle as the

The criterion of identity, then, which

makes use of this notion would involve the following claim:

persons x

and y are identical, only if for any times t and
t', such that t'

occurs just after t,
at t

x

exists at t, and y exists at t',

are spatiotemporally continuous.

ficulties with this principle.

x

at

t

and y

(There are fairly obvious dif-

To alleviate these difficulties, one

must have at hand some distinct means of settling questions of syn-
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chronic identity.

Let us put these difficulties
aside here.)

The bodily continuity criterion
sketched here does seem to
avoid
contradiction. Since not both B and
C can have more than
half of the
stuff composing A, not both
B and C, after fission,
will be spatiotemporally continuous with A, before
fission. Thus, not both B and
C are
identical to A.

Gale seems to ignore this
particular not implausible way of ex-

plaining the relation of spatiotemporal

,

or bodily, continuity.

Ex-

actly why Williams thinks that the
"fact of fission" indicates the lack
of spatiotemporal

continuity remains unclear.

But if indeed Williams

does adopt the fifty percent plus rule,
then it becomes

a

bit easier to

see why he finds it reasonable to hold
that bodily continuity is

necessary condition of personal identity.
ables one to avoid contradiction.

a

The view, quite simply, en-

The relation specified in the fifty

percent plus rule satisfies (Wl).

Adopting bodily continuity as

a

necessary condition of personal

identity may, thus, enable one to avoid contradiction.
there are difficulties with this position.

Nonetheless,

We now turn to these dif-

ficulties.

Bodily Continuity Criteria

Clearly,

a

person may from one moment to the next lose more than

half that stuff of which his body is made and nonetheless continue to
exist.

Under the fifty percent plus rule,

a

bodily continuity criter-

ion would yield that this situation could not arise.

terion is false.

Hence, that cri-

Because of this remarkable fact about people, it ap-
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pears that no bodily
continuity criterion will

be correct.

Someone inclined for Williams'
reasons toward

a

bodily continuity

criterion might suggest the
more plausible view that
the correct criterion of personal identity
is the one based on brain
continuity. Of
course, the prihciple will
be helpful in the face
of fission only if
the fifty percent plus rule
is assumed.

where
that

x

f

Thus, one might hold that,

and y are persons, x is
y only if for any times

occurs just after t,
t

and y

s

x

brain at t

sider, then, the original

exists at

and y exists at

t\

t\

are spatiotemporally continuous.

fission case.

ation yields that either afb or
a*:.

tained concerning Gale's case.

t

and

t

such

x's

Con-

The principle under consider-

Analogous results would be ob-

Thus, it looks as though

a brain con-

tinuity criterion may well enable one
to avoid contradiction.
Brain continuity principles are,
however, problematic for other
reasons.

In

right-handed persons it generally happens
that the left

cerebral hemisphere, which controls the
right-hand, is the seat of

linguistic and analytic abilities.
to the right cerebral

fect on the person.

reason, still

In such

cases even extensive damage

hemisphere seems to have relatively little efA right-hemisphere patient can still talk, still

remember .

oo
00

Many of the abilities he had prior to the

trauma are retained.

Given these facts, the following case is surely logical ly--even

physically

possible.

Jones' right cerebral hemisphere is damaged and

must be removed from hs cranium to prevent the spread of infection.
His left "verbal" hemisphere remains as healthy as ever.

The infection

has, however, already spread to certain parts of the middle and lower
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brain.

Some of these have to be
replaced by donated organs.

All

in

all, slightly more than
fifty percent of Jones' brain
is removed.

awakens from surgery with his
memories intact.
cate.

and

He is able to

He

co«uni-

Even though he has difficulty
understanding abstract language,
hard time sketching accurately
what he sees, the operation
is de

a

dared

a

success.

His life has been saved.

But the brain continuity

criterion directs that the resulting
creature is not Jones-that
fact no one who now exists is Jones.

in

Thus, the brain continuity cri-

terion is false.

Alternative Brain Continuity Criterion
A brain continuity criterion
according to which identity with

some future person requires that the
verbal hemisphere persist more or
less intact seems to have the advantage of
both enabling one to avoid

contradiction and directing that Jones, in the
case described above,
survives surgery.

But such

judged to be unsatisfactory.

a

criterion must ultimately,

I

think, be

For consider the more pitiable cases

which left, verbal hemisphere damage is present.

in

It was noted earlier

that in such patients, a variety of higher cognitive abilities
may

linger if not flourish despite the fact that verbal communication
is

typically thought to be impracticable.

Furthermore, in left-handed

persons brain lateralization (division of labor between the hemispheres) has been found to be less dramatic:

linguistic ability may

thus not be so affected by damage to either of the hemispheres.

finally it is difficult to see why
ical

a

symmetry exists could not occur.

And

case in which perfect hemispherIn such a case, both hemispheres
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wou,d be verbal.

Then, there would be
no unl q ue verbal
hemisphere.
The above criterion would
direct falsely that
such a surviving subject
does not in fact survive.

Consider, then, yet another
criterion.
identical just in case
(1)

between

x

and y at all

It is that persons

certain brain continuity
relation

a

such that

z

one another at all times during
their lives but
z

z

z

and x bear B to

and y do not or (B)

such that z and
y bear B to one another at all

times during their lives but
brain continuity relation:
here.

holds

B

times during their lives
and (2) it is not the

case that either (a) there is
some person

there is some person

are

z

and x do not.

39
B

here is

a

weakened

the fifty percent plus rule
is not assumed

The intuition behind the principle
is that survival of just half

or less may guarantee survival

of the person, providing there
exists

no competitor which is related in
analogous significant ways to the

original.

Consider, then, the case of Jones, introduced
above.

On

this new criterion, in contrast to the
original, Jones survives the

operation, for he bears B, the weakened
continuity relation, to some
future person.

Furthermore, the principle applied to Gale's case

yields that A^B and that
structed from

B)

Aj*C;

the relation appealed to (not

satisfies Williams'

(W2).

B

that con-

In other words, adopting

this principle would, it seems, enable one to avoid
contradiction.
I

will

call

this final brain continuity criterion (BCC).

clearly inadequate.

It is

One problem with it is that the relation B has not

been carefully specified.

It is not all

clear that

a

brain continuity

relation meeting the above description (i.e., one which relates Jones-

before-surgery and Jones-after-surgery) can be specified.

The change
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in

Jones'

brain is far too dramatic.

Perhaps some appropriate repair
could be made.

However, it seems

that there are more fundamental
objections to this last stab.
I
will
consider two such objections
here.
The first involves a certain
twoworld argument. Let wl be a
world in which the original
fission case
occurs. That is, a's brain is
divided and transplanted; the
resulting
creature, b, inherits a's left
hemisphere and c, his right. Let
w2 be
a

world in which a's left hemisphere
is transplanted;

duced; and a's right hemisphere
is destroyed.
wl. afb and, in w2, a=b.

b is

thereby pro-

(BCC) yields that, in

Since if things x and
y are strictly iden-

tical, it is necessary that they are
identical, the principle leads to

contradiction.
One might attempt to defend (BCC) on
the grounds that the preceding argument is based on a certain faulty
assumption.

that

a

is

involved in both the wl and the w2 cases.

assumption is that b is involved in both the

wl

Let it be given

Then, the faulty

case and the w2 case;

these two characters may indeed be remarkably similar
but they are

nonetheless two.
The defender of (BCC) may thus point out that contradiction
may
be avoided by rejecting a certain cross-world identity
claim, as well
as by rejecting

(BCC).

The difficulty with this reply is that, given that there are some

cases of cross-world identity, the basis on which diversity between
and b's w2 look-alike can be claimed is elusive.

creature of w2 "b

1

."

b and b‘

Call

b

the b-like

may be assumed to have the same genetic

coding, the same futures; they may be assumed to be composed, subse-
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quent to surgery, of just the
same stuff.

Furthermore, the worlds

in

which the two exist are as similar
as they can be, given
the fact that
c exists in one but not the
other.
Claims as to the diversity of
b and
b

appear to be wholly ad hoc maneuvers
designed to save (BCC).
The defender of (BCC) may well deny
that such claims are purely

——

At least, it seems that it can
be shown that the "consider-

ations of similarity" between

and b'

b

appealed to above in support of

the claim that b=b', do not in fact
provide one with enough reason
to hold that b and b'

sider

a

are identical.

The argument is as follows.

second series of worlds and entities.

In w3 block of wood d

loses one-quarter of the stuff which
composes it.

loses

a

third of its remaining stuff.

half remains intact, then, as d.
loss of material

half.

What was originally d's upper

In w4 d undergoes similar

persists not as its upper half but as its lower

d

Finally, in w5

d

is from moment to the next chopped in two,

horizontally left to right.

Call what was originally d's upper half

"e," and what was originally d's lower half, "f."

w3's

d and

A moment later it

(If one desires, one may imagine the

to be less abrupt.)

changes, except that

Clearly, e^f.

w5's e are composed of exactly the same stuff arranged

exactly the same way.

Con-

But
in

Their futures if not their pasts are the same.

They simply come to be in their final forms at different rates.

siderations of similarity lead one thus to conclude that

analogously, one concludes that

d

_i_s

f.

d

Con-

is e;

Given the symmetry and trans-

itivity of identity, it follows that e=f as well.

But it cannot be

that both e=f and e^f.

Some premise or group of premises in this argument must, there-
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fore, be rejected.

The weak links In this

(BCC) W0Uld h0,d
*

ardent,

the defender of

claim of cross-world
identity between

d

and

e and between d and f.

for these claims.

Considerations of similarity
formed the bases
Therefore
curh considerate
eTore such
are misleading.

Thus, it may appear that
the claim that
not

b and b'

are distinct is

merely ad hoc maneuver
designed to save the criterion
in question. As it turns out, there
is nothing really
objectionable about
this ploy, for, as it happens,
considerations which originally led
to
a

the identification of b and b'

lead, when applied to other
cases, to

contradiction.
It is perhaps obvious that
the above defense of (BCC)
is inade-

quate, however.

The fictional speaker for the
defense assumes that,

to avoid contradiction, identity
between d and e or between d and f

needs to be denied.

tradiction.

But clearly there are other means
of avoiding con-

One may hold instead as the "false
identity" that between

the original d, in w3, and d's
upper half, also in w3.

This would seem

to be the more intuitive route.
A brief summary of the preceding
discussion of (BCC) may be helpful

here.

I,

first, argued that (BCC) together with the
two-world case

leads to contradiction.

ment against (BCC).

I,

then, considered an objection to the argu-

The objection involved the claim that

cross-world identity— not between b and

b'— which

my argument against (BCC) does not in fact hold.

I

a

assumed to hold in

An argument support-

ing the claim of diversity between b and b' was then adduced.
I

certain

Finally,

suggested that this latter argument was not persuasive, since it is

based on questionable assumptions concerning certain diachronic iden-
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titles.

A stalemate has been
reached.

It is one which cannot
be bro-

ken until

certain profound Issues of
cross-world Identity are
settled.
These issues need not, I think,
be settled here.

of the more fundamental

that b=b'.

I

a

objections to (BCC) does not
involve the claim

turn, now, to this second
objection.

contrary to fact) that

For the second

b

and b' are distinct.

and b (of wl) are diverse,
and

mere existence of the offshoot
ence in these two cases.

c

a

in

and b'

Then,

Suppose

(I

think

(BCC) yields that

(of w2) are identical.

The

world wl is what makes the differ-

But this seems wrong.

Whether

c

exists or

not should make no difference
to how the question of identity
between

and b, or b', is answered.
Thus,

(BCC)

a

But on (BCC) whether c exists
is crucial.

is unacceptable.

Some Conclusions

At this point

a

variety of conclusions can be drawn.

that criteria of personal

It seems

identity for which the original fission case

does not present problems-criteria, that
is, involving relations which

satisfy Williams' condition— can be counterexampled
by the case of
Jones.

And those that yield correct results when applied
to the Jones

case lead to contradiction when applied to the case
of fission.

They

do not, that is, involve criteria which satisfy
Williams' condition.

The difficulty introduced at the beginning of this chapter

— the

fact, that is, that an intuitively plausible criterion of identity

apparently leads to contradiction, given the fission case— has thus
evolved.

One can, of course, avoid contradiction by rejecting (S).

But it seems that, paradoxically, there are certain contexts, such as
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the Jones case, in which
onin criteria such as (S) which,
together with
the facts of the fission
case, entail a contradiction
yield precisely
the right results.

Thus, it appears that

a

perfectly general problem,

a

problem for

the bodily continuity criteria
which Williams advocates
as well as for
psychological criteria, has emerged.
It can be stated in the
form of
an argument.

Consider

a

world in which a's left
hemisphere is trans-

planted and his right hemisphere,
destroyed.
b, awakens;

b

is tested;

and the operation is declared

seems that any adequate criterion
of personal
a=b.

(Such

tion.)

a

The resulting creature,
a

success.

It

identity would yield that

criterion would thus yield that Jones
survives the opera-

Consider, further,

a

world in which a's right hemisphere
is

transplanted and his left hemisphere,
destroyed.

The resulting crea-

ture, c, awakens; c is tested; and
the operation is declared

success.

a

As before, it seems that an adequate
criterion would yield that a=c.

(Recall

the more "pitiable cases.")

Since if

x

and y are identical,

necessarily they are identical, and since identity
is both transitive
and symmetric, it is necessary that b=c.
in which the original

direct that b^c.

fission case occurs.

But finally consider

a

world

Any adequate criterion will

Thus, it appears that any adequate criterion will

lead to contradiction . 40
I

will

refer to this argument as the "three-world problem."

paradoxical flavor should be noted:

each premise is compelling, and

the conclusion appears to follow validly from the premises.

clusion itself is not

a

Its

The con-

contradiction (for perhaps there are no

adequate criteria of identity for persons), but it is startling.

It
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throws into question each
and every criterion
of personal identity
whether based on
psychological or bodily
continuity. Thus, against
this objection, the
defender of bodily
continuity criteria has no
better reply than the
defender of psychological
criteria.
One position which would
allow for a fast solution
to this puzzle
has already been discussed.
On this position (in
fact a defense of
BCC), certain crucial
cross-world identity claims
fail.
However, the
issue of whether or not
this position could ultimately
be justified was
hever Settled '
«« ^ally concluded that even if this
questionable
position could be justified,
(BCC) nonetheless was not
salvageable.

«

Analogous points may be made
about the three-world puzzle.
course, if it could be shown
that the person as whom

a

Of

survived in the

non-fission world, labeled "b,”
is not identical to the fission
world
creature, also labeled "b," who
inherited a's left hemisphere, then

the

three-world problem could easily be
defused.
pelling difficulty takes its place.

non-fission world, then
world.

Why is this?

a

For, if

However, an equally coma

survives— as

The worlds differ only in the ways they

world and fail to survive in the other.
a

in

one world befalls

a

in the other,

must,

It is grossly implaus-

ible to suppose that, because of these
differences,

pens to

the

survives-as b's analogue-in the fission

given that c exists in one but not in
the other.

in one

b— in

a

should survive

But, if whatever hapit does no harm to

assume that the cross-world identities, which have
yet to be established, in fact hold.

The original three-world problem thus remains

intact.
In the

following section, one solution to the problem will be
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considered,

others will be Introduced in
Chapters IV and V.
Parfit's Solution

m

his article “Personal

Identity." Derek Parfit
proposes an in-

novative solution to what is.
basically, the three-world
puzzle.41
this section, I examine his
proposal.
He does not suggest

a

criterion of personal identity.

In

Indeed, he

remains unsure that there is any
such criterion available.

He is none-

theless willing to make certain
judgments concerning identity. 42

Following his lead on the fission
case, one would hold that not
both a=b and a=c and would hold
(S) to be in consequence false.

this manner Parfit would avoid the
apparently absurd claim that
Of course Williams, also, disavowed
psychological

^1ution

is c.

b

and c are the

But such proclamations do not by themselves
amount to

t0 the Puzzle.

Parfit accordingly goes further.

him, a, while not identical

timate relation to both
and c.

b

criteria; he with

Parfit, wants not to be committed to
the position that
same person.

In

a

According to

to both b and c, nonetheless bears some in-

b and c;

in

particular,

a

survives as both b

Thus, in non-fission worlds, involving, say,

free to claim that

a

survives as b.

a

and b, one is

Thus, following Parfit's recipe,

one might say that while (S) is an inadequate criterion of
identity

,

the principle just like (S) except that "survives as" replaces
"is

identical to" is adequate as
I

a

criterion of survival.

have not detailed Parfit's view here.

But one can,

ready see some of its advantages and disadvantages.

I

think al-

One remains free

to hold, about the fission world (w3), that b^c, yet to hold, about the
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non-fission world (wl and w2),
that
as c. respectively.

a

survives as b and that

Thus. Parfit's view allows
Lockean intuitions to

be satisfied to some
considerable degree.

that

is

a

survives

a

identified with

b

But it is never the case

and c. who are assumed
distinct.

So con-

has certain desirable
features.

One may

tradiction is avoided.

Parfn's approach thus

say approximately what one is
inclined to say about the fission
case

without becoming enmeshed in
contradiction.
first glance, the appeal

inadequacy.

Nonetheless, especially at

his theory has is eclipsed by

a

certain gross

For his view seems to require
that one deny the surely

true principle that, where x and
y are persons, necessarily if
vives as y, then x-y.
survival

x

sur-

According to Parfit, the important question
of

should be "prized apart" from questions
of identity. 43

ever, that this conceptual

How-

splitting, upon which he must insist, can be

accomplished is unclear.
Parfit, of course, has anticipated this objection.

reasonably construed as espousing

a

He is most

view which is, contrary to appear-

ance, consistent with the surely true principle
stated above linking

survival
sense of
fit

s

and identity.

For one of Parfit's aims is

'survive' which does not imply identity." 44

.

1

will write "surviveso" when

I

to suggest a

.

Survival, on Par-

view, indicates not identity with some future person

psychological continuity with some future person . 4 "
I

".

,

but rather

To avoid ambiguity

want to suggest the ordinary sense of

the word, according to which one survives only if one is identical with

some future person, and

Parfit's special

I

will write "survivep" when

sense of the word.

I

want to suggest

Here, then, are two statements
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Parfit could be expected
to endorse.
then x=y; and, possibly, x
survives

Necessarily. If x surv1ves
as y and xfy.

as y>

Thus, Parfit's

position is, contrary to initial
appearances, consistent with
the
surely true principle linking
survival
and identity.
He can consistently hold that "survives" in
its ordinary sense-“survives
"-implies
identity wi th some future person
.

But in maneuvering to avoid one
objection to his view, Parfit di-

minishes substantially the overall
value of his approach.

It was al-

leged earlier that one of the
virtues of Parfit's account was
that it

satisfied Lockean intuitions.
logical

continuity between

for su rvival

died.

,

x

It appeared that on Parfit's
view psycho

and

a

future person y, since it suffices

would decide such important issues
as whether

x lived or

But having examined Parfit's reply
to the earlier objection, we

are in a position to see that in fact
Parfit's view is that psychological

continuity decides no such important issues.

The Lockean intuition

that "double success" represented in the
fission case is no "failure"
remains unsatisfied.^
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CHAPTER

IV

PERSONS AS AGGREGATES
John Perry has suggested

a

means of solving what

Chapter III the three-world
puzzle.

1

I

called in

The first step, on his view,
is

to come to a thorough
understanding of the events which
occur in the

fission world.
of fission
in

Perry thinks that examining
cases more mundane than that

(such as the "forking road"
case described below) is helpful

obtaining this understanding.

For, according to him, what
one says

about the more mundane cases can
then be applied to the fission
case.
Perry's insight concerns the utility,
in solving the fission case,
of

abandoning the principle that the number
of (non-overlapping) temporal

person-stages which exist at

a

given time t is just the number of per-

sons which exist at t.

Perry develops

a

theory based on this insight; he later
indicates

dissatisfaction with this particular theory but
continues to urge that
solving the fission puzzle will ultimately
involve rejecting the com-

monsensical principle according to which the number
of person-stages
at t is the number of persons at t. 2

one of these more mundane cases.

identity suggested by David Lewis.

I

In this

section,

then turn to
Lewis'

a

I

first examine

theory of personal

theory is similar to the one

Perry finally rejects in that it requires that this commonsensical
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principle be denied.

(I

consider Lewis' theory rather
than Perry's in

this chapter because it is
the more plausible of these
two closely-related views.)
After presenting Lewis' view.
I
defend it against ob-

jections proferred by Derek Parfit
and Penelope Maddy.
raise two further objections
which indicate,

I

Finally.

I

think, serious diffi-

culties with Lewis's view.

Perry's Insight

Suppose that through the center of
town runs
Street.

3

Just out of town the road splits.

a

certain road, Main

As one travels out of

town, one sees that the fork to the
left is called "Seventh Street" and

that to the right, "Highway 67."

There is considerable reason to iden-

tify Main and Seventh; they are very
like, and someone may travel onto

Seventh without ever suspecting that he has
changed roads.

Finally,

reasons which favor the identification of
the road running through the

center of town are matched equally be reasons which
favor identifying
the road with Highway 67.

Consider, then, the following argument (Argument A).
were no Highway 67, Seventh and Main would be identified.

If there

Thus, since

possibly there is no Highway 67 and since if possibly Seventh
then in fact Seventh is Main, Premise
(1) holds:
1.

Seventh Street is identical to Main Street.

One may reason analogously to (2):
2.

Highway 67 is identical to Main Street.

Since identity is symmetric and transitive,
3.

Highway 67 is identical to Seventh Street.

is Main,
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But clearly,
4
'

Street!!

01 '** C#Se that Highwa
* 67 1s identical to Seventh

A contradiction, from
(3) and (4), can thus be derived
from premises

Which are, at first glance,
innocuous enough.

The analogy between this

argument and the three-world
puzzle is obvious.
The justification given above
for premises (1) and
(2) is based
on, of course, the assumption
that various crucial cross-world
identities hold.

The question of whether or not
such an assumption is legi-

timate has already been considered
(Chapter III, Section 7).
it

However,

seems (as before) that even if the
assumption is discarded, other

justification for these premises exists.
roads very_ j_ike Seventh and Main

Examining

a

world containing

(and perhaps not Seventh and Main)
but

such that offshoots of Main do not
exist, one is strongly inclined to
say that these "look-alikes" of Seventh
and Main are identical.

But

whatever it is which obtains between the
look-alikes and compels one to
judge that they are the same surely also
obtains between Seventh and
Main.

(The existence of Highway 67, that is, seems
irrelevant.)

one says about one world should be said about the
other.

What

Premise (1)

thus can be justified without appeal to the assumption that
the

original

roads and their respective look-alikes are identical.

So,

also, can premise (2) be justified.

Argument A concerns

a

very ordinary sort of case.

problem with it can be spotted.
work out

a

Surely, the

Then, this information can be used to

solution to the three-world puzzle.

The following analysis seems plausible.

If premises

(1),

(2),
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and (4) seem intuitively
compelling, it is only because
they are easily

confused with a second set of
similar-sounding premises which
are intuitively compelling. Members of
the second set express,
not identities
between roads, but rather unities
among road £a^. The
difference is
that one can accept members of
this second set of premises
without becoming enmeshed in contradiction.
One need only refrain from
assuming
that one road part cannot be a part
of distinct roads.

Consider, then, the following argument
(A').
4

Call the stretch of

road which runs just through the
center of town, c; the stretch run-

ning to the left out of town, "1”;
and the stretch running to the right
out of town,
1

In

.

c

"r."

and

Then, consider Argument A'.
1

are stretches of some same road.

other words, there is some road such that
c and

1

are better

stretches of that road.
2

From

.

(1
'

3

)

•

c

and

and (2
1

and

r

'

are stretches of some same road.

)

r

are stretches of some same road.

But clearly.
•

It is not the case that

1

and

are stretches of some

r

same road.
The conjunction of (3

'

)

and

(4')

is a

contradiction.

The claim is, then, that premises (1) and (2) are false .
tions are satisfied, nonetheless, since

1
(

'

)

and (2‘) are true.

the second argument (A'), in contrast to (A), is inval id .

premise (3) of (A) is simply
(2),

a

logical

IntuiBut

For, while

consequence of premises (1) and

(3') does not follow from the conjunction of

(!') and

(2').

The
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only plausible principle
licensing the inference from
(1') and (2') to
O') is the principle that a stretch of road
can belong to (be a

stretch of) at most one road.
this principle is false.

Known facts about roads
indicate that

Thus,

(A')

is invalid.

The paradox is

resol ved.

The fission puzzle may be similarly
resolved.

Recall that si is

a's stage prior to fission; s2 and
s3 are, respectively, b's and
c's

stages after fission.

One may hold that si and s2 are
stages of single

person, as are si and s3.
person.

But s2 and s3 are not stages of

single

One may say about the non-fission
worlds just what one says

about the fission world, without fear
of contradiction.
is

a

(perhaps)

a

Thus, herein

solution to the three-world puzzle.

The above, roughly, is the way Lewis
describes fission.
Lewis'
well

view is in some respects similar to Puccetti's:

Thus,

on his view,

as

as Puccetti's, where one expects to find
a single person, one

sometimes finds more.

But Lewis' view has

a

certain advantage:

need not argue that the subject of fission is really
two conscious beings.

In the

following sections,

I

a

he

conglomerate of

develop Lewis'

theory in detail.

Lewis' Theory

In his paper

“Survival and Identity," Lewis writes:

Pretend that the open questions have been settled, so that
we have some definite relation of mental continuity and
connectedness among person-stages in mind as the relation
that matters for survival.
Call it the R-relation, for
short.
Lewis's R-relation

— the

rel ata of which are person-stages

— is

both re-
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flexive and symmetric, but it is
not transitive.

How, then, can Lewis'

criterion of identity satisfy Williams'
condition?
is not transitive, then for some
s,

Rss".

s', and s“, Rss', Rs's", and
not

Since the relation is symmetric, Rs's.

first glance that Lewis' criterion
will
In

fact, this is not so.

For if the relation

Thus, it may seem at

fail Williams'

condition.

Lewis appeals to the R-relation, not in

order to state identity conditions,
but rather to define “person."

The

definition he suggests is the following:
D6.

x
1.

is a person «-»
x is an aggregate of

^

(s)(s belongs to x
(s* ) (s' belongs to x

2.

(D6)

person-stages &

w

Rss'))

yields that the aggregate of si and s2

5

is a person

and that the aggregate of si and s3 is a person

("c").

(call

him "b")

6

Having defined "person," then, Lewis provides identity
conditions
for such creatures.
I.

x =
(

s

) (

y

«
is a stage of x

«

s

is a stage of y)

Thus, persons x and y are identical just in case they have all their

stages in common,

of

si

b, the

aggregate of si and s2, and c, the aggregate

and s3, are then distinct persons.

Lewis requires, for identity between persons x and y, that every
stage contained in x be related by R to every stage contained in y.
as indicated above,

ness."

is a

relation of "mental continuity and connected-

Lewis' view, then, applied to the "King of China" example

yields that he who wanted so badly to be King is not himself crowned;
Lewis'

R,

theory yields, when applied to the case of Jones, whose right

hemisphere is extracted and the operation declared

a

success, that
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indeed Jones survives surgery.
It

should be noted as well that Lewis'
criterion satisfies

Williams' condition.

If persons x and
y have all

common, and persons x and

clearly, persons y and

z

z

their stages

in

have all their stages in common, then,

have all their stages in common.

Thus it can

now be noted that Williams too hastily
reached his conclusion that

bodily continuity is

a

necessary condition for personal identity.

Psy-

chological criteria which satisfy Williams'
condition can be formulated.

How Lewis manages to avoid contradiction should
be carefully examined.
(I)

As noted above,

yields that b^c.

(D6)

instructs that

b and c

are both persons;

If identity between b and c can be inferred as

well, then indeed Lewis' theory leads to contradiction.

identity cannot be inferred.
a,

with

On

Lewis' view, there is no one person,

who exists prior to surgery and is
b

or c.

b

and c, rather, exist all

a

candidate for identification
along:

prior to surgery, they

share a single person-stage; afterwards, they do not.
a

But this

Thus, Lewis'

is

psychological criterion which does not result in contradiction when

applied to the fission case.

For, while it is certainly surpri sing to

learn that two persons may exist in precisely the same place at precisely the same time, this claim does not by itself lead to contradic-

tion.

Objections to Lewis' Theory

Derek Parfit suggested in an article which appeared several years

before Lewis' "Survival and Identity" that the fission puzzle can be
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solved by “prizing apart" the
relations of identity and survival.
(This view was detailed in Chapter
III.)

Thus> on p arf1t s view> s1nce
.

"mental

continuity and connectedness" decide
such important issues as
survival, a survives as both b and c.

Yet since Parfit also holds that

it

is not the case that survival

implies identity, contradiction is

avoided.

Lewis finds this "prizing apart" of
identity and survival una-

ceptable.

Thus, the theory he suggests is
consistent with the prin-

ciple (SI):
SI.

x

survives as y

—

>

x

= y

Yet, he also at least seems to suggest that his
theory validates prin-

ciple (CS), which Parfit presumably would accept.
CS.

It

is

7

If an appropriate relation of mental continuity
and connectedness, such as R, holds between some
stage of x and some stage of y, then x survives
as y.

against Lewis' claim that his theory (the conjunction of (D6) and

(I)) is consistent with both (SC) and

often been raised.

(SI) that objections have most

Parfit, in defense of his own way of handling the

fission cases, and Penelope Maddy, citing Parfit, have suggested such

criticisms.

I

turn now to these objections, and then to

a

defense of

Lewis.

Parfit argues that the fission case itself poses grave problems
for Lewis.

Suppose that surgery is about to take place.

Parfit

writes:
[Since s3 bears R to b's present stage si, by] the first
half of Lewis' thesis [i.e., by the principle that the
"R-relation is what matters in survival"; by, that is,
(CS)], [s3] stands to [b's] present stage in the relation
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It is not
tlTh 6 C3Se ° 8iv ' 5 ' on
is a
counterexample of the thesis. 8

;

(sm

.

Parfit seems to reason as
follows.

The principle (CS). which
Lewis ac-

cepts, together with the claim
that s3 bears R to b‘s
present stage,
entails that b survives as the
person to whom s3 happens
to belong.
That person is c.
A second principle which
Lewis accepts, (SI),

directs, since b survives as c,
that b is c.
the conjunction of (D6) and
(I).
ready been noted, yield that
is amiss.

b*.

But Lewis also accepts

These principles together, as has
alThus, both b=c and b/c.

The problem may be stated in the
following way:

Something
Lewis'

theory, that is, the conjunction
of (D6) and (I), does not in fact
have
all

the virtues he claims for it.

In particular, one cannot consis-

tently hold both his theory and both
of those intuitively right prin-

dples Lewis was apparently eager

to endorse.

The problem may also be put more bluntly:

Lewis' various

claims— (D6), (I), (si), and (CS) — given the
possibility

of fission

lead to contradiction.

Parfit 's argument is, however, not persuasive.

For in fact there

is no good reason to believe that Lewis accepts
or even intends to en-

dorse (CS).

What evidence there is that he does accept this principle

is to be found in the following passage.
If you wonder whether you will survive the coming battle or
what-not, you are wondering whether any of the stages that
will exist afterward is R-related to you-now, the stage
that is doing the wondering.
Similarly for other "questions
of personal identity."
If you wonder whether this is your
long-lost son, you mostly wonder whether the stage before
you now is R-related to certain past stages.
If you also
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the past.

If you wonder whether it

is in vnnr coif
y0u [', 0,d age > y°u wonder
whether the stages
tha^ti
that
tiresome old gaffer you will
become are R-related to
W t0 8 s,9rnflcantl
y greater degree than are all the
nther° person-stages at
other
9
this time or other
•

'^

f° r

1

times .

This passage indeed suggests
(CS).
are quite ordinary.

more than one person.

But note that all of these
cases

These are cases in which no one
stage is shared by
(CS), restricted to such cases,
does not lead to

contradiction.
However, Lewis goes on to say:
If you wonder as you step into the
duplicator whether you
will leave by the left door, the
right, door, both, or neither
you are again wondering which future
stages, if any, are R-related to you-now.
In this passage Lewis seems to
suggest that the principle

for fission cases as well.

holds

(CS)

Isn't Parfit thus justified in his reading

of Lewis?

Lewis

comment is, however, better understood as simply

a

very rough outline of the position he eventually
details.

a

precise statement of his

'official" position.

a

It

part of
is not

The point of the com-

ment is merely to stress, yet again, the importance of the R-relation.
There are two reasons for so construing his comment and thus for

disregarding it.

For one thing, on Lewis' view, prior to fission,

there is no one person wondering whether

he^

shall

survive.

There are

rather two; thus Lewis' comment which suggests that prior to fission

there is only one person ("you") is clearly not intended to relfect
an accurate way his final

in

view.

For another, Lewis holds that possibly two persons may share

a
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single person stage.

And since he so emphatically
affirms (SI), it is

obvious that he does not hold
(CS) as well.
Lewis could be expected to adopt

a

principle linking survival and

psychological continuity which is very
like (CS) and thus perhaps easily confused with

(CS).

just in case there is
t

,

x

The principle is as follows:
a

time

t

and

a

time t’

survives as y

such that t occurs before

exists at t, y exists at t', every
stage in

stage in y, and finally every stage in
y bears
I.

x

x

bears

R

to every stage in x.

R

e., just in case x exists at an earlier
time, and y at

and x=y.

Survival

Lewis

a

later time,

is, thus, as is identity, decided by
appeal

appropriate relation is not
from R.

to every

R

itself but rather

a

to an

relation constructed

Thus, the R-relation is important in determining
survival, on
view, but Lewis remains free to affirm the
commonsensical prin-

ciple (SI).
turn now to the objection Maddy reises against Lewis'
views on

I

fission.

Maddy summarizes the intuitions Lewis expects his theory to

confirm as follows:

"...

identity and the special [psychological]

relations [which Lewis collectively calls "R"] are what matters in survival."

She calls this statement "Lewis' Thesis"; and indeed Lewis

makes comments which suggest it.
Lewis'

Then, she argues that in fact

theory does not support these crucial intuitions, since on his

theory the following principle (RI) is false:
RI.

For any stages s and s' and any person x, if
is a stage of x, then Rs' s if and only if s'
I-related to each of x's stages.

The I-relation may be specified as follows:

lated if and only if

s

and s' are stages of

stages
a

s

s

is

and

same person.

s'

are I-re-

Thus, on
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Lewis’ view s and s' are

I

-related if and only if they are
R-related.

Maddy is correct to point out that
Lewis' view (RI) is false.

Consider, yet again, the fission case,
s3

a

stage of c.

Furthermore, Rsls3.

si

is a stage of b,

recall, and

But s3 is not 1-related to each

of b's stages since it by definition
is not related to, for example,
s2.

Thus, Lewis must deny (RI).
The mistake Maddy makes is in claiming
that, if Lewis' theory is

incompatible with (RI), then his theory
intuition that
port "Lewis'

R

is

in fact fails to support the

"what matters" in survival, and thus fails
to sup-

thesis."

Her argument for this conditional

Suppose that it happens that your current stage bears
stage which occurs after
stage does not bear
fore the battle.
On Lewis'

view,

I

a

is as follows.

to some future

R

certain battle, even though that future

to each of your stages, all of which occur be-

(If this situation can arise, then

(RI)

is false.)

"you survive the battle [if and only if] there is

post-battle state I-related to all your stages. "14

a

Thus, on Lewis'

view you do not survive the upcoming battle, even though your current
stage bears R to some future stage.

fission case is

a

Thus, Maddy concludes,

counterexample to Lewis' thesis, and

identity and the special

a

"...

the

wedge between

relations has become established."^

This argument, to the conclusion that Lewis' theory is unsatisfactory.

Indeed on Lewis' view one may fail to survive the upcoming

battle even though one's current stage bears

R

to some future stage.

But does it follow from this fact that "Lewis' thesis" is false, in

particular, that the "special relations" (collectively, R) are not
"what matters in survival"?

The claim that "special relations" are
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what matters in survival
survival" ic
is v/amm
vague.

a

One might in part mean by
these

words (RS):
RS
'

If

bedrs R t0 some st *9e
which
until t.

atT^henT
x survives

exists at t, then
elisis

(RS) is what is meant, then
obviously it does follow,
from the claim

that one may fail to survive
the upcoming battle even
though one's current stage bears R to some
future stage, that (RS) is
false.
But the
evidence that Lewis would adopt
(RS) is no better than the
evidence
that he would accept (CS).
(In fact, the passage supporting
the latter
just is the passage supporting
the former.)
If the

questionable words are meant to express
the principle that

some future stage bearing
insures that
to Lewis.

x

R

to each of a given individual

x's stages

survives, then Maddy rightly attributes
"Lewis' thesis"

But her argument remains inadequate,
since the negation of

the thesis, so understood, does
not follow from the claim that one may
fail

to survive the upcoming battle even
though one's current stage

bears

to some future stage.

R

These two are,
calls
quate.

Lewis
In

thesis.

I

think, the only likely readings of what Maddy
I

conclude, then, that her argument is inade-

fact, it is very like Parfit's (whom she cites)
and fails

for similar reasons.

Another Objection

Lewis

features.

theory of persons has, of course, certain counterintuitive
One surprising consequence of Lewis' view is that two people

can share a single person-stage, for example.

This consequence will be
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examined carefully in Section 5.

But

1

should note that it is unclear

Whether this counterintuitive feature
of Lewis' view counts very
heavily against it.
For it is hardly shocking
that an entirely accurate

description of something as untoward
as

a

person's fissioning should

suggest surprising things about persons.

Furthermore, the supposition

that on any satisfactory view of
personal

identity each person-stage

belongs just to one person might even be
regarded as question-begging
againt Lewis.
In this

section

I

suggest

a

line of criticism involving

a

ple which governs how one justifies the
theories one accepts.

principle which is intuitively true; it is one
used at times
ary discourse;

it stands up well

to philosophical

not depend on any specific view on personal

princiIt

in

is a

ordin-

scrutiny; and it does

identity.

Anyone who

refrains from accepting Lewis' view in order to avoid
violating such

a

principle as this can scarcely be accused of founding an
objection on

dubious intuitions or of begging the question.
tification (J) is as follows:
is not

anyone who arbitrarily accepts

justified in accepting that theory.

ously true.

This Principle of Jus-

I

a

theory

think that (J) is obvi-

But it might not appear to be so at first.

After all,

can't someone be justified in arbitrarily accepting one view over

another?

Suppose for example

have two maps of the same area, and

I

equally good evidence for the accuracy of each. 16
conflict.

I

also know that if

not matter which

Thus, am

I

—

I

I

I

see that the two

don't follow one or the other

— it

does

stand no chance of ever reaching my destination.

not justified in accepting, entirely arbitrarily, the "view"

or "theory" provided by one of the maps and rejecting the "view" or
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"theory" provided by the
other?
I

think not.

than the other.

chooses to use

I

am justified only in
usin* one of the maps rather

(Thus the principle that
"If someone arbitrarily
a

particular theory, then he is
not justified

so" is false; but this
principle is not

(j).)

i

doing

in

WO n't argue further

for (J) here.
I

will

call

the conjunction of Lewis'

"Lewis person-stage").

(D6) and

(I)

"LPS"

Much of the remainder of
this section

devote to arguing that there is

a

(for
I

will

theory APS ("Alternative person-

stage" )-another theory of
persons-which has these important features:
it

is

incompatible with LPS; and any evidence
which supports LPS is

such that there is evidence of
exactly equal weight for APS.

Anyone who recognizes that there is
APS which has these properties will
than to accept APS.

a

second theory of persons

have no more reason to accept LPS

This sufficiently knowledgeable person,
if he has

accepted LPS without accepting APS, quite
clearly has done so arbitrar-

ily.
justi

According to principle (J), then, he has accepted
LPS without
fi

cation.

I

take it that this problem is

a

serious one for LPS

(and for APS as well).

Of course, if one accepts both LPS and APS, his
selecting LPS
will not be thought arbitrary.

But as noted before LPS and APS are in-

compatible; together, if applied to the fission case, they lead to contradiction.

Thus, surely no one who recognizes this fact will be

justified

accepting both views.

in

justified in accepting

a

For

I

take it that one is never

view or set of views if he is also justified

in believing that the view or set of views leads to contradiction.
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The theory APS is easily
enough constructed.
on how people are to
be individuated:

only if any person-stage
which is

APS and LPS agree

persons are identical if and

part of one is

a

a part of the other.
The two views are only
different with respect to
the definitions of
"person" they provide. APS
includes (D7) rather than
(06):

D7.

x
1.

2.

is a person
x is an aggregate of
person

stages:
(s)(s belongs to x
ps'Hs' belongs to x & Rss')); &
~Py)(y is a proper part of x &
y is an aggregate of person-stages &
(s)(s belongs to
y <-»
(3s')(s' belongs to
y & Rs s')))

w

(D7) yields that the aggregate
of si, s2, and s3 is a person.

The differences between LPS and
APS are perhaps obvious.

LPS

directs that two people are involved
in the fission case both before
and after surgery.

surgery there is

a

APS, given

(I), directs that both before and after

single person.

Thus, on LPS two people share one

person-stage prior to surgery; on APS one
person, after surgery, has
two distinct person-stages.
The theories are clearly incompatible.

which exactly one person fissions.
there are exactly

n

people.

world there are exactly

n

+

Consider

a

world in

Suppose that on APS in that world

According to LPS, in contrast, in that
1

people.

Is there really as much reason for accepting APS as
there is for

accepting LPS?

Consider first the disadvantages of the two theories.
flict somewhat with intuitions about what people are.

Both con-

It has already

been noted that LPS has certain counterintuitive consequences.

For
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according to it two people can
share

a

single person-stage.

Thus, on
LPS two people can exist
In the same place at
the same time (assuming

people are spatially extended).

But APS is equally
counterintuitive;

according to it, one person can
be the possessor of
distinct simultaneous person-stages. That is,
one person can exist in two
wholly separate places at once. Thus,
both LPS and APS violate the
intuitively
true rule that each person occupies
his own continuous chunk of
space.
Of course one might hold that
person-stages are not spatially

extended.

In this case

LPS and APS violate.

there is another intuitively true
rule both

It is the rule that there is a
one-to-one cor-

respondence between people and "centers of
consciousness."
less obscurely put, is as follows;

The rule,

each person is aware of all his

thoughts and feelings, and no person is
directly aware of the thoughts
and feelings of any other person.

LPS and APS both require that this

rule be denied.

Counting difficulties infect both views.
Lewis calls "over-population." 17

LPS leads to what

It should be the case that,

in some

sense, it is true that after fission there are more people
that there

were before fission.

But LPS directs that there are two people all

along.

The analogous problem for APS might be called "under-popula-

tion."

According to APS just one person is involved throughout.
Lewis suggests

a

solution to this particular problem.

poses that counting be based on
ti ty-at -a -time .

^

a

notion of tensed identity

,

This notion can be specified as follows:

identical -at -t if and only if they both exist at
stage at t.

He pro-

t

and share

or idenx

and y are

a

person-

The problem of under-population may be solved by appeal
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to the same notion.

When counting is relativized
in this way. it

turns out on both LPS and
APS that the number of
persons which exist
at a time just is. after
all, the number of
person-stages which exist
at that time.

Finally, on both LPS and APS
language-related difficulties arise.

Consider the noun phrase “the
person sitting

now."

Ordinarily.

on LPS

this chair

intend this phrase to refer to
just what is sitting in this

I

chair.

in

if

there is

not denote:

I

a

would say that

I

intend it to refer to me.

But

fission looming in “my“ future,
this phrase does

there is no unique thing which is
both

a

person and sit-

ting in this chair.

Suppose that the same description is used
after fission has occurred rather than before.

This case reveals

phrase, one might claim, denotes.
is the

person

— both

of his

problem with APS.

The

But if it denotes, its denotation

parts— which

part) is sitting in this chair now.

a

is such that some of him

(one

So, the phrase, if it denotes,

denotes too much.

Those difficulties may not be without solution.

One possible

solution involves the claim that the referents of such denoting
ex-

pressions are just aggregates of person-stages, not necessarily aggregates which are people.

Alternatively, one might claim that the

description "the person sitting in this chair" denotes £t

_t

if and

only of there is exactly one, counting by identity at t, person sit-

ting in this chair.
I

turn now to the advantages of the two views.

One important

and obvious virtue shared by LPS and APS is that of not leading to
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contradiction when applied to the
fission case.
feature has already been shown.
all

Consider, then, APS.

relevant stages belong to just one
person.

nses.

It

That LPS has this

APS yields that

No contradiction a-

makes no difference, in blocking
the contradictions, whether

one holds that there is one
person or two people throughout.

In other

words, APS, like LPS, satisfies
Williams' condition.
A further advantage of LPS is,
as noted earlier, that it
provides

psychological criterion of person identity.

a

So,

clearly, does APS.

The two theories decide identity
differently only for cases of "fis-

sioning" and "fusing."
for psychological

is

Thus, the considerable amount of support
there

criteria is support for APS as well as for
LPS.

Yet another advantage of APS is that
it, like LPS, "reconciles"

survival

views.

and identity:

the principle (SI) is consistent with both

(The defender of APS could be expected to hold
that x survives

if and only if x is such that there is some
future stage bearing R to
x

s

present stage, that is, if and only if

future person.

x

is

identical to some

The reconciliations are thus different in detail but

the strategy is the same.)
It

in

All

is

likely that there are features LPS has which count either

its favor or against it but which have not been considered here.
I

have done is to consider some of its outstanding advantages and

disadvantages, and show that APS has analogous advantages and disadvantages.

But it seems to me that these are features of LPS that pro-

vide whatever reason there is to affirm LPS.

Other advantages have not

been emphasized in the literature; others do not come to mind.
it thus that the burden

I

take

is on whoever wishes to defend LPS to say why
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one should accept LPS
rather than APS.

However, it should be noted

that the two views are
entirely parallel.

Thus

doubt that

I

a

reason

for accepting LPS over
APS can be adduced.

Of course, as noted above,
one difference between
the two theories is that they disagree
on the number of people
existing in a world
where fission occurs. But
this fact does not help
to adjudicate between the two views. What
is needed is some reason
to think that one
and not the other is the
one that is right. But
there are no tests

which might be used to determine
the truth of the matter.
itions helpful here?

No.-intuitive^

Are intu-

it seems that there is one
person

prior to fission and two persons
afterwards.

But this claim is false

on both views.

Thus, anyone who accepts LPS and
not APS, or APS and not LPS,
does so arbitrarily.

According to (J), then, neither view
is justi-

fied; at least neither is justified
for

person.
to reject

a

sufficiently knowledgeable

To claim that such a person is
justified in accepting LPS is
(J);

and

I

take it that this is more than should be
done in

exchange for LPS.
One reply to the objection sketched above
must be considered.

might be claimed that LPS can be modified
serve Lewis'

in

such

a

It

way as to (1) pre-

general approach but (2) avoid the objection raised above.

The modified view is the view LPS-or -APS.
Is this a satisfactory view?

what

a

I

think not.

For it does not do

theory of personal identity is expected to do.

Such

a

theory

should say, for example, whether or not the people emerging from the

operating room are identical.

But LPS and APS differ on this question.
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Hence, the answer obtainable
from the view LPS-or-APS
is "yes or no.
Thus, the disjunctive
version of Lewis' view
will not do
A Final

in this

section

I

shall

Objection tn

a

pc

argue that both LPS and
APS satisfy one

set of intuitions concerning
personal

lating

i

identity at the expense of
vio-

second set of intuitions
which are in some sense,
more im-

portant.

Imagine several persons in

a

single room.

Some are, at a given

time t, drinking wine;

some are dancing.

others, tiddly winks.

Someone-George, say-is asked to examine
these

Some are playing marbles, and

people at t, and to say how many
of them there are.

The people in

question are entirely ordinary;
their corpus callosums, and their
per
sonal

1

ties, are intact.

task demanding.

I

cannot imagine that George would find
the

To provide an answer, he would
of course have to be

able to determine whether, for
instance, the person playing marbles
and the person playing tiddly-winks
are one and the same.

this he could not appeal to, say,
Leibniz's Law.

For it is perfectly

consistent with that principle that all the
person-stages
or all

And to do

in the room-

the stages in the left-hand side of the
room, or all the happy

stages, or whatever--are stages of the same
person.

I

assume further

that George does not have at hand a copy of
some well-argued philo-

sophical article which details how to go about
counting persons at a
time.

Still

he can accede to the request; his intuitions about what

persons are will see him through.

Now imagine another sort of case.

George is asked to examine
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over a £eriod of time

a

series of situations
occurring in one partic-

ular room.

Certain questions of identity
have, suppose, already been
settled; George already knows
that at any one time during
this period
there is in the room at most
one person (excluding
George himself).
George is asked, then, to say
how many persons there
have been altogether in the room when the
time period in question is
over.
The sequence he will observe is, roughly,
to be described as follows.
First,
an ovum is fertilized.
Then, an embryo, then a fetus,
develops. A
child matures, and so on and so
forth until an old man begins
to deteriorate physically and mentally.
Finally someone dies. George, to

answer the question of how many
persons there have been
will

in

the room,

have first to answer certain
questions of diachronic identity.

Suppose that the man's deterioration
is brought on by
he suffered.

a

massive stroke

George shall have to answer, then, the
rather difficult

question of whether the person who exists
in the room just prior to the

occurrence of the stroke is identical to the
person who exists in the
room just after the stroke occurs.

This case is ordinary; yet how the

issues of identity are to be settled is not
obvious.

George may well

come to the conclusion that the same person
persists in the room

throughout the period in question.

But, it seems to me, he will not

find questions of diachronic identity quite so easy to
answer as ques-

tions of synchronic identity.
ing what

"constitutes"

a

Roughly, then, that intuitions concern-

single person at

intuitions concerning what "constitutes"

a

a

time are "stronger" than
single person across time.

The cases just described are relatively common.
can, however, be made concerning the fission case.

I

The same points
am inclined to
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say, having inspected world
wl
a

I

is

identical

which

a

and b but not c exist, that

has survived, that

b

is not a new person.

am inclined to say something
analogous about

a

and c, when

w2.
I

to b, that

in

a

The fission case undermines
these intuitions, to

I

inspect

degree.

a

remain relatively confident
that prior to fission there

is

just

But
a

single person and that afterwards,
there are two.

Consider, then, Lewis’ view.

When one contemplates only
issues

of identity across time, LPS
seems quite satisfactory,

it provides the

"right" results when applied to Leibniz’s
King of China example.

Shoemaker's "body-transplant" case, and

a

host of others.

Even when

applied to the fission case, where one
is inclined to say that no one
has died, that whoever existed
originally continued to exist, results

are satisfactory.

However, LPS
less satisfactory.

s

answers to questions of synchronic identity are
Recall that, in the case of fission, LPS instructs

that prior to fission, there are two persons
who share

stage.

a

single person-

APS instructs that after fission there is only one
person, who

has then two distinct person-stages.

Thus, both of these views vio-

late intuitions about synchronic identity in order to
preserve intu-

itions about diachronic identity.

The type of bodily theory William would urge does just the reverse.

When theories are evaluated, then, just in terms of the results

they generate when applied to the fission case, theories conforming to

Williams'

sketch seem the more plausible of the available bunch, since

they at least validate the stronger of the two sets of intuitions.
Lewis, of course, has

a

reply to this criticism.

His notion of
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tensed identity has already
been introduced.

If one counts by appeal

to this notion, one finds
that on both LPS and APS
prior to fission

there is just one person, and
afterwards there are exactly
two.

This seemingly helpful notion
of tensed identity deserves
further
careful scrutiny.
Lewis writes:
Let us say that continuants
Cl and C2 are identical-attime-t if and only if they .both
exist at t and their
stages at t are identical .

This passage, together with those
earlier passages in which Lewis defines and individuates persons,
suggests that in some sense b and c
(for instance)

are not identical at time t, (prior
to fission), and in

another sense,

a

new sense, b and c are identical-at-time-t.

Thus,

in

some sense b and c are not one at tl,
and in some other sense b and c
are one at tl.^

1

Clearly, Lewis thinks it is important for
there to be some sense
in

which, prior to fission, there is just one
person in the room in

question— say. Room 100.

He thinks, that is, that it is important that

he offers some way of solving the problem
of "over-population" which

his view creates.

His intention, apparently, is to provide such

sense by stipulating the existence of

a

certain ambiguity.

a

Thus,

sentence (1)
1.

"At tl, there is one person in Room 100"

ambiguously expresses both
2.

and

I

2'.

At tl, there are persons x and y in Room 100
such that x=y

At tl, there are persons x and y in Room 100 such
that x's tl-stage and y's tl-stage are identical.

said before that the ambiguity Lewis appeals to in order to solve the
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problem of "over-population"
is one which

is

stipulates .
For it is
clear that the semantic
link between
(1) and (2') fs not part of
the
natural language (in
contrast to that between
(1) and (2)).
Thus,
(l)'s ambiguity is not,
convenient though it would be
for Lewis, inherent in the language,
available for exploitation.
It has to be in

troduced.
But if this point is correct,
then Lewis' theory is
vulnerable

to a serious objection.

For, while Lewis indeed
provided

a sense in
which the sentence
(1) is true, he does not thereby
satisfy the very
strong intuition that, prior
to fission. Room 100 contains
just one
person.
(2) is false, on Lewis' view; and
(2'), although true, is far

removed from the intuition the
notion of tensed identity was
introduced
to satisfy.
It

cess,

s eems

that fission does not destroy anyone
(a "double suc-

it seems,

is no

"failure"); however, it is surely far
clearer

that prior to fission there is one
person and subsequent to fission

there are two.
it

validates

a

One problem with Lewis' LPS-and APS as
well-is that

collection of rather murky intuitions at the expense
of

violating what are, in comparison, easy truths
about plain matters of
fact.

CHAPTER IV NOTES

(Sept.

7

^ 1972 ), "463-488.

Se ^ f Div ^ de? "

IH* Journal of Philnsnnhv

M

t
C n
° f d Pers0n:
1975," Forthcoral ng*1
1963 ‘
n°the ChSSl^«r2f ?Sh e ?In ? !Pt
ternational Institutes of
Philosophy volume on philosoDhv
nf mini
J

Ibid .

Persons, edl’tael
California Press, 1970)^p. 20
.

*

Id n ity *“ in The
Identities of
f
L ° Se An9eles:
University of

a " !|
d

5
s

,

Survival

of his view.

and

11

Idpni*it’\/

nn
pp.

99
9
22-3,

*

for

a

statement

g
h
pfu1 » in comin 9 to understand
this definition to
annlv itt to ll
apply
the ^.
fission case. Consider the
aggregate of staies’sl and
S
aS
ef
sta9
are invoked n
he
Usii Iase° si s2 aII
nd s3; Rsls2 ’ Rsls3
and R s2s3.)
Call
this
aaorpo^tp
“h*l'
e
b
9
9
s b a P er son?
b satisfies the first
*
clause of (D6)I
T
a? 9 r
a
rSOn Sta9eS b
furthe ore » satisfies the
def nitL s sL
"n
Dropping the quantifier and substituting
••si"
si
iJ ?Sr
in
for “s“
SiPlSl a t*
s
yields
true biconditional, "si belongs to b
^
S
RS S ^
f r Sl bears R to each
of b s P er sonstaqes °sl and tnT?
?
J
nal0
90us reasons, the biconditional obtained
by substi^Uno "s?"*fnr°" ^
,

^

«

>

t*

L°rir

’

'

™

'

’

&s
f r

e m r
r e iS SOme ^Tage
s2
°,
It
I Int t h CaSe that Rs3s2

— which

scsr™'

does-b?long to b and is
h
Thus > as before - the biconditionaf is true. Analogous
a
I
tionai
reasoning about other potential values of "s"
yields in each case that the resulting
biconditional is true. Thus,
the quantified biconditional, with "b"
in for "x," is true; thus b
satisfies the second clause of (D 6
).
Reason i n 9 analogously, one may conclude that
the aggregate of
sl andj s3, c, is a person.
Is the aggregate of sl alone--if such
exists--a person? Such
an object (call it "o") fails the second
clause of (D 6 ):
s2 does not
belong to o, but there is a stage, sl, which
does belong to o and is
such that Rs2sl .
The qualified claim, with "o" in for "x
is thus
false.
Is the aggregate of sl, s2, and s3 a person?
Call this object
„
„
0 ,
It, too, fails the second clause.
For s2 belongs to o’ as does
s3, and it is not the case that Rs2s3.

^

1

,

136

137

Lewis, "Survival

and Identity,"

pp.

18 - 19 .

8

Persons

V'"'* “ d

ed^Rony^p!'

.

Wh,t Matters

’"

in The

Identity

9,

Lewis, "Survival

1Q

and Identity,"
pp. 20-21.

Ibid .

Phi) 0 s 0P h1carst»d1nf RR\cl?i
12

13
14
15
16
17

18

Lewis,

°f

IdentUy Derivative? ”

Survival and Identity,"
pp. 21-22.

Ibid .

Ibid .

This example was suggested to
me by Gareth Matthews.

Lewis, "Survival and Identity,"
p. 26.
Ibid.

A
e
ely;
fail!
Jn d»nnil
3
merely ^ ^art o? a person

21

?^y°- anCe

Maddy, "Is the Importance
of Identity Derivative?"
155.

IPS

20

t

,

U

“

T

Lewis, "Survival and Identity,"
p. 26.
Ibid.

^

be sa1d that on Ps * the Phrase,
as on
the Chdir 1$ " 0t a
but

of

CHAPTER

V

towards a new theory
of fission
in the

preceding chapters,
severe, criteria of
persona, identity
were formulated,
evaluated, and ultimately
rejected.
From these discusses emerged certain necessary
conditions criteria of

personal
identity must satisfy,
if they are to he
judged adequate.
One of the
tasFs I undertake in the
present chapter is that
of cataloging these
various necessary conditions.

may seem as though any
theory which satisfies
each of these
conditions will itself lead
to contradiction, given
the possibility of
fission.
For this reason, it may
seem further that, however
distasteful, one should either
abandon the least compelling
of these various
necessary conditions (if such
exists) or give up altogether
the effort
of describing a coherent
concept that can plausibly be
associated with
the word “person."
I
win argue, in this chapter, that
appearances to
the contrary one is not
forced by logic to adopt either
of these
It

alternatives.

Support for this claim will be
given in the form of

a

sketch of a view which both
satisfies the adduced necessary
conditions
yet fails to lead to contradiction
given the possibility of fission.
The view, as one might expect,
has certain counterintuitive features.

However, it will become clear that
problems with the view here less to
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do with how well

it

fits intuitions than
with whether its many
obscuri-

ties can be clarified.

Some Intuitions
It may seem that

any theory which
satisfies each of the desider-

ata emerging in earlier
chapters must lead to
contradiction.

intuitions concerning
personal
A1

identity include (Al)
through (A3):

0 " 8 PerS0 " PeC

'

These

two'persons.

“ eS

(in

That is. fission procedures
multiply persons.

*•«*•>

1

Prior to fission, the

surgeon is ministering to
one person; after fission,
he finds himself
ministering to two. Thus,
while contradiction must be
avoided, it
should not be avoided by
denying that fission has any
effect on population.

Consider, then,
A2.

(An

(A2).

In ordinary cases, if a
later person has
consciousness of doing something an
earlier
person in fact did, then the
earlier person
survives.

ordinary case is just

a

non- fission case.)

The notion of conscious

ness appealed to here is that
specified in Chapter II.

time t be quite unlike person
y at
identical to y.

x may be y,

a

later time

f,

Person

x

may at

and nonetheless be

for instance, even though x and
y do not

share the same body, providing x and
y are related in other important
ways.

2

Finally, consider (A3).
A3.

Conclusions reached concerning ordinary
cases apply to fission cases as well.
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On (A3),
then in

if someone,

a,

is

fission world,

a

identified with someone, b,
in one world,

a'

must be identified with
b', give n that a',

although perhaps not a,
is very like a, that
b', although perhaps
not
b. is very like b,
and finally that certain
significant relations
(e.g., psychological
continuity) holding between
a and b also hold
between a' and b'.
The motivation for this
claim is just the fact that
whether a
is b' seems to have
nothi ng to do with the
question of the
1

survival
a

is

of some offshoot of a',

a'

is

b

1

,

regardless of offshoots, if

b. 3

It

may seem, on the one hand,
that no consistent theory could
be

produced which-given the possibility
of fisslon-satisfies each of
these three intuitively correct
claims. Why this is so is perhaps
obvious.

First, consider two ordinary
cases, the case of

and the case of a and c in w2.

b

doing something a in fact did.

By

consider w3.
c'.

In w3, a'

a', b', and c'

a

and b in wl

and c both have consciousness of
(A2), then, b=a and c=a.

But now

fissions; the resulting creatures are

b'

and

are practically indiscernible from a, b,
and c,

respectively; furthermore, b' and c' are
related to

significant ways in which

b

and c are related to a.

since a-b, a =b'; and since a=c, a'=c'.

tivity of identity, b =c
1

'

.

1

a

By

in the same

(A3), then,

By the symmetry and transi-

But this result apparently violates (Al),

according to which fission produces two persons.

There is

a

way of avoiding the result that b'=c'.

with Lewis that "a

1

This maneuver will
also violates

(Al).

"

It

ambiguously refers to distinct persons,

is to say
b'

and c'.

block the inference to the claim that b'=c'.

But it
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But, on the other hand,
it nay seen clear
that not an available
theories of persons which
conforn to (Al).
(«), and (A3) 1ead t0 con .
tradiction. Or so I shall
urge in what follows.

A Way Out

Certain philosophers have
suggested that, if one were
willing to
abandon a single comnonsensical
thesis about persons, one
would find
oneself in

a

position to solve the fission
puzzle.

This comnonsensical

thesis is that, given that
person-stages do not overlap at
any point,
the nunber of persons which
exist at a given time is
just the number of
fierson-staaes which exist at that time. 4
(Or:

associated at least one person.)

with each person-stage is

Some philosophers, rejecting this

thesis, have suggested that
possibly more persons than person-stages
exist at

a

given time; other philosophers
have suggested that possibly

fewer persons than person-stages
exist at
It has already been noted that

a

given time.

if this commonsensical

relating persons and stages is abandoned,
then

thesis cor-

consistent view of

a

persons can be given which maintains
Lockean intuitions yet allows for
fission.

(Consider for instance Lewis' view.)

The problem is,

however, that in accepting this view, one must
abandon other important

intuitions

— in

particular,

It seems that,

(Al).

if one is bent on maintaining

(Al) as well

as

(A2), then in order to avoid contradiction one will

have to abandon the

commonsensical thesis stated above and to abandon

second somewhat

less compelling thesis as well.

with the word "person" is

a

a

This second thesis is that associated

single, utterly coherent concept.

An al-
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ternative position is that the
word "person" ambiguous!,
expresses two
distinct concepts. On this
position, entities which
are ordinarily
classified as persons simpliciter
in tact
fart cHef
c
satisfy one or two exclusive
concepts.

Adopting this alternative
position enables one to
construct
View of persons which satisfies
(Al),

a

(A2), and (A3).

For convenience,
entities satisfying one of these
two concepts may be called
"physical
persons" and entities satisfying
the other may be called
"psychological

persons.
A sketch of how appeal

given.

to these notions may be useful
can now be

Assuming that the various questionable
cross-world identities

hold here and henceforth will
ensure that (A3) is satisfied.

^

may hold, about the

and is b in world wl,

chological persons a, b, and c, that

a

in the fission world w3,

persists and is
a

c

in world w2,

persists and is both

b

and

Then, one
a

persists

and, thus, that
c

(thus b=c).

One may hold as well, concerning the
physical persons a, b, and c, that
in w3 a fails to survive as b or
as c.

Since the names

,,

a," "b," and

"c" would al so be understood, on this
position, to be ambiguous, there

is no contradiction.

(Al),

(A2), and (A3) are nonetheless satisfied.

As noted before, the assumption of identity between
a, b, and c and

their respective

primes" ensures that (A3) holds.

Furthermore, in some

sense of the word "person," prior to fission there is just one person,
and, afterwards, two.

For the physical

person

time of fission; the physical persons

b and c

(Al)

In

is

satisfied.

"person,"

a

What about (A2)?

a

ceases to exist at the

are new creatures.

some sense of the word

single person survives fission.

For the psychological

Thus,
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person
(A2)

a

is

persists in wl and is

satisfied as wel

b

’

i tn
anri a
and
also
Persists in w2 and is c.

So

1

Clearly, then, views
abandoning both the
commonsensical thesis
correlating persons and
person-stages, as wel, as the
less obvious
thesis that "person" is
unambiguous, may satisfy (Al)
through (A3).
The task at hand now is
to determine whether any
plausible view
Of this sort can be
described. Of course,
ambiguities are easily

enough stipulated; and any
view of persons having the
results indicated
above will be unsatisfactory
if, on that view, the
crucial ambiguity is

H£eli

stipulated.

Thus, for this reason, my
next step will be to

support the claim that the word
"person" is in fact ambiguous
in
helpful way.

Consider the following case.
normal

human being.

a

Smith is an entirely healthy and

He is at some point kidnapped by

a

deranged scien-

tist; the scientist removes a
rather important part of his brain.

result he suffers total and irrevocable
memory loss.
unhurt.

Call

this possibly new creature "Smith*."

As a

He is otherwise

Smith* is found, by

Smith's family, wandering about; he does
not know who he is, where he
lives, what city he is in, or what has
happened to him.

But members of

Smith's family seem to recognize Smith*; he is,
after all,
outward ways very like Smith.

in

many

After talking with Smith*, family

members agree that, although Smith has lost his memory,
he has retained
his marvelous wit and great sensitivity.
I

Is Smith

identical to Smith*?

think that there is an overwhelming inclination to count them
one

person.

But now consider another sequence of events.

Smith is kidnapped
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by

a

deranged scientist who
transplants

another human body not unlike
Smith's.
is

destroyed.

a

bit of Smith's brain into

The remainder of Smith's body

Call the hew creature
"Smith**."

Smith**, when he
awakens, thinks he is Smith,
remembers what he did the day
before, and
remembers having been kidnapped.
He escapes from the
scientist's laboratory, and hurries to what
he thinks of as home.
Members of Smith's
famtly. Of course, do not
recognize Smith**; they exclaim
that they
have never seen him before.

But, in talking with him, they
quickly

discover that he remembers all that
Smith would have remembered had
Smith come home that evening; and
that furthermore he has the same
quick with and great sensitivity for
which Smith himself was known.

They accept him, eventually, as
Smith.

The scientist is indicted; the

charge is something less than murder.
Is Smith

identical to Smith**?

Again, it seems that there is an

overwhelming inclination to identify the two.
But there seems to be an important difference
between Smith* and

Smith**.

It

is not

implausible to say that Smith* and Smith** are of

distinct sorts, or kinds.

Members of the one kind survive if they are

psychologically continuous with future members.

Members of the other

kind survive if they are bodily identical with future members.

One might of course insist that Smith* and Smith** survive under
the same conditions, that is, that there is no difference in kind be-

tween Smith* and Smith**.

ceptable consequences.

This position, however, has certain unac-

For suppose the position to be correct.

Suppose, that is, that the original Smith is of the sort members of
which survive if either bodily identical with some future person or
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psychologically continuous
with some future person.
We turn, then, to
nevitable fission case.
Since Smith is Smith*
and Smith is
Smith**, Smith* is Smith**
Th» n in
1

.

i
The old puzzle
arises in a new guise.

Does it help to say that
the "subject" of fission
is really two
persons, of the same kind,
existing in the same place
at the same time?
This position has all the
drawbacks of Lewis' view.
An appealing

alternative is to say that
involved in the fission case
are distinct
kinds of creatures. Creatures
of one kind survive if
they are psychologically continuous with future
members of the kind; creatures
of the
other, if they are bodily
identical with future members.
But if the involved entities
come in distinct sorts, complete

with distinct identity conditions,
then the word "person" should
be
Viewed as ambiguous between
distinct concepts. Both these concepts
are
plausibly associated with the word
"person." For consider the aggregate of person-stages involved
in the first Smith case.

intuitively,

a

£erson ?

second Smith case.

Isn't that,

Consider too the aggregate involved

Isn't that, as well, as person?

I

in the

think so.

Persons as Bodies

I

will

assume that some adequate criterion of identity for
things

such as amoebas and snakes is available;

about such

a

criterion here.

I

I

will

only say

a

few words

suppose, with Williams, that such

criterion is based on spatiotemporal

,

a

or bodily, continuity; and

further that spatiotemporal continuity is interrupted when
an entity
suffers an abrupt, significant reduction in constituent stuff.

This

latter assumption is entailed by what was earlier called the "fifty
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percent plus" rule.
When an amoeba, for
instance, undergoes
fission during reproduction, on the principie
suggested above, it ceases
to exist and two new
amoebas, offspring of the
original, come into existence.

Principles providing necessary
and sufficient conditions
for
identity which appeal to
spatiotemporal continuity are
vulnerable to
some of the same ineffecti
vity charges as principles
appealing to psychological continuity.
I
will not attempt to state
such a principle
here.
It is, however. Important
to have at hand necessary
conditions.
We may say that, where the
fifty percent plus rule is
assumed, if x and

y are £h£sical Persons, then x=y only
that x exists at t and
y exists at
t

is

is most plausible, perhaps,

live human bodies or human beings.

f,

such

and t' occurs just after t, x at

spatiotemporal ly continuous with
y at
It

in

f

if for any times t and

t.

6

to view physical

persons as simply

They have their survival conditions

common with snakes and amoebas; and
presumably these survival con-

ditions involve the notion of spati
otemporal continuity.
The view that there are physical
persons— that is, human bodies
or human beings

distinct from persons of another sort is pervasive.

Locke distinguished between men^ which were
simply animals of
sort, and persons

,

a

certain

which, unlike mere men, are morally culpable.

recently, John Perry suggested the distinction.

More

According to him, the

class of human beings and the class of persons are distinct;
he seems
to think that, among other differences, identity
conditions for the

former are more easily settled on than identity conditions for the
latter.
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Very young human
fetuses may be included
in the Cass of physical
persons, as well as individuals
whose upper brains have
ceased to funcand even so-called
ventilated corpses.
a

live human body is a
physical

We can initiate
the notion of

a

a

Anything properly counted

person. 8

description of the fission
case by appeal to

physical person.

The physical person

a

who is the sub-

ject of fission is identical
to neither the physical
person b nor the
Physical person c.
Since it is impossible that b
and c after fission
are both spatiotemporally
continuous with a just before
fission, the
identity conditions suggested
above will yield that afb or
a*c, or
ai<b

and afc.

Thus, so far, so good.

In

fission, one person, one

fihisical person becomes two; before
fission, the physician ministers
to one person afterwards, to
two.

(Al)

is satisfied.

Now the ques-

tion of in what sense he who
fissions may be said to survive must be

addressed.

Psychological Persons

I

assume, for purposes of this section, that
the notion of

physical person is already adequately
understood.

I

a

assume further

that physical person-stages are just
non-overlapping temporal parts of

physical persons.

The notion of

a

psychological person-stage may then

be specified in terms of the notion of
a physical

person-stage and the

M* relation (defined in Chapter II).
D8.

is a phychol ogical person-stage
s is a physical person-stage; &
2.
(3s')(s' is a physical person-stage &
M*s,s v M*s ,s)
s

1.

1

'
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see

psychological person-stages
are distinguished in
that they are the
first in a series of
"‘-related psychological
person-stages. These may
be referred to simply
as "first psychological
person-stages." and
specified as follows:
D9.

is

s

first psychological
person-stage
Psychological person-stage &
s
ls earlier than s
'[
&

a
s

'

s *

,

~

.

M*s

,

s

The notion of a psychological
person can now be specified.

DIO.

x
1.

is a psychological person -*
x is an aggregate of
psychological

personstages; &
(3s)(s is a first psychological
personstage &
s belongs to x &
s
( S
belongs to x
) (
M*s,s'))

2.

w

‘

'

Thus, for each first psychological
person-stage there exists

psychological person.

a

unique

That psychological person is the
aggregate of

stages which includes the first
stage and all those stages to which the
first stage bears M*.

Identity conditions, not unexpectedly,
are the

fol lowing:

(

x

)(y)(x and y are psychological persons—

~

(x=y
(s)(s is
(s

a person-stage -*
belongs to x <->
s belongs to
y))))

Consider, then, the original fission case.
and s3 is a psychological

person.

The aggregate of si, s2,

There is no other psychological

person associated with the fission case.

The names "a," "b," and "c," used in describing the
three-world
case, are ambiguous, each between a physical

person.

(Thus,

person to wnom

a
si

person and

a

psychological

refers ambiguously, for instance, to the physical

belongs and the psychological person to whom

si
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belongs.

Ordinarily, the ambiguity of the
word "person" is not troublesome and need not be noted.
But for the present
purposes it is important that the ambiguity be
avoided. Thus, I will use
"
,"
"a

and

"C"
M

“a*,"

to refer to the physical

bV

1

"b'

persons involved in fission,
and

and "c*" to refer to the
relevant psychological persons.

At this point, the description
of the fission case begun
above can be

completed,
in which a

a* is identical to b* in world
wl

survives and is b.

It can

(Al) and

a

sense in which

Thus, the view conforms to (A2):

survives, in some sense, in both

a

and w2.

wl

now be noted that the view conforms
to (A3) as well as to

(A2)

must befall
a

is

non-fission worlds, pyschological
continuity ensures persistence

of the person,

that

thus, there is a sense

Furthermore, there

survives in world w2, since a*=c*.
in the

;

a

According to (A3), what befalls

.

in world w3.

survives in

That is,

a

in

worlds wl and w2

(A3) precludes the possibility

and w2, but fails to survive in w3.

wl

this view a* survives in all three worlds, and
each of the three worlds,

(A3)

a'

Since on

fails to survive, in

is satisfied as well.

The view obviously allows for the possibility of fission.

And,

finally, it apparently does not lead to contradiction.

Objections and Revisions

Six objections will

suggested above.

In

be raised in this section against the view

response to the fifth objection, revisions of the

view will be proposed.
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First Objection
The view in question
accommodates intuitions
(Al), (A2), and
(A3).
That it does so, without
leading to contradiction
constitutes
,
a large part of
whatever evidence there is
in favor of i t.
The problem
is that surely the list
of intuitions given
originally is incomplete
ih certain important
ways. Furthermore, a
complete list would indicate, if the original indicates
the view sketched above,
some view
other than the one sketched
above-some view, perhaps, which
posits
m °re tha " juSt tw0 sorts ° f
person. Thus, because of the
incomplete
ness of the original list of
intuitions, the view in question
is un-

satisfactory.
The objection can be put another
way.

Surely ordinary, non-fis-

sion cases can be imagined in which
examination of connections, other

than the M*-relation and the bodily
cohtihuity relation, between, say.

Brown and Brown*, incline one to
say that Brown is Brown*.

Thus, this

intuition too should be added to the
list; following the strategy used
above,

a

slightly more complex view, positing three
sorts of persons,

would then be proposed.

But if there are really three distinct sorts

of persons, then the original

view is incorrect.

A related problem should be noted in this context.

concerns, not the original
egy used above.

This problem

list, but rather the view-generating strat-

New intuitions perhaps can be accommodated, by apply-

ing the strategy used above.

But should they be accommodated?

Is one

thereby led to more satisfactory views on persons?

Theories so generated may accommodate numerous intuitions; the

problem is that views that validate any and all intuitions concerning
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Persona,

survival

are sure,* suspect.

For> 1n general

.

successful

solut^ns to paradoxes or
puzzles indicate where
one has gone wrong,
so to speak;

useful

tions are faulty.

solutions indicate which
among conflicting intuiBut views generated in
accordance with the strategy

used above do not function
in this way; they
simply validate the
various inclinations which,
taken together, seem
to lead to contradiction.

Mix.

Two comments are appropriate
here.

First, it should
be noted that accepting
the view sketched above
in fact requires that
one give up

a

certain possibly dear intuition.

This is the intuition

that “person" unambiguously
expresses some one concept.

If one accepts
the view in question, one
must also accept that some
persons' persist-

ence is determined by appeal
to one set of conditions,
and other persons' persistence is determined
by appeal to a second
set of condi-

tions.

The intuition which must be
given up is not one which was

listed initially, but it is clearly
crucial in generating the puzzle.

There is none without it.

Furthermore, it seems that the claim
that

there is just one sort of person—
one set of identity conditions
for things we call
(Al) through (A3).

"persons"~is less obviously the case than any of
Other intuitions involved in generating the
puzzle

are still more compelling:

fission is possible; identity is syranetric

and transitive; and no contradiction
can be true.

Thus, the view at

hand, contrary to what was suggested above,
does tell one where one
"went wrong."
A

second point concerns how philosophical theories are to be

evaluated.

It

seems that such theories are plausible, roughly, to the
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extent that they
accomodate stronger intuitions
about persons. Thus.
lf
aCCOmm ° dateS TOre
important, intuitions than
a
second, then the one is
more plausible than
the other.

^

It may indeed ultimately
come to seem that the

(Al) through

Smith cases.

(A3)

stated originally is
incomplete.

In one

list of intuitions

For reconsider the

case. Smith was said to
survive despite the fact

that there was little bodily
continuity between Smith and
the person
as whom Smith survives.

In the other case. Smith
was said to survive

even though the person as
whom Smith survived remembered
having done
none of the things Smith in
fact did prior to his mishap.
On the view
sketched above, one may say
that "Smith" in the description
of the two
cases is being used ambiguously.
In one case "Smith" refers
to a

psychological person, in the other
case "Smith" refers to
person.

In

survives.

a

one case the psychological, but
not the physical, person
In the other case the physical,
but not the psychological,

person survives.

In both cases, the imagined
entities seem to fall

under what one would ordinarily describe
as "the concept of
It seems to

physical

a

person."

me quite likely that some third case
could be described,

which would incite one to say that the
subject of the case, say. Brown,
survives, even when little bodily continuity,
and no appropriate memory,

is

present.

If this new relation, the relata of which
are earlier

and later person-stages

,

is

called "X," then intuitively, X's relating

the earlier and later stages suffices for
Brown's surviving.

Thus, let

us say that the most plausible view will

be that which satisfies the

most complete ranked list of intuitions.

Of course, the method de-

scribed above will be useful

in

generating more plausible views of
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persons only if the list on
which the theory is
based mentions only
firm intuitions. A slight
Inclination obviously may fail
to lead
to

a

more plausible view.

Second Objecti on
It was assumed above that
an adequate identity
criterion for

things such as amoebas. trees,
and physical persons would,
among other
things, preclude a thing's
surviving if that thing abruptly
lost half
or more of the stuff that
composed it.

The claim that identity condi-

tions— as sume d to involve spatiotemporal
continuity-for such things
must obey the fifty percent plus
rule plays

a

crucial role in the

quest to avoid contradiction, given
that fission multiplies persons.
For this claim yields that not both
a'-b'
the details of the case,

and a'=c'; the fact, given

it yields that both not a'=b'

and a'=c'.

The

objection at hand concerns the legitimacy
of applying the fifty-percent
rule to such objects.

Surely

a

tree, for instance, when pruned may

lose half of the stuff which compose it
yet continue to exist.
in fact the

But if

fifty percent plus rule is weakened or dropped,
then the

view to question helps not

revised three-world puzzle.

a

whit in solving what is only

slightly

a

The puzzle which remains unsolved in-

volves Gale's example, in which one person rises from his
chair and

thereupon spontaneously divides

— as

an amoeba would

but very similar fully-formed persons . 9

j[s^

two distinct

If one denies the fifty per-

cent plus rule, then it seems that one shall

deny that the original

— into

have not basis on which to

each of the two resulting creatures.

One is

thus faced with a new version of the old problem.

Reply *

Two comments are appropriate at this point.

I

will urge,
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first, that the fifty
percent plus rule is
not plausible.
Second. ,
Will note a way of modifying
the view in question
which will render
the results of these
sufficient conditions
more palatable.

claimed above the identity
conditions for amoebas,
snakes, and
trees should hold for
physical persons as well.
I
said further that
such identity conditions
would appeal to the notion
of spatiotemporal
continuity, and finally that
things could not be
spatiotemporal ly continuous from moment to moment
unless more than half of
what composes
each of them, at those moments,
is shared.
This last claim is entailed
y the fifty percent plus rule. Let
us call this principle (FPP).
I

Then, as noted before, sufficient
conditions for diversity between
Physical persons may be stated as
follows:
X and

y, if x exists at t and y exists at

t, then if X at t and
y at t'
xj<y

(STC).

for any physical persons

t\

and t' occurs just after

are not spatiotemporal
ly continuous, then

The objection at hand is not,
however, directed against

this particular principle.

It concerns rather the broader claim
that

identity conditions for things such as
amoebas and snakes as well as
physical persons— identity conditions which

I

here presume to involve

spatiotemporal continuity— must obey the (FPP).
It will
a

be helpful to consider two distinct case here.

case in which something of sort

to produce diverse F's.

F

Consider

is divided or spontaneously divides

Each of the two F's contains half of the stuff

which constitutes the original.

Instances of this type of case would

be an amoeba s splitting and perhaps a philodendron's
being pruned.

The original F, if the analogue in this context of (A1

cannot be each of the resulting F's.

)

is to apply,

But on what basis can it be
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denied that the oriqinal
9

F

i<;
S

osrh
eaCh of the resulting
F's?

without vioanalogue in this particular
u dr context
it appears
it
»
that the
only applicable consideration
is that spatiotemporal
continuity, defined by (FPP), does not
link the original
F's with the two later
F's.
It is not the case
that the original F
js each of the resulting
F's,
just because neither of
the latter have in
common mure than half of
the
stuff which constituted
the former.
Thus, (FPP) has a certain
plauslating (A3)

1

s

ibil ity.

Consider

a

second, more difficult,
case.

An

F

is divided or

spontaneously divides to produce
apparently distinct entities,
each of
which contains just half of
that stuff which constituted
the original
F.

Only one of these resulting
creatures is an F; the other is

blob of matter.

An example of

tree's being trimmed.
original F survives.

a

mere

a

case of this sort would involve

a

One is, of course, inclined to
say that the
But given (FPP), the original

F

did not survive.

Isn't something, therefore, wrong
with the claim that identity con-

ditions for things such as trees must
obey (FPP)?
Two points, in defense of (FPP), may be
noted.
is

First, while one

inclined to say that the original F-tree,
amoeba, or physical per-

son-survived, the inclination does not compare,

I

think, to that which

leads one to affirm that the original
person, in some sense of the

world "person," survives.

One is more willing, with respect to such

objects, to give to otherwise acceptable views

a

certain legislative

authority.
Second, if (FPP) continues to seem wildly implausible, when,
say, applied to such things as amoebas and physical persons, then

a
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certain revision could be
made in theories
providing conditions for
such Objects' survival.
Thus, for instance,
one might suggest
that
three concepts can be
identified with the word
"person." The notions
Of a physical person
and a psychological
person have already
been introduced; given this third
concept, a person
survives providing he has
the same character
(say) as some future
person and is (weakly)
spatio-

tem£oral_l^ contijiuous

«FPP

is dropped)

ing this third concept
helps
tips,
f

I
i

with that future person.

Posit-

think
tn
trunk,
to defuse objections
to the

claim that (FPP) applies to
physical persons.
Generalizing, then, one may hold
that various so-called
"sortals"
are ambiguous. There may
be, for instance,
physical trees and
func-

tional trees, physical

ships and functional ships.

Third Objection
Where, intuitively, there is
just one entity, on the view in

question there are two~a psychological
person and

a

physical person.

Consider an ordinary case, the case
of, say, Ronald Reagan.

On the

view sketched above, the name
"Ronald Reagan" actually ambiguously
refers to two persons of distinct
sorts.

person and one psychological person.

It

refers to one physical

Two related questions arise.

First, it seems that one will care more
about the persistence of psy-

chological persons than about the persistence
of physical persons (or

v^

versa).

the other,

Won't this sentiment indicate that one person,
but not

is the

"real" Reagan?

Second, to whom does Reagan refer

when he, in ordinary contexts, uses the word "I" (when
he says, for
instance,

_

"I

•

want to ride my horse now")?
A first, perhaps obvious, point to be made here is that
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on the view in question
it is not the case
that distinct £ersons
exist
in the same place at
the same time. For however
the word

“person" is

disambiguated, the result is that
no more than one
person exists
one place at any one time.

in any

Consider, second, the question
of whether the
psychological person, but not the physical
person, or the
physical person, but not the

psychological person, is the
real Ronald Reagan.

It seems clear

that, possibly, each who is
named "Ronald Reagan" may care
more about,
say, the persistence of the
physical person than about the
persistence
of the psychological person even
though the physical person is
not the
"real" Reagan.

Williams would, apparently, disagree.

He attempted to argue in

favor of spatiotemporal continuity
criteria of person identity by posing a fission

case-one something like the case

of Smith. 10

ing creature is to be tortured, and
the other, rewarded.
his reader to imagine that he is the
original person.

One result

Williams asks

The reader is

asked, then, to say which of the two creatures.
Smith* or Smith**, he
is more

concerned about.

Is the prospect of Smith* being tortured

more terrifying, or the prospect of Smith** being tortured?

The idea

behind Williams' Gedankenexperiment is just that whomever
one cares

more about is (one might say) an acid-test for who one is.
The case is indeed

a

puzzling one.

One complicating factor is

that not infrequently happens that one person is more distressed at
the prospect of someone else's being harmed than at the prospect of
he himself being harmed.

Thus, the "care" criterion, which Williams

seems to be urging, is problematic.
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But this complicating
factor could be avoided.

Wi,l iams cou1d
have asked the reader
insteead to say whether he
will be tortured if
Smith* is tortured, or he
will be tortured, if
Smith** is tortured. Of
course this revised test does
not represent any
revolutionary way of

stimulating intuitions concerning
personal identity.
this point here.

But

I

will ignore

Williams would apparently
suggest that the dilemma he

poses is helpful in determining
who the “real” Smith is.

And Williams,

presumably, would be inclined
toward the view that if one
is the original Smith, one will be
tortured if Smith* is tortured,
but not, if

Smith** is tortured.

11
I,

however, do not share Williams'
intuition.

It remains quite unclear to
me that

may somehow manage to escape
tor-

1

ture altogether, if Smith* is
tortured but Smith** is not, or
if

Smith** is tortured, and Smith* is
not.
Consider, finally, the question of the
reference of "I."

when

Reagan uses the word "I," to what does
he in fact refer?

Won't the

pronoun, on the view in question, be ambiguous;
and isn't

is

surely not

ambiguous?
will, on the above view, have to be regarded,
with certain

I

other pronouns, as ambiguous.

dicates

a

But it does not seem that this fact in-

difficulty with the view.

In

fact, if there really are

physical persons and psychological persons occupying, for
long periods
of time, precisely the same spatial

ambiguity is not

a

location, then it seems that this

difficulty but rather

a

convenience.

Most personal

properties one has interest in are properties possessed for limited
periods of time; these properties may be said to belong to the aggregates in virtue of their belonging to

a

given person-stage or subaggre-
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gate of person-stages.

Since ph y s,cai persons
anO psycho, ogica,
persons share many, perhaps
most, of their stages,
physica, persons and
psychological persons have many
of the commonly-noted
properties in
common (being warm, being
hungry, hoping for rain).
But there may be
cases in which the physical
person is singled out.
If one were to say
"The fact that I was in
a coma for years
hurt my career," one would
be
referring just to a certain
physical person,
if, prior t0 fission>
smith says "In a moment I will
have a new body." he may
be referring
just to a certain psychological
person.
In contrast to Lewis’
view,
there is on the view in question
dexical
a

s

a

means by which proper names
and in-

can be disambiguated even before
one knows that there is to be

fission in one's future.

This advantage is due to the
fact that on

the view in question, the claim
is made that associated with
the word

"person" are distinct concepts.

Fourth Objection
On the view in question, it happens
that distinct objects occupy

exactly the same spatial location at
plausible.

a

given time.

Surely, this is im-

An even greater difficulty with the view
at hand is that,

on this view, possibly, distinct objects
occupy exactly the same spatial

location at every time either one exists .

for there to be

a

physical person

x and a

That is, it is possible

psychological person y such

that every person-stage belonging to x belongs to
y and every person-

stage belonging to y belongs to x.

But surely such

a

situation logi-

cal ly cannot ari se.

Re£lx*

It is worth noting, first, that cases in which physical

objects overlap in space are ubiquitous.

For instance, any intact
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Chair overlaps spatially
with the part of that
chai

which forms its

r

back.

The following is

a

more controversial
description of

perfectly ordinary case.

a

Fully overlapping are

particular artifact.

Cay

a

Cay

is

is a
a

second

particular mass of matter and

The mass of clay may, then,
persist longer than

the bowl does (if, say, the
bow,

than the mass of

second,

The clay which makes up
the clay bow,

physical object; and the clay
bowl made up by the same
physical object.

a

(if,

is shattered), or the
bowl,

for instance, a bit of

Cay

longer

is cut away and

replaced by some other bit of clay).

Clearly,

a

possible situation may be described

and the clay overlap perfectly
in space and time.

in which the bowl

The situation is not

obviously logically impossible; indeed,
given the claim that the clay
is not the bowl,

it must be accepted as at least
possible.

It would,

of course, be capricious to accept
the possibility of perfect coinci-

dence between the bowl and the clay, while
rejecting without further

argument that between

a

physical person and a psychological person.

One might claim that involved in the

cl

ay-and-bowl case is really

just one physical object--the clay--and that that
physical object was
shaped one way for a period of time, then another way.

Given, however,

the restriction that only one physical object is involved
in the case,
it becomes

case.

a

coherent description of the

The following, for instance, will not do.
1.

If

rather difficult to provide

There is a bowl x such that the clay is
identical to x for a period of time and
then ceases to be identical to x.

ever the bowl and the clay are identical, they then have all the
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properties they have at any
later time

in

common; thus, if at the

earner time the clay has the
property of being identical

to the clay
at the later time, the bowl,
as well, has the property
of being identical

to the clay at the later
time.

Here is
2.

a

Thus, (1) will not do

second attempt.

The clay has the property of
being "bowlish"
tor awhile, and then ceases
to have that
property.

Thus, just as a table can be red
for awhile, then cease to be
red,
bit of clay can be bowlish for
awhile (shaped in

a

a

certain way), then

a

table's being red

cease to be bowlish.

The analogy is weak,

I

think.

The case of

for awhile, and then ceasing to be red,
is quite unlike the situation
at hand.

In

contrast to the case of the bowl, one has
no inclination

to say concerning the table that

a^

nsd exists for awhile, and then

ceases to exist.

Consider, finally,
3.

(3).

The clay is identical to the bowl; that object
has for a period of time the property of being
bowlish, and then ceases to have that property.

The problem with this description is perhaps obvious.
bowl

(=the clay) has been smashed into

clay persists, so does the bowl.

a

Even after the

thousand pieces, since the

But this is wrong.

Thus, it seems most plausible to say that the bowl and bit of
clay really are distinct objects which, for

overlap.

a

period of time, fully

The case could be assimilated even further to the description

offered above concerning the relation between physical and psychological

persons:

the clay and the bowl, one may say, have some, but
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(perhaps) not all, of their
stages in common.

Thus,
cal

I

do not think that the
view that physical and
psychologi-

persons overlap-even
imperfectly-is implausible.

no more implausible than

a

Indeed, it is

perfectly coherent view
concerning the

relation between artifacts
and the stuff of which
they are made.
Fifth Objection
It was

suggested earlier that

a

primary motivation for the
view

question was that it seemed to
conform to the strong intuition
that,
in fission, one person becomes
in some sense two.
Lewis' view LPS was
rejected in part because it did not
in

have this result.

question is similarly problematic.
case.

But the view in

For consider the original

fission

On the view in question, both
before and after fission there is

just one psychological

person.

Thus, the counting results are, on
this

view, after all unsatisfactory.

Re£l£is that on

person

One advantage of the view in question
over certain others

it there is a certain

intuitively reasonable use of the word

such that it is true to say, "Before
fission there is just one

person, and afterwards there are two."

I

think that the counting dif-

ficulties, given the possibility of fission, cannot
be minimized any
further by any other view which both conforms to
intuitions (Al),

(A2),

and (A3) and avoids contradiction.

However,

a

related difficulty should be noted at this point.

On

the view in question, the psychological person a, a*, survives

fission and is both b* and c*.

Thus, a* could be depicted as

shaped array of person-stages.

Consider then the following sequence of

events.

Suppose that the original fission case occurs.

a

Y-

Suppose then
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then that several years
later b and
here) find themselves in
battle,

cians, to "save" him,
operate.

c

r

(the names are used
ambiguously

survivpc
ives, kbut*

k
b

is wounded;

physi-

The result
u't is that th
k
the physical
person

b'

survives; but after surgery b
does not recall having
done any of the
things any earlier person
in fact did.
On the view in question
an of
the psychological and
physical persons involved
in the case prior to
the battle survive:
the Ecological person
a* survives, and so do
,
the £ hJ! sical_ persons b' and
c'.
But to someone who has very
strong
Locken intuitions, it may seem
that some person has ceased
to exist.
It may seem that a given
person x, who exists at t,
ceases to exist if
no person who exists at a later
time
has memories of x's own

f

experiences, or bears the ancestral
of the memory relation to

x at t.

A slight modification of the
view in question accommodates this
intui-

tion.
cal

Consider the following revised definition
of “first psychologi-

person-stage."
Dll.

s

is a

s

is

(1.

(Other definitions need not be modified.)

first psychological person-stage •*->
psychological person-stage &
~(3s')(s' is earlier than s &
M*s ,s) v
(3s')((s' is earlier than s &
M*s',s) &
(3s")(s" is contemporaneous with s &
s^s" &
M*s ,s" ) ) &
~{3s*)(s* is earlier than s &
ps')((s' is earlier than s* &
Ms', s*) &
M
(3s")(s
is contemporaneous with s* &
s*^s" &
M*s ,s" ) ) )
a

'

2.

1

'

On this definition,
is an
in

a

a

psychological person-stage is first if either it

earliest in sequence of M*-related stages, or

it

is an earliest,

sequence, which bears M* to just those stages to which some
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contemporaneous person-stage
bears M*.
The intuition
behind
this

Of an additional
^k^sica,

£§1Ch0l091Cal PerSOn -

modifier
lotion

is that the
introduction

person in effect brings
into existence

a

new

Each dlsti "0t human
body after al, has
the

capacity to record its
own experiences but
no one else's. Thus,
the
presence of a new human
body
indicates
y
1cai:es a rniior-t-collection of* human experi..... ... .....

m

..

..... ...... c. whic. thes
, ecperienc.s belwlg wil]

^

,y

yo

future stages.)

Thus, consider again the
sequence of events described
above.
After fission occurs but
before the battle takes
place, there exist, as
before, two physical
persons but three psychological
persons, a*
survives as a*, the Y-shaped
aggregate.

But fission brings into exis-

tence two new psychological
persons, each of whom overlaps a*
and each
of whom, one may hope, will
survive the upcoming battle.
In the

situation described above, however,
only one of the two newly-

introduced psychological persons
survives the battle.

So Lockean

intuitions are satisfied.
Let us, then, turn our attention to
this revised theory of persons.
It
a

will

I

is the

refer to it henceforth as "TF," for
"Theory of Fission."

view that "person" is ambiguous between
two concepts, that of

physical pe rson

that of
(D8)

,

d

,

individuated in accorcance with (STC) and (FPP), and

psychological person.

(DIO),

(I), and

This latter notion is explicated by

(Dll).

Sixth Objection

David Wiggins finds all views according to which persons
are
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aggregates implausible.
mUCh t0 °

u " like

The problem
proDiem ic
is that aggregates
are

People."12

An aggregate or
fus on>

^

.

"...
'„'_'_

wrUeSj

_

has its relevant properties
derivately [sic] from the
propert1es of
its constituent moments.
But at least half the
things we want to say

about persons cannot be even
tortuously explained in terms
of the
states at an instance of
person-moments." 13 Consider for
instance,
the followinga Hproperties*
uperties.

erratic ,

is

.

.

.

st rong

i

clever

,

.

.

.

.

brave

.

.

.

.

honest ." 14

Mixit

"

for an

Wiggins seems to argue as follows.
a ggregate

being erratic.

One cannot say what

of Stases to have, for
instance, the property of

But one can say what it is for

property of being erratic.

a

£erson to have the

Thus, persons cannot be merely
aggregates

of stages.

This objection seems mistaken.

For if indeed one can say what it

is for a person to be erratic, one
can say what it is for an aggregate

of stages to be erratic.
in a five-minute period,

Suppose that
x

a

believes that

person x is erratic, if, withP

(for some proposition P),

then believes that it is not the case that
P, and finally believes that
P.

Given this account of what it is for

a

person to be erratic, one

can now say what it is for an aggregate of
person-stages to be erratic.
An aggregate of stages is erratic if, within a
five-minute period,

three stages belonging to that aggregate contain, respectively, the
beliefs that P, that it is not the case that

P,

and that P.

would reject the above reply on the grounds that,

_i_f

15

Wiggins

persons really are

just aggregates of person-stages, then one cannot know what it is for
person to be erratic (say), unless one already knows what the term
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"erratic" means "in terms of"
person-stages.

Thus, he writes:

We might, I suppose, explain
what one or two of these
[terms such as "erratic" and
"resolute"] meant in terms
n m0mentS lf " e a,redd
* Possessed their signi-

ficaHon f
reverse^rocedure?^

"

^

“

S8 “*

But surely he is wrong on
this point.

e1

-b

'

e

iAhe

One knows what it is for a

Eerson to be erratic if one knows
that

it

is for a thing to be erratic.

The project at hand may fairly,
and vaguely, be described as
an attempt
to "explain," in part, the
concept of person in terms of
aggregates of

person-stages; but this does not involve
an attempt to “explain"

properties of persistent individuals

in

terms of properties of temporal

parts of those individuals, or to
"reduce" the former to the latter.
Further Difficulties

In

the preceding section,

objections to the view TF.

considered and rejected several

I

In this section,

I

will mention two

remaining difficulties.
One crucial

issue difficult to settle one way or the other con-

cerns the notion of

a

psychological person.

The Y-shaped aggregate of

stages involved in the fission case was said to be

person.

psychological

The problem concerns the plausibility of the claim that such

an object falls under any concept the word

tempted to say flatly "no."

a

"person" expresses.

On the other hand,

to what Berkeley suggests, having

accepting

a

a

it seems that, contrary

particular concept is

particular set of principles.

One is

a

matter of

While typically one

recognizes and evaluates some of the implications of

a

given set of

principles (one wants to verify, for instance, that the implications
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conform to (Al) through (A3)),
one typically does
not recognize
111 of
the implications of anj,
set of principles one
holds- and,
thus, it

would not be surprising
were it to turn out
that some peculiar sort
of
thing fell under a given
concept,
For this reason,
I

fact that on TF the Y-shaped
array counts as

does not indicate

a

fatal

A second potential

and in another context.

a

think that the

psychological person

flaw with the view.

difficulty is one which was
mentioned earlier
It concerns the M* relation.
The difficulty is

that this relation has not
yet been satisfactorily specified.
of

a

psychological person was specified
by appeal to the M*

relation; thus, the crucial notion
of

obscure.

The

a

psychological person remains

And the ultimately worth of the
view in question depends, in

part, on the coherency of this
notion.

Finally,

itage, that is,

have said little here about the
notion of

I

a

temporal person part .

person -

a

For this reason, the

definitions given in this chapter are incomplete.

Concl usions

The difficulties raised above against the view
TF do not present
reason enough to reject the view.

They, rather, indicate the need for

further work in specific areas.
TF is vulnerable to its own unique set of objections.

well ultimately come to seem unacceptable.

It may

Nonetheless, the fact that

such a view can be constructed, one which is not obviously incoherent
or entirely implausible, suffices to show that one is not, after all,

forced by logic to reject any of the basic intuitions, (Al) through
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(A3),

listed above, or the coherency
of the concept or
concepts
associated with the word ••person."
stronger support than this
may be
given here in favor of TF
TaHnr.g person
as unambiguous, given
(Al)
through (A3) and the possibility
of fission, leads one
irredeemably
into contradict, on.14 And
rejecting as incoherent the
notion the word
"person" unambiguously
expresses-if such exists-leads
one to
absurdity of a different sort;
for obviously it is sensible
to say, of
certain objects, that they are
persons. The view sketched
above-or
..

one very much like

natives.

It— Is

clearly preferable to either
of these alter-
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